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This thesis offers a periodization of the present according to which contemporary art 
and visual culture are understood to be symptomatic of an increasingly pervasive 
pessimistic social, political and ecological outlook. This pessimism I will claim is 
what is authentically new about our contemporary cultural forms, which are directed 
towards a particular form of humour and stupidity. Core elements in the 
periodization include the limitation of imaginative horizons expressed in the well-
known remark of Fredric Jameson’s that it is easier to imagine the end of the world 
than the end of capitalism, as well as the pervasive sense that nature is in a state of 
perpetual and endemic crisis and the idea that modern computing technology is 
making us stupider than we have ever been before. I argue that these issues are 
symptomatic of what Gilles Deleuze, in 1990, termed the societies of Control – a 
world of corporate power, ubiquitous computing, data extraction and financial 
capitalism that has intensified since its early diagnosis.    
 However, dominant narratives of art and visual culture continue to theorize 
artistic production according to traditionally avant-garde categories of resistance, 
criticality, transgression and subversion. This presumes art to have an agency that is 
difficult to imagine in the current social situation. In this respect, the thesis in part 
constitutes a critical reflection on the pressures placed upon our existing models of 
art and visual culture - for example, and centrally, the idea of an ‘avant-garde’ - by 
current social and technological conditions. Building on these observations, the 
thesis proposes a new model of contemporary art and visual culture that has no 
agency: images under control that are formed, as epiphenomena, by technological 
apparatuses of Control; studying examples such as extreme sports stunts, internet 
memes, online trolls, bad quality jpegs and impassive ‘artworks’. The purpose is to 
ask what value we can place on these emergent cultural forms, which seem to mirror, 
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This thesis engages with the idea of a society of Control, following Gilles Deleuze 
who developed his argument in a short essay entitled ‘Postscript on the Societies of 
Control’ (1990), a few years before he committed suicide in 1995. The description he 
proposed is of a society supported by ‘a Control mechanism, giving the position of 
any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a 
reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar)’.1 Deleuze’s 
proposition of a general ‘Control mechanism’ seems eerily to anticipate the many 
and varied devices of electronic surveillance that organise us today, from mobile 
phones to online data profiles and electronic passports. Likewise, his suggestion that 
social order is maintained upon the premise that we are never not under or within 
some sort of Control and that we always have the sense we are being watched or are 
giving our position away to some unseen authority, seems aptly to describe the 
mechanisms of social regulation with which we are now so familiar as to, most of the 
time, more or less forget about them. Deleuze writes of Control as corresponding to a 
world of computers, corporations, ‘idiotic’ competitiveness, finance capital, 
marketing, debt; a world where everything ‘enter[s] into the open circuits of the 
bank’.2 Indeed this is the world as we now know it.     
 ‘Images under Control’ sets out to examine the visual culture of this society: the 
images or sets of images that can be seen to materialize, or make real, the conception 
of the world or particular worldview that is advanced by Control. More crucially, the 
thesis argues that we can use these images to think with. By this, I mean that images 
will be used here to extend, test, trouble or call into question what we think we might 
know about our societal situation and Deleuze’s account of it. In this respect, images 
are understood as mediations between the world and human beings. They are a 
necessary component of our everyday experience because, as the media philosopher 
Vilém Flusser makes clear, ‘[h]uman beings ‘ex-ist’, i.e. the world is not 
immediately accessible to them and therefore images are needed to make it 
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comprehensible’.3 Thus we might say that it is through images that we know the 
world and orient ourselves within its mesh. At the same time, Flusser warns that such 
images ‘are supposed to be maps but they turn into screens: Instead of representing 
the world, they obscure it until human beings’ lives finally become a function of the 
images they create’.4 Building on Flusser’s definition, the thesis presents a series of 
images that delineate specific categories of experience which functionalize our 
behaviour in unexpected ways, and signal the manner in which our lives are 
administered in a Control society. In this sense, I neither idealize the efficacy of 
images, as if they could ‘escape’ Control, nor am I totally cynical about them, as if 
the operations of Control entirely explained their functioning, but in all cases, I argue 
for the primacy of the image in our day-to-day experience. It is what enables our 
understanding of Control’s putative ‘reality’ because it, to follow Jean Baudrillard, 
has ‘contaminate[d] reality and [begun] to model it’.5 Moreover, I want to claim that 
the operations of images exceed our rational understanding, meaning that we can 
unpick them, finding buried thoughts or ideas, in a way that challenges our 
preconceptions. Thus this project seeks to develop a new model for the interpretation 
of contemporary visual culture: one that is at odds with existing accounts, which too 
often - at least to my mind - seek to maintain an avant-gardist logic grounded in 
theories of capitalist society that were conceptualised before the social, cultural and 
technological innovations that define our current social situation. Indeed, it is on this 
point that the central questions of the thesis emerge: what are the pressures placed 
upon our existing models of art and visual culture - for example, and centrally, the 
idea of an ‘avant-garde’ - by current social and technological conditions? How are 
these pressures registered and also negotiated in images? What new forms have been 
found by artists that bring these questions to light in an aesthetic register, one no 
longer premised on the staid bifurcation between, on the one hand, art as a kind of 
idealistic social praxis and on the other hand, merely a version of modernism as 
usual? I will argue that the examples of visual culture presented here, in an account 
which cannot be exhaustive, but aims to be insightful, may upon close analysis, be 
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4 Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, 10. 






found to respond to the challenges presented by Control society; at the same time, 
forcing us to develop new theories and conceptualisations in order to account for 
their sometimes surprising effects and operations.     
 For Deleuze, Control represented an epochal break from the older ‘disciplinary’ 
societies, which Michel Foucault, in his book Discipline and Punish (1975/1977), 
located in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and which reached their fullest 
realisation in the twentieth century. Discipline was connected to the process by 
which the bourgeoisie became the politically dominant class in the eighteenth 
century. Their establishment of a ‘formally egalitarian juridical framework’ was 
supported by ‘discipline’, which Foucault writes of ‘as all those systems of micro-
power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical…They seem to 
constitute the same type of law on a different scale, thereby making it more 
meticulous and more indulgent’.6 Disciplinary society organized life into a series of 
enclosed spaces, within which the individual was implicated in specific systems of 
‘micro-power’. Social experience was concentrated, arranged and rigidified as a 
procession of what Deleuze terms molds. He writes that:  
The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, 
each having its own laws: first, the family; then the school (“you are no longer in 
your family”); then the barracks (“you are no longer at school”); then the factory; 
from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the 
enclosed environment.7 
The spaces of Control, by contrast, are not organized as molds but as modulations: 
like a ‘self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the 
other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point’.8 This is to say 
that the old separated spheres of life have collapsed and what was ‘discipline’ (i.e. 
specific sets of rules for specific spaces) has become ‘free-floating’ and gaseous so 
that we are always being acted upon by some sort of indeterminate ‘micro-power’. 
Deleuze provides the contrast between the factory and the corporation as an example 
of this shift - the corporation being emblematic of Control’s modulatory power. For 
instance, the corporation, which has symbolically replaced the factory in the Control 
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societies, imposes a ‘modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability’, 
meaning that wages are no longer fixed but always have the potential to modulate up 
and down, pinning the worker to a state of continuous uncertainty.9  This is certainly 
the case with an increasingly precarious workforce who may be self-employed, on a 
temporary contract or earning sales/bonus related pay. Accordingly the corporation 
supplements work with a spirit of competition, pitting workers against one another 
through challenges, contests and ‘highly comic group sessions’.10 The worker must 
commit to these activities wholeheartedly in order to care for their now anxiety-
inducing ‘metastable’ salary, which is liable to fluctuate according to any number of 
variables. ‘If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful’, Deleuze 
intones, ‘it’s because they express the corporate situation with great precision’.11 
This constant sense of anxiety, competition and uncertainty is crucial to the 
disciplining of society after discipline because it pressures individuals to discipline 
themselves. The Intel CEO Andy Grove all but confirms this in his 1996 book on 
management theory Only The Paranoid Survive, in which he writes that the ‘most 
important role of managers is to create an environment in which people are 
passionately dedicated to winning in the marketplace. Fear plays a major role in 
creating and maintaining such a passion. Fear of competition, fear of bankruptcy, 
fear of being wrong, and fear of losing can all be powerful motivators’.12 Moreover, 
Grove lends further credibility to Deleuze’s analysis in his likening of the 
corporation to a ‘living organism’.13 In language that evokes Deleuze’s claim that 
Control’s spirit animal is the snake (‘discipline,’ he suggests, corresponds to the 
‘mole’), Grove asserts a serpentine character to the corporation, which ‘has to 
continue to shed its skin’ and remain in a state of constant ‘transformation’.14 This is 
moreover reflected in the normalization of flexible and precarious work, which also 
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requires us to remain in a state of continuous transformation. In the new corporate 
work environment, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello write, the exemplary individual 
(they use the phrase the ‘great man’) is one who ‘proves adaptable and flexible, able 
to switch from one situation to a very different one, and adjust to it; and versatile, 
capable of changing activity or tools, depending on the nature of the relationship 
entered, into with others or with objects. It is precisely this adaptability and 
versatility that make him [or her] employable’.15 One of the distinctive and eye-
catching features of Deleuze’s theorisation of this situation, helping to make it more 
imaginative and revealing than a straightforward sociological analysis, is his claim 
that each society is ‘easily matched’ with a type of machine.16 This means not that 
the machine determines social forms, but rather that the machine expresses the social 
forms capable of generating them and using them. This can be interpreted as 
suggesting that machines and their attendant cultural forms can be unravelled in a 
way that brings to light some implicit trends and tendencies that are entrenched in 
current society. We can confidently assert that the non-enclosed and free-floating 
power of Control is best symbolised by the computer - a machine that sits in the 
office, in the home, in the pocket and on the body and through which we can 
continuously monitor the world and be continuously monitored ourselves. Computer-
based technologies are therefore fundamental to the images explored in this thesis, all 
of which are directly mediated in some way by this machine. These images, 
however, are not understood as fully determined by the machine: rather they function 
as epiphenomena, running alongside its protocols, sometimes overlapping and 
adjoining and sometimes unadjoining and confusing or contradicting them. In this 
sense, the thesis comprises what may seem outwardly a haphazard study of various 
images that are emergent to the social and technological order of Control. 
Nevertheless, this heterogeneity allows for an extensive look at and consideration of 
various vital features of our society’s visual culture, such as for instance, different 
modes of image production technologies, different modes of images’ circulation and 
distribution, and varying uses, receptions and forms of critical evaluation of images. 
Thus user-generated online imagery produced for social media, ‘iconic’ images from 
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popular culture, ‘elite’ artworks, and cutting-edge videos existing both within art 
galleries and on YouTube all have a place in my analysis.    
 The thesis is structured in four chapters, each of which tackles particular aspects 
of contemporary visual culture or contemporary art production on the principle that 
both ‘high’ art and popular culture function as equally revealing manifestations of 
wider societal trends. It follows that art and popular visual culture are treated here as 
equivalent categories, their only differences being understood as institutional 
(conditions of production, reception, sale, display etc.). In this respect, this is an anti-
exceptionalist treatment of art that does not recognize any supposed unique agency 
of the artwork or artist: for the simple reason that, I maintain, such agency cannot 
exist for any individual or cultural form in our current society. Indeed, an initial 
motivation of the thesis was to challenge and attempt to dismantle this presumption, 
which continues to underwrite much contemporary critical writing on art, thereby 
perpetuating a false impression of our social situation.   
 Each chapter serves a specific strategic purpose in the thesis, revealing and 
exploring key aspects of Control’s problematizing of our existing models of art and 
visual culture. For instance, the concept of ‘nature’, the revolutionary figure of the 
‘collective’ and the idea of the ‘avant-garde’ are recurring themes. This is because 
these subjects, inherited largely from modernism, continue to have a certain currency 
within artistic discourse that, to my mind, requires reconsideration in light of 
contemporary conditions. The first chapter looks at ‘real’ or literal pictures of the 
Earth: iconic images that organize our perception of the world by pulling it together 
as a singular visual object, and that, I argue, indicate our changing relationship to 
‘nature’ in an environment thoroughly augmented by advanced technological 
apparatuses. Using Martin Heidegger’s 1938 essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’ as 
an interpretative framework, I suggest that NASA’s iconic photographs of the Earth 
from outer space, from 1966-1972, represent a realization of Heidegger’s concept of 
the ‘world picture’. The chapter then considers what might best literalize our current 
‘world picture’. Overall, I propose a shift from a euphoric worldview in the ’60s and 
’70s, symbolised by NASA’s Earthrise and Blue Marble photographs, to a dysphoric 





project.17 This dysphoria is indicative, I suggest, of a new perception of our planet, 
mediated in part by a new relationship to nature. In the ’60s and ’70s the Earth was 
widely viewed as a fragile and beautiful object, a bounty of resources that united 
humanity via a shared duty of care. Now, by contrast, the planet is viewed as a 
threatening or potentially hostile object whose interests are at odds to our own. A 
current prediction states that by December 2016 ‘the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere will be high enough to trigger a new phase of global climate 
change from which the chances of recovery are slim’.18 This, we are told, is a point 
of no return: ‘beyond our climate’s tipping point’.19 On this account, the Earth is no 
longer bountiful: it’s a ticking time-bomb.       
 Indeed we have already surpassed many climate tipping points: May 2015 was 
the deadline for a 2007 UN tipping point and the year 2000 was the tipping point for 
a 1989 prediction.20 Furthermore in 2009 the NASA scientist Dr. James Hansen 
informed the then-President elect Barack Obama that he had four years to save the 
world from global warming: another expired deadline.21 Climate change was first 
recognized as a serious problem in 1979 at the UN’s First World Climate 
Conference, which issued a statement calling for governments ‘to foresee and 
prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-
being of humanity’.22 Needless to say, our perception of the planet has shifted 
dramatically from 1979 onwards, into what is now full-on and perpetual planetary 
dysphoria: a generally depressive, cynical and perhaps suicidal outlook that sees us 
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18 Roz Pidcock, ‘Can we estimate the tipping point into irreversible climate change? We assess the 
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21 See Robin McKie, ‘President “has four years to save Earth”’, The Guardian (January 2009), 
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22 See ‘Framework Convention on Climate Change’, United Nations, 
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counting down the days until inexorable catastrophe, thereby severing the euphoric 
sense of community that was fostered by the photographs of the whole Earth in the 
’60s and early ’70s. The implications of the philosophical shifts explained in this first 
chapter return throughout the rest of the thesis, which further explore the question of 
our altered relationship to ‘nature’, under different aspects. For example, the theme 
re-emerges in Chapter Three, which in part interrogates the aesthetic feeling of the 
‘sublime’ in contemporary visual culture. Traditionally the sublime was related to 
awe-inspiring spectacles of ‘crude nature’.23 Now, by contrast, I consider the 
capacity of technological spectacles, specifically as represented in digital 
photography (what Julian Stallabrass has usefully termed the ‘data sublime’), to 
evoke a similar affective response in the viewer: asking how we might understand 
this collapse or dedifferentiation of the aesthetic sublime within a technological 
system.24         
 The theme of the ‘collective’ is also evoked in Chapter One, via a consideration 
of the way in which the various literal ‘world pictures’ under discussion produce 
unifying visions of the planet and of humanity in general. I argue, however, that as 
they emerge in the present, rather than offering the means to imagine and mobilise 
any politically empowering model of a ‘collective’, these unifying visions tend to be 
thoroughly dysphoric, depressing and disappointing. These changing models of the 
‘collective’ are important objects of study for my thesis because historically hopes 
for the political or critical agency of art have been constituted upon a unified 
conceptualisation of the masses who share a common social identity. Such hopes are 
indebted to the Marxist ideal that the proletarian masses could be collectivised, 
becoming self-conscious agents of historical and revolutionary change: thus making 
it the task of critical practice to facilitate this ‘true’ enlightenment. Such positive 
theorisations of the collective continue to mark our understanding of contemporary 
art, particularly regarding socially engaged praxis. However, one of the questions 
asked by my thesis is what sort of ‘collective’ can we imagine today? And 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement [1790], tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis; Cambridge: 
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in Contemporary Art Photography’, October, no. 122 (Fall 2007), 82.  It is also mentioned in his 
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furthermore, is the traditional Marxist category of the ‘collective’ relevant to the new 
masses? Perhaps instead the truth of the ‘collective’ today affirms Baudrillard’s 
belief that the mass, as an object, has a ‘fatalness’ that will always frustrate the logic 
of the system that addresses it as such. This is a mass, Baudrillard writes, ‘whose 
strength comes from its very destructuration and inertia’, rather than, for instance, its 
collective identity.25 Nevertheless, this is not an entirely cynical position: the mass 
does not at all ‘constitute a passive receiving structure for media messages’.26 For 
instance, it often displays what Baudrillard calls an ‘excess of conformity’ to cultural 
norms, ‘giving the same coded responses, with the same exasperating, endless 
conformity, only to better escape’, he writes, ‘any definition as object’.27 Patricia 
Cormack helpfully glosses Baudrillard’s concept when she explains that:  
	  
As a mass, we do not deflect back the messages projected on to us, nor do we 
take up the projects of History (progress, enlightenment) or the Social (rationally 
organised lives) handed to us, but instead enthusiastically take on the formless 
object position claimed for us. This passivity allows for the absorption of 
messages and suspension of meaning. When asked to exercise a serious and 
considered political will, we offer instead an endless delight in popular 
spectacles. When asked to express consumer preferences, we vacillate 
capriciously. When asked to be objects of social policy, we refuse to provide or 
comprehend practical information.28 
It is the awkward aspect, or destructive potential of the passivity of the mass, as 
Baudrillard defined it, that I suggest points the way forward to understanding key 
features of our visual culture today.       
 Chapter Two further explores the question of the ‘collective’, as it examines the 
way in which the internet functions as an apparatus of Control that produces its own 
‘public’ (here following and modifying Louis Althusser’s influential account of 
‘Ideological State Apparatuses’).29 I argue that the internet, understood as what I 
term a ‘post-State apparatus’, organizes subject formation today, to the extent that 
our values, desires and preferences are inculcated according to its precepts, 
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predominately in the interest of rendering us productive in a new economy based 
upon data accumulation. The nature of the ‘public’ thus constituted is identifiable, I 
argue, in the online culture of internet memes that circulate on social media networks 
and within the abusive and anonymous forums of 4chan. Both these aspects of online 
culture have been subject to certain positive critical claims within academia, and yet, 
I argue, such claims rely on the aforementioned outdated model of the ‘collective’. In 
my reading, by contrast, the ‘public’ we can discern in these forms of online culture 
is not one that we can presume to have any agency or self-determined intention. 
Instead, these new online ‘collectives’ signal a passivity, stupidity, indifference and 
involuntary aggression that grate against such positive claims. Nevertheless, I ask, 
are there any terms in which these traits can possibly be valued?   
 This questioning of the ‘collective’ also extends into Chapters Three and Four. 
Both chapters focus my exploration more specifically, however, via issues related to 
the idea of the artistic avant-garde. It can be argued that this traditionally subversive 
and transgressive conception of artistic production was premised upon the idea of 
producing oppositional ‘publics’, who would be shocked by the artwork into a 
position where they might question the social and political status quo. Thus these 
chapters focus on works of contemporary art that, in part, signal an outmoding of the 
avant-garde in the current period. In this sense, the periodization I am offering is also 
art-historical in that it signals a stage after both the historic avant-garde (1910s-30s) 
and the neo-avant-garde (1960s-70s) have passed away, when their catalogue of 
critical strategies are fully integrated and functionalised within the contemporary 
mode of production. This means that the cultivation of dissent, transgression and 
oppositionality within the sphere of contemporary art fails to have any genuine 
critical effect because these forms have become, as Sianne Ngai writes, ‘the very 
lubricants of the economic system which they originally came into being to 
oppose’.30 In other words, they appear as conventional aspects of everyday life, 
based on what Ngai understands as the normalization of ‘radical alienation’ within 
the current workplace.31         
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 I examine the implication of this periodization of the present as post-avant-garde 
in more detail through two chapters analysing examples of contemporary art: the 
German photographer Thomas Ruff’s Jpeg series (2004 - 2007) in Chapter Three and 
American contemporary artist Jordan Wolfson’s Raspberry Poser (2012) in Chapter 
Four. These case studies are chosen because each seems to recuperate some aspect of 
the historic avant-garde: the cultivation of the ‘poor’ or ‘bad quality’ image in the 
former and the prioritisation of the violent discontinuity of ‘montage’ in the latter. 
Both strategies are conventionally premised upon the idea of shocking the viewer out 
of their passive acquiescence to the status quo or more simply outraging a bourgeois 
viewing public, and, moreover, both strategies still function for many commentators 
as active criteria for the evaluation of contemporary artworks. In contrast, I argue 
that these celebrated devices of the avant-garde - the ‘poor image’ and ‘montage’ - 
have become operational, although not always seen, within the structures of visibility 
that undergird our supposedly transparent everyday regime of images: the ‘poor 
image’ in digital photography and ‘montage’ in the systems of screens that augment 
and fragment our immediate experience of the world. Therefore, these chapters 
deepen the periodization the thesis offers by highlighting the way in which our new 
historical conditions supersede or outmode existing art theoretical models and 
concepts, producing new art historical problems and challenges. Indeed one of the 
initial motivations for the thesis was a sense of personal frustration with a critical 
framework employed within contemporary art discourse that remains indebted to the 
historic avant-garde and their ‘sentiments of disenchantment’.32 My reading of Ruff 
and Wolfson’s work, by contrast, argues that their contemporary recuperation of 
avant-garde strategies functions merely to draw attention to the defunctness of these 
devices: their inability to act upon us within the altered historical conditions of 
Control. This is to suggest that the avant-garde has met a depressing fate, 
corresponding to Baudrillard’s remark that ‘there is no end to anything and that 
everything will continue to take place in a slow, fastidious, recurring and all-
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encompassing hysterical manner - like nails and hair continue to grow after death’.33 
Or reminding us of Adorno’s comment in Aesthetic Theory that ‘the concept of the 
avant-garde, reserved for many decades for whatever movement declared itself the 
most advanced, now has some of the comic quality of aged youth’.34 I choose to 
handle the sense of deathliness that emerges in these works, specifically as it relates 
to the idea of the avant-garde, however in line with the tone of Adorno’s remark, 
which is not a simple expression of despair or despondency, but instead carries a 
comedic register. Indeed, I suggest these works have a strange and vital aesthetic 
sensibility; and accordingly, a task of each chapter is to pin down, or least attempt to 
provide some understanding of this set of aesthetic effects.    
 Whilst, as I have acknowledged, the choice of cultural artifacts examined in this 
thesis might give the impression of heterogeneity, I am nevertheless interested in 
what unifies them as a group: namely, I shall argue, a shared cultural pessimism. It 
seems that the combination of the specific technological, economic and ecological 
aspects of our present society, encompassing environmental politics, ubiquitous 
computing, supra-national corporations, flexible working and 24/7 capital, work 
together in a way that produces a pessimism that significantly marks our visual 
culture. This is something that I want to bring to clearer recognition, because, I 
propose, it is an effect that is widely felt and acknowledged within critical theory, but 
typically, only as something to rail against and overcome. Indeed, its bearing on our 
cultural imaginary is disavowed or denied amongst critical theorists and artist 
practitioners who, whilst acknowledging this sensibility, nevertheless earnestly and 
energetically attempt to invent new forms of collectivity, participation and alternative 
economies: thus endlessly reincarnating figures of ‘criticality’ that I would suggest 
have demonstrably already been functionalised and therefore drained of genuine 
negative affect. The pessimistic sensibility underlying such attempts - disavowed by 
them, but avowed openly here - is perhaps best summed up in Virno’s A Grammar of 
the Multitude; which provocatively suggests that we are now living in a nightmare 
version of communism: 
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The metamorphosis of social systems in the West, during the 1980s and 1990s, 
can be synthesized in a more pertinent manner with the expression: communism 
of capital. This means that the capitalistic initiative orchestrates for its own 
benefit precisely those material and cultural conditions which would guarantee a 
calm version of realism for the potential communist. Think of the objectives 
which constitute the fulcrum of such a prospect: the abolition of that intolerable 
scandal, the persistence of wage labor; the extinction of the State as an industry 
of coercion and as a “monopoly of political decision-making”; the valorization of 
all that which renders the life of an individual unique. Yet, in the course of the 
last twenty years, an insidious and terrible interpretation of these same objectives 
has been put forth.35 
Virno’s conception of the world is characteristic of much critical theory on the left, 
even that which aims most fervently at the finding of new solutions. It is a pessimism 
that was arguably confirmed by the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial collapse, 
when the economic system that created the crisis was fast restored as if nothing 
untoward had happened: making the idea of any alternative to capitalism even more 
unimaginable.36        
 Nevertheless, the popular writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri can be 
looked at as an example of the tendency to acknowledge a fundamentally pessimistic 
worldview and at the same time devise positive strategies based upon critical models 
from a previous stage of capitalist society. Notably, they have labelled the new, 
seemingly impervious, post-state global power formation, ‘Empire’. For Hardt and 
Negri, ‘Empire’ poses a problem for any politics of resistance that might take a 
critical stance against its power. In part this is because, they argue, ‘Empire’ has 
ushered in an age of ‘real subsumption’. This phrase, taken up from Marx’s Capital, 
describes the subsumption of all aspects of life by capital: ‘not only the economic or 
only the cultural dimension of society’, they write, ‘but rather the social bios itself’.37 
An outcome of this is that everything is subordinated to an economic logic or 
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rationality. As Hardt and Negri explain: ‘There is nothing, no ‘‘naked life,’’ no 
external standpoint, that can be posed outside this field’.38 The depressing truth of 
‘real subsumption’ - that there is no outside - demands that political, social and 
cultural resistance has to come from within. However, despite this state of affairs 
Hardt and Negri argue that our new terrain nevertheless ‘provides greater 
possibilities for creation and liberation… [and the] multitude, in its will to be-against 
and its desire for liberation must push through Empire to come out the other side’.39 
In their understanding, the multitude represents a new social class or proletariat that 
is inherent or perhaps immanent to ‘Empire’: a positive and unifiable ‘collective’ on 
which to pin a revolutionary teleology. Similarly, the widely debated political theory 
of ‘accelerationism’ is for some commentators premised upon a telos that pits itself 
against the selfsame pessimistic conception of the world. ‘At the beginning of the 
second decade of the Twenty-First Century’, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek write 
in their ‘#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics’ (2013), ‘global 
civilization faces a new breed of cataclysm. These coming apocalypses ridicule the 
norms and organisational structures of the politics which were forged in the birth of 
the nation-state, the rise of capitalism, and a Twentieth Century of unprecedented 
wars’.40 Attendant on this is ‘the absence of a radically new social, political, 
organisational, and economic vision’, which for all intents and purposes, cancels the 
future via a ‘paralysis of the political imaginary’.41 Accelerationism gambles upon 
this sense of extreme cultural pessimism in order to propose a counter-politics that 
mobilizes latent productive and technological forces ‘as a springboard to launch 
towards post-capitalism…a future that is more modern - an alternative modernity that 
neoliberalism is inherently unable to generate’.42 The aim, Steven Shaviro glosses, is 
to push ‘capitalism’s own internal tensions (or what Marx called its “contradictions”) 
to extremes. Therefore ‘accelerationism hopes to reach a point where capitalism 
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explodes and falls apart’.43       
 Both of these examples, in my view, project a revolutionary hope onto a unified 
‘collective’ that does not exist: placing faith on the possibility of agency in a 
totalizing system of ‘real subsumption’. Indeed the current forms of the ‘collective’, 
as we actually experience them, seem too passive, indifferent and dispersed to 
embrace this type of self-imagining and there seems little point in social theorists 
exhorting us to be different. Whilst this thesis engages with a similar set of historical 
issues, rather than hoping to identity any new or re-emerging avant-garde strategies, 
it draws attention instead to an alternative set of responses to the dysphoric 
worldview synonymous with Control society. These cultural manifestations of our 
pessimism do not disavow it, but instead welter in it. They grab our attention by 
pointing out and making explicit this contemporary sensibility. In doing so, 
moreover, they indicate an unexpected upshot of this outlook; a liveliness that is 
generated and seems to gather around this drudging negativity that results in a 
strangely energetic outpouring of the selfsame pessimism. This often has the effect of 
inducing us to find the terribleness of everyday life funny or stupid. Building on this, 
the thesis asks an additional question of Control society’s art and visual culture: is 
our current critical vocabulary adequate to the images produced under contemporary 
conditions? Can it properly describe the cultural forms that engage directly with the 
fact of life under Control? Is there another vocabulary that might replace, or at least 
supplement current critical discourses concerning art and visual culture?   
 An example of recent discussion surrounding the adequacy of our current critical 
vocabulary is provided by the question of ‘criticality’, which forms the focus of an 
essay in Hal Foster’s book Bad New Days (2015) – the very title of which (quoting 
from a remark by Bertolt Brecht) suggests the author’s attempt to take on the cultural 
pessimism I have described, and defeat it, in the name of a continuation of modernist 
leftist cultural politics. Foster seeks to defend the continuing importance of 
‘criticality’ in the contemporary public sphere, despite the many threats to it which 
he acknowledges, including for instance, the ‘real-time’ of communication 
technologies that dissuade reflective thought; the denial of an ‘outside’ position, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Steven Shaviro, ‘Accelerationist Aesthetics: Necessary Inefficiency in Times of Real Subsumption’, 
e-flux, Journal #46 (June 2013), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/accelerationist-aesthetics-necessary-





what is otherwise known as critical distance, within ‘real subsumption’; the ‘post-
critical’ position arrived at within much contemporary cultural theory.44 What Foster 
means by ‘criticality’, he explains, is ‘resistance to any operation whereby human 
constructs…are projected above us and granted an agency of their own, from which 
position and with which power they are more likely to overbear us than to enlighten 
us’.45 So criticality equates to resisting and criticising, or at least exposing 
mystification and its oppressive functions. Certainly the culture of our times is 
characterised by the kinds of oppressive and mystifying operations Foster describes, 
and something like what Foster calls ‘criticality’ is important to my analysis of 
Control society, insofar as I seek to point out the ways in which our society 
disciplines and controls our forms of thought and activity. But as long as this critical 
perspective is described in a vocabulary consisting of increasingly dated tropes, 
deriving from a time when oppositions such as technology and nature, power and 
resistance, machine and human, consumption and production, leisure and labour, 
criticality and complicity (etc.) were more fixed, then these so-called ‘critical’ 
positions can only perpetuate an implausible representation of our social situation. 
Now, by contrast, oppositions such as technology and nature, or power and 
resistance, seem interweaved and twisted together as in a Möbius strip or double 
spiral, and I think not just our critical vocabulary, but our critical imaginations – our 
capacity to imagine new forms of criticism and opposition – must be renewed 
accordingly.          
 It is for this reason that the thesis turns its back on recent trends toward didactic 
or socially committed works of art and culture.46 Instead it attends to an art and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For instance, Foster suggests that the ‘post-critical’ position is present in the writing of the 
philosophers Bruno Latour and Jacques Rancière. Both deny the viability of an ‘antifetishist’ 
criticism: Latour, he writes, claims that ‘the critic assumes a position of enlightened knowledge that 
allows the critic to demystify the fetishistic belief of others more naïve than he is, that is, to 
demonstrate how the belief of these others is “a projection of their wishes onto a material entity that 
does nothing at all by itself.” For Latour, the fatal mistake of this critic is not to turn his antifetishistic 
gaze on his own belief, in particular his own conviction in the powers of demystification (which 
Latour thus counts as a fetish in its own right), a mistake that renders the critic the most naïve one of 
all’. Rancière’s target is an idea of ‘critical art’, which he suggests is premised on the false projection 
of a passive audience that it claims to activate. See Hal Foster, Bad New Days: Art, Criticism, 
Emergency (London; New York: Verso, 2015), Kindle edition. 
45 Foster, Bad New Days: Art, Criticism, Emergency, Kindle edition. 
46 I am thinking here of the trend from the 1990s to the present day for participatory art projects that 
seek to improve social cohesion or a sense of community amongst the viewing public. This can  be 





visual culture that might be considered synonymous with what Adorno called the 
‘hardened and alienated’ aspects of everyday life.47 Indeed I am loosely following 
Adorno’s belief that ‘[i]t is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives’.48 He 
proposes instead, that art ‘is modern art through mimesis of the hardened and 
alienated; only thereby, and not by the refusal of a mute reality, does art become 
eloquent’.49 Whilst this metaphor of the ‘hardened and alienated’ seems to contrast 
strongly with the language associated with the form of Control, which typically 
invokes an atmospheric or liquid aesthetic, I want to suggest that what was ‘hardened 
and alienated’ in modernism has altered accordingly. And it is within the ‘hardened 
and alienated’ aspects of everyday life that we might, I suggest, find the vocabulary 
to properly address and grasp the ‘ultra-rapid’, ‘free-floating’ and ‘dispersive’ power 
of Control.50 It is in these terms that I will consider above all the pessimism, stupidity 
and humour that seem to mark so much of our art and visual culture. A significant 
goal of the thesis is to provide a new theorisation or evaluation of these trends, which 
conflict with the values (such as ‘criticality’, ‘resistance’, and ‘oppositionality’) 
operative in much contemporary critical theory. Instead, I propose they represent the 
latest stage in a distinctive tradition that draws on the dissident surrealism and 
negativity of Georges Bataille, Roger Caillois and more recently Jean Baudrillard 
and Vilém Flusser. Adorno is also important to this analysis, despite the fact that his 
thinking is mostly unrelated to this tradition, and in some respects, may seem at odds 
with it. Nevertheless, the various insights of these thinkers can be seen to converge 
according to a shared address to the question of the meaningfulness and value of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Relational Aesthetics’ in the 1990s, which ‘take as their theoretical and practical point of departure 
the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space’. 
The artist in this view is a catalyst for a social situation in which people come together and participate 
in a shared activity. This is more generally reflected in the various ‘turns’ in artistic practice that 
followed, for example, the ‘social turn’, the ‘ethical turn’, the ‘collaborative  turn’ etc. See Nicolas 
Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, tr. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 
2002), 113. More recently this trend can be identified, for instance, in the 2015 Turner Prize winners 
Assemble: a collective of artists, designers and architects who, a Tate profile announces, ‘create 
projects in tandem with the communities who use and inhabit them. Their architectural spaces and 
environments promote direct action and embrace a DIY sensibility’. See ‘Turner Prize 2015 Artists: 
Assemble’, Tate, http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tramway/exhibition/turner-prize-2015/turner-prize-
2015-artists-assemble, accessed 07/01/16.   
47 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 21. 
48 Theodor Adorno, ‘Commitment’ [1965], tr. Francis McDonagh, in Adorno et al, Aesthetics and 
Politics (London; New York: Verso, 2007), 180. 
49 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 21. 





aesthetic experiences available to us within varying stages of advanced capitalist 
society.           
 In line with the insights offered by this miscellaneous group, I want to argue for 
an understanding of contemporary forms of pessimism, stupidity and humour as 
resolutely non-productive, non-useful, and thus truly negative: unlike the implicitly 
productivist critical vocabulary of resistance, subversion, transgression and 
oppositionality, which continues to be employed despite the aforementioned 
functionalization of these once-negative values and traits within contemporary 
capitalism. This is to say that these pessimistic, stupid and funny cultural 
manifestations don’t appear to produce anything, there is no resolution or synthesis, 
they appear anti-productive and indifferent. My question is: what value can we place 
on these qualities? There is something historically new and distinctive about these 
‘images under control’ I propose, that it is the business of this thesis to work out. 
Whilst I cannot in the end hope to answer this or any of the other questions raised 
definitively, it at least asks the questions, in the process aiming to provide an original 
analysis of what we might call the aesthetics of Control. This attempt is pursued in 
the belief that these are among the most important questions to ask now, when 
Control is, as Seb Franklin has convincingly argued, the ‘cultural logic’ and 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








The Age of the Literal World Picture
	  
I don’t know if you were scared; I was certainly scared when I recently saw the 
photographs of the earth taken from the moon.1 
Martin Heidegger’s disturbed response to NASA’s photographs of the Earth taken 
from outer space is an unusually negative reaction to this pioneering event. These 
were the first photographic images of the Earth from space. They showed the whole 
Earth in the single frame of a photograph. The dominant reception of this dramatic 
advance in photographic representation was positive: as if Man’s so-called escape 
from ‘the prison of his planet’ provided empirical evidence of his freedom and 
triumphal proof of modern science’s messianic supplanting of the natural world’s 
horizons.2 Commenting on the distribution of these images, a 1972 issue of the 
Kansas City Star suggested that they had the capacity to explode a conception of life 
on Earth as constrained, administered and generally lacklustre: from ‘that stunning 
perspective…looking back across the void…[Man] understood that it was a prison 
only if he let it be’.3 This rapturous reception was, of course, bound up with Cold 
War concerns regarding the constant threat of the Earth’s annihilation through 
thermonuclear weaponry.        
 The interview in which Heidegger expressed his horror regarding the Earth 
photographs took place in September 1966 (Heidegger insisted that it remain 
unpublished during his lifetime, and it eventually appeared in Der Spiegel on May 
31, 1976, five days after his death), and the image he is most likely referring to is 
that taken by NASA’s Lunar Orbiter 1 spacecraft: an unmanned photographing 
machine which now resides on the far side of the Moon, after it was retired and 
nudged out of orbit by a signal from Earth to crash-land. This robotic device was 
placed in orbit on August 10, 1966. It was designed to scan and photograph the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Martin Heidegger, ‘Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten’, Der Spiegel 30 (Mai, 1976), 193-219, tr. 
William J. Richardson as ‘Only a God Can Save Us’, 
http://www.ditext.com/heidegger/interview.html, accessed 20/07/14. 
2 Kansas City Star [7th December 1972] quoted in Robert Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the 
Earth (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2008), 94. 






moon’s surface in order to help select future landing sites for NASA’s Apollo 
missions. It also took the first ever picture of the Earth, from the distance of the 
moon, on August 23, 1966 (fig. 1.1). This image – the photograph it is most likely 
Heidegger saw - is grainy and distorted. The photograph struggles to picture the 
planet, which flickers up from behind the moon in a tremor of visibility. It appears as 
a streaked and imprecise flash, which belies the fact that everyone who ever existed 
did so within its smear.4             
 Lunar Orbiter 1’s picturing of the Earth was the first image in a new - 
extraterrestrial - paradigm for photographic production. Whilst images of the Earth 
from space were first achieved by nonhuman robotic actors, astronauts were soon to 
follow and there have now been over 268,000 photos taken from orbit by NASA 
astronauts. Two images, however, stand out: Earthrise (fig. 1.2) and Blue Marble 
(fig. 1.3), the latter being ‘perhaps the most widely reproduced photograph in human 
history’.5 In December 1968 NASA released the Earthrise photograph. It was taken 
by the crew of its Apollo 8 mission during the first manned orbit of the moon. The 
photograph was not part of the scheduled manifest. According to Robert Poole’s 
account (in Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth [2008]), NASA’s focus was on 
the moon and its orbit. It was not explicitly intended to produce documentation of the 
Earth as seen from space. ‘At programme level’, Poole explains, ‘decision making 
was dominated by engineers and mission planners with a decidedly limited tolerance 
for ‘‘tourist photographs’’’.6 However, the vision of the earth appearing over the 
lunar horizon made a forceful and existential impression upon the astronauts. It 
absolutely compelled their attention. Frank Borman, Apollo 8’s commander, 
remembers it as ‘the only thing in space that had any color to it. Everything else was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A passage in Robert Poole’s book Earthrise details the laborious process of creating images using 
Lunar Orbiter 1, which perhaps accounts for its distorted representation of the Earth: ‘To take a 
photograph, the controllers on Earth had to orientate the spacecraft correctly and then send a signal to 
activate the camera. Each picture was processed as it was taken. When the photography had been 
completed the film would be scanned and the signal transmitted, line by line, a quarter of a million 
miles, over a connection considerably slower than the slowest dial-up internet …The scanned images 
were downloaded to the Deep Space Network tracking stations at Goldstone, California, and Robeldo 
De Chavela, near Madrid. Even then the process was not complete. The signal had to be copied onto 
videotape and projected onto a kinescope where it was filmed with a movie camera. The film negative 
was then sent to the Eastman Kodak processing lab at Rochester, New York, cut into strips and 
processed into individual prints, which were in turn sent to Langley [NASA research centre] for 
analysis and publication’. See Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth, 73-76. 
5 Denis Cosgrove and William L. Fox, Photography and Flight (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 86. 





either black or white, but not the Earth’.7 And crewmember Bill Anders, who is 
credited with taking the photograph (archived by NASA as image AS8-14-2383), 
recalls glancing out of the window and seeing the earth coming up: ‘I was 
immediately almost overcome by the thought that here we came all this way to the 
Moon, and yet the most significant thing we’re seeing is our own home planet, the 
Earth’.8 Thus ‘the sight of Earth came with the force of a revelation’ and the crew 
used its handheld Hasselblad camera with a telephoto lens to take one black and 
white photo and two in colour, as is detailed in the following transcript of their 
onboard recorder: 
03 03 47 30 CDR Oh, my God! Look at that picture over there! Here's the earth 
coming up. Wow, is that pretty!         
03 03 47 37 LMP Hey, don't take that, it's not scheduled.     
03 03 47 39 CDR (Laughter) You got a color film, Jim?      
03 03 47 46 LMP Hand me that roll of color quick, will you - -                                     
03 03 J47 48 CMP Oh man, that's great!9 
The resulting shot showed the Earth, one third in darkness, suspended in a black 
void, appearing behind the grey lunar surface, with the ‘entire human race…in the 
frame, bar the three behind the camera’.10 This image, as it came to be received, was 
subjected to post-production editing. Apollo 8’s lunar orbit was equatorial (with 
respect to both Earth and the Moon), and so from the photographer’s point of view 
the Earth did not rise but emerged from the left side of the Moon. The original 
photograph was thus rotated 90 degrees, so that the moon’s surface became the 
ground of the photo.11 Moreover the original photograph was cropped, cutting off 
much of the dark surrounding space so that the Earth was made to appear much 
larger. This made it truly spectacular: a viewpoint from which we are allowed the 
phantasmic experience of witnessing the Earth rise, as if standing on the moon, from 
a position totally independent of earthly life.       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Frank Borman quoted in Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth, 2. 
8 Bill Anders quoted in Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth, 2.  
9 Transcribed from the Apollo 8 Onboard Voice Transcription, as recorded on the Spacecraft 
Onboard Recorder, January 1969, made available at the NASA, Johnson Space Centre History 
Collection, http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/, accessed 01/05/2014. 
10 Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth, . 22. 
11 Robin Kelsey, ‘Reverse Shot: Earthrise and Blue Marble in the American Imagination’, in El Hadi 






 Four years later another image was captured by the Apollo 17 crew, this time of 
the whole Earth, in its entirety, prominently framed by pitch black space. The Apollo 
17 mission was the last Apollo mission to land people on the moon, and the Blue 
Marble photograph was taken by its geologist and geophysicist, Jack Schmitt. The 
image is especially distinctive because there is no part of the Earth in shadow. The 
full disc is on view, illuminated from horizon to horizon. The contrast between this 
image and that taken by Lunar Orbiter 1 is stark: there the Earth appeared uncertain 
and temporary – its smeared form indicating more a photographic aberration than a 
planetary mass – and here it appears proud and permanent. This image was initially 
archived by NASA as AS17-148-22726 but its startling appearance and gleaming 
colour has, since its distribution, commonly encouraged the comparison to something 
like an impossibly precious gemstone or Christmas-tree bauble. Thus, it received the 
affectionate moniker Blue Marble. This image, like Earthrise, was also reoriented. It 
was manipulated in accordance with the appearance of the world map, being rotated 
180 degrees so that the Antarctic glacial clump could be repositioned to the bottom 
of the earth.12 These subtly edited photographs have subsequently become two of the 
most celebrated images of the latter part of the 20th century. Indeed they were ranked 
numbers one and two as part of the Smithsonian museum’s 2008 celebration of 
NASA’s fifty most memorable images.13 Regarding Blue Marble, NASA’s director 
of photography, Richard Underwood enthuses that: ‘More people have seen that 
photo than any in the history of mankind…I was the first person to see that 
photograph…When I saw it I said, “Boy, that’s it.”’14   
 Heidegger, however, was scared when he saw that crude precursor to Earthrise 
and Blue Marble. Whilst NASA scientist Edgar Cortright, for instance, celebrated 
our newfound ‘ability to contemplate ourselves from afar’, Heidegger was altogether 
more pessimistic.15 We might perhaps begin to understand his response by turning to 
his 1938 essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’: since these images, particularly Blue 
Marble’s totally illuminated representation, might seem to precisely literalize his 
account of a ‘world picture’. From this point of view, we can begin to understand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Kelsey, ‘Reverse Shot: Earthrise and Blue Marble in the American Imagination’, 12.  
13 See http://www.airspacemag.com/space/top-nasa-photos-of-all-time-9777715, accessed 19/01/16.   
14 Richard Underwood quoted in Poole, Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth, 93. 
15 Edgar Cortright, Exploring Space with a Camera (Washington DC: NASA, 1968), electronic copy 





these images in a different light to that of the positive humanist message that was 
repeated by so many commentators. By examining Heidegger’s idea of a ‘world 
picture’ in more detail, we can begin to explore why his response to the photographs 
of the Earth from space was so fearful. We can then question what might be at stake, 
for Heidegger, in these literal ‘world pictures’. 
world picture 
	  
‘The fundamental event of the modern age’, Heidegger wrote, ‘is the conquest of the 
world as picture’.16 This suggests the totalization of a particular world view. Whilst 
his essay ‘The Age of the World Picture’ (1938), does not specifically refer to, or 
even imagine, a picture-of-the-world, Heidegger’s response to the photograph of the 
Earth produced by NASA in the Der Spiegel interview provokes an intriguing set of 
questions and provides an opportunity to explore this connection. For Heidegger the 
conquest of the world as a picture is ‘one of the pathways upon which the modern 
age rages toward fulfilment of its essence’.17 This ‘essence’, he explains, is ‘man’s 
domination of the earth by means of his technological will’, or ‘Total 
Mobilization’.18 From this perspective it seems that these photographs may have 
shocked because their early gesture towards an enclosed representation of the Earth 
signified this ‘raging’ toward the fulfilment of the modern age’s essence. 
 When Heidegger uses the word ‘picture’ (bild), he does not mean a literal picture 
or simply a representation of something, like a painting, but rather a conception of 
that something in its entirety: as in ‘the colloquial expression, “We get the 
picture”’.19 To get the picture ‘throbs with being acquainted with something, with 
being equipped and prepared for it’, Heidegger writes: ‘Hence world picture, when 
understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world, but the world conceived 
and grasped as picture’.20  NASA’s photographs can be seen as both: a picture of the 
world and an example of the world grasped as picture. This is because their 
distinctive picturing of the Earth produces the impression of an object totally under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’ [1938], in The Question Concerning Technology, 
and other essays, tr. William Lovitt (New York; London: Harper Row, 1977), 134. 
17 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, 134. 
18 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, 137. 
19 Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, 129. 





our control. It comes to us as a finite and understandable thing. With Blue Marble, 
for instance, the viewpoint is suggestive of a scientist looking down at a petri dish, in 
which the Earth’s flocky swirls and amorphous forms appear as some sort of 
microbiological culture observable within neutral laboratory conditions. Thus we 
arrive at Heidegger’s distinction between a modern ‘representation’ and a Greek 
‘apprehension’, and this, he explains, is crucial to our understanding of ‘modern 
science’s’ process of ordering the world around us. This distinction advises that in 
the age of the Greeks, the world could not become picture. A translation note makes 
this clear: ‘The noun Vernehmer is related to the verb vernehmen (to hear, to 
perceive, to understand). Vernehmen speaks of an immediate receiving, in contrast to 
the setting-before (vor-stellen) that arrests and objectifies’, which for Heidegger 
characterizes the modern era.21 In further support of this notion, Heidegger 
comments that Greek science, in vast contrast to modern science, was ‘never 
exact…could not be exact, and did not need to be exact’.22 It was concerned with the 
apprehension, rather than domination of nature. It accepted the fact that it could 
never fully comprehend and master the natural world.   
 Earthrise and Blue Marble can be considered as ‘representation’, rather than 
‘apprehension’, because of their assumption of something like an Archimedean 
Point. This is a hypothetical vantage point from which the observer is removed from 
the object of study. It is applicable to NASA’s photographs because their immensely 
complex means of production is entirely invisible: the images appear perfectly 
natural and uninterrupted, as if there were no underlying forces or conditions for 
their production. This assumption of a privileged Archimedean perspective is 
certainly indicative of a vor-stellen, or setting in place of nature. We can therefore 
see this essay as a partner to Heidegger’s later text ‘The Question Concerning 
Technology’ (1954): both understand the essence of modern scientific technologies 
as an ‘Enframing’. Heidegger uses this word to signify the way in which ‘Beings’ are 
‘experienced by man as in one way or another “posed”…to, by and for man (e.g. 
“com-posed,” “contra-posed,” “pro-posed,” etc.) and thus conceivably subject to his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Translator’s note, Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, 117 and 131. 





control’.23 The predominant material drive behind this technological control is the 
denaturing, ordering and instrumentalization of the world as standing-reserve, for the 
purpose of capital accumulation.         
 The emergence of photographs of the Earth from space can be interpreted as part 
of Heidegger’s epistemology of modern man, which, Devin Fore explains, sees man 
as ‘distinct and apart from the object (Gegen-stand) before him, and who maintains 
this degree of cognitive remoteness by interposing a membrane of representations 
between himself and the world’.24 As an example of this distancing from the object-
world, Fore cites the invention of the atomic clock in 1949, which recomposed the 
passage of time as something determined by rates of atomic decay, rather than the 
alternation of day and night. At stake for Heidegger is the uprooting of man from 
Earth and from a form of perception grounded in the regular movements and 
dimensions of the planet. The photographs of the Earth from space are symbolic of 
this severance of the subject from the object and more widely, from the world. Its 
representation in these ‘world pictures’ becomes a visual short-hand for ‘the world’, 
replacing a more experiential or phenomenological ‘apprehension’. From thereon in, 
the world is fixed as something always and already known: pre-seen and pre-
cognized. Whilst Heidegger didn’t, and perhaps couldn’t, envisage such an image in 
1938 when he wrote the essay, the NASA pictures seem strangely to illustrate and 
demonstrate key points from his argument, almost as if prepared to his direction. An 
uncanny effect: no wonder he felt ‘afraid’ when he saw that smeared image of the 
planet captured and transmitted back to Earth by Lunar Orbiter 1 in 1966. It follows 
that Earthrise and Blue Marble, which followed just four years later, can be 
understood as further securing (or marking our accession to) Heidegger’s ‘Total 
Mobilization’. Thus, whilst the dominant early reception of these photographs put 
forward a vision of the Earth as something new and uncharted and that promised a 
new sense of planetary collectivity, when read in conjunction with Heidegger’s 
essay, these ‘world pictures’ evoke an overwhelming, even claustrophobic, sense of 
confinement: the world seems small, pictured as if we can reach out and grasp it, as 
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something to be used.        
 Fredric Jameson has famously written of this sort of abolition of distance as a 
more general condition of postmodern spatiality, which witnesses the colonization of 
previously uncharted spaces by capital. This is, for Jameson, a crucial feature of 
postmodern cultural politics. It can be seen, he argues, in the collapse of ‘some of our 
most cherished and time-honored radical conceptions about the nature of cultural 
politics…However distinct those conceptions may have been - which range from 
slogans of negativity, opposition, and subversion to critique and reflexivity - they all 
shared a single, fundamentally spatial, presupposition…“critical distance”’.25 This 
refers to the possibility of ‘positioning…the cultural act outside the massive Being of 
capital’, which Jameson argues, is now an impossibility.26 NASA’s space 
photographs can be seen as the historical marker for this new period in history, in 
which Heidegger’s totalizing system of representation is intensified, or perhaps 
completed. This is particularly applicable to Blue Marble, which was taken in 1972; 
the very year in which Jameson claimed the ’60s properly ended (he cites numerous 
events from the early ’70s that seemingly put an end to the culture of the ’60s, for 
instance, the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and various crises 
amongst the unified mass protest movements that emerged a decade earlier) and a 
genuinely ‘historical (and socio-economic) reality emerged as a third great original 
expansion of capitalism around the globe’: 
late capitalism in general (and the 60s in particular) constitute a process in which 
the last surviving internal and external zones of precapitalism – the last vestiges 
of noncommodified or traditional space within and outside the advanced world – 
are now ultimately penetrated and colonized in their turn. Late capitalism can 
therefore be described as the moment in which the last vestiges of Nature which 
survived on into classical capitalism are at length eliminated: namely the third 
world and the unconscious.27 
With a nod to NASA’s literal ‘world pictures’ we can, I suggest, add the ‘cosmos’ to 
Jameson’s set of eliminated or colonized domains of Nature. Indeed we might 
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conclude that these planetary photographs effect a recalibration of the cultural 
imaginary according to a total system of representation, in which nothing is beyond 
Heidegger’s concept of vorstellen. The result can be understood as a realisation of 
what Jameson describes as the ‘colonization’ of ‘noncommodified or traditional 
space’ by capital and the attendant elimination of ‘Nature’ as a separate category of 
experience. This is because these perfect and fully-enclosed images seem to 
spectacularly materialize the idea that there is no outside.     
 In the aforementioned interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger claims that ‘we 
have not yet found a way to respond to the essence of technicity’.28 He goes on to 
explain that he sees the ‘situation of man in the world of planetary technicity not as 
an inextricable and inescapable destiny’, and that it is the task of ‘thought’ to, within 
its own limits, help man to ‘achieve a satisfactory relationship to the essence of 
technicity’.29 Thought, or ‘thinking’, for Heidegger refers to a form of engagement 
that ‘stands in dialogue with the epochal moment of the world’.30 In the USA (circa 
1966), for instance, Heidegger claimed that ‘pragmatic-positivistic’ thinking in 
regard to technology blocked genuine reflection, and the possibility of a ‘free 
relationship to the technical world’.31 As we shall see, it was also blocked by the 
‘world pictures’ that materialized his concerns regarding the modern world. And yet, 
in the public consciousness, these photographs did not produce a fear that 
corresponded to Heidegger’s nor did they engender an awareness of the 
claustrophobic enclosure later described by Jameson. Instead euphoria dominated the 
public reception of NASA’s photographs in the ’60s and ’70s, which seemed to 
symbolise a new ecological or environmental consciousness, promising to unite 
humanity via a shared duty of care towards our planet.  
consuming whole earth  
	  
‘Everywhere’, Robert Poole writes of the period immediately after the release of 
Earthrise, ‘newspaper editors wrote about the brotherhood of man and the spiritual 
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unity of mankind’.32 These missions were not just a triumph for NASA and modern 
science, but had been ‘a triumph of all mankind’.33 In The New York Times, the 
American poet Archibald MacLeish pronounced that to ‘see the earth as it truly is, 
small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence in which it floats, is to see 
ourselves as riders on the earth together’.34 Certainly the photographs seemed to 
confirm Buckminster Fuller’s famous allusion to the Earth as ‘our spaceship’.35 
Indeed Apollo 8’s capture of Earthrise apparently transcended political ideology: a 
semi-official Soviet congratulation mentioned in Poole’s book declares that the 
voyage of Apollo 8 ‘goes beyond the limits of a national achievement and marks a 
stage in the development of the universal culture of Earthmen’.36   
 The front cover of the first issue (Fall 1968) of Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth 
Catalog displayed a photograph of the Earth in its entirety that seems to preempt 
Blue Marble’s configuration (fig. 1.4). The image was taken by NASA’s ATS-3 - a 
geostationary weather and communications satellite - in 1967, making it the ‘first 
spacecraft to transmit operational multicolor earth-cloud photographs’.37 This image 
of an enclosed Earth, repeated in Blue Marble (which was, unlike the 1967 image, 
taken by human hand) came to symbolize a holistic worldview that found a popular 
voice in Brand’s publication. The Whole Earth Catalog (published between 1968 and 
1972) functioned as a directory of objects, tools and ideas for a communal and 
ecologically attentive lifestyle (for instance, advice on water purifiers, building 
teepees and geodesic domes, and obtaining fringed deer-skin jackets alongside 
extracts from recent theoretical research in cybernetics and systems theory). With a 
first edition of only a thousand copies, the Whole Earth Catalog became a publishing 
phenomenon: after several subsequent editions and supplements, Poole explains, 
‘The Last Whole Earth Catalog was published internationally by Penguin in 1971 
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and sold nearly a million copies’.38       
 ‘We are gods now’, Brand wrote in the first line of the first issue, ‘and we might 
as well get good at it’.39 Brand’s statement might seem in direct correspondence with 
Heidegger’s fearful remark that, in our condition of ‘Total Mobilization,’ ‘[o]nly a 
god can save us’.40 Brand’s bombastic rhetoric is, however, taken directly from the 
anthropologist Edmund Leach’s book A Runaway World? (1968). In this book Leach 
asserts that: ‘Men have become like gods’.41 He then goes on to ask, ‘Isn't it about 
time that we understood our divinity? Science offers us total mastery over our 
environment and over our destiny, yet instead of rejoicing we feel deeply afraid’.42 It 
follows that Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog sought to mobilize modern science in a 
manner that connected people with each other and with their planet, which was now 
popularly understood, following Fuller, as a communal type of spaceship. In this 
view, we can all become gods, united in protection of our shared planet, if 
technology is properly distributed and made available to everybody. Indeed the 
period between 1967 and 1970, Fred Turner writes in From Counterculture to 
Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital 
Utopianism (2006) was marked by ‘tens of thousands of young people set[ting] out 
to establish communes, many in the mountains and woods’.43 ‘If mainstream 
America had become a culture of conflict’, Turner continues, ‘with riots at home and 
war abroad, the commune would be one of harmony. If the American state deployed 
massive weapons systems in order to destroy faraway peoples, the New 
Communalists would deploy small-scale technologies – ranging from axes and hoes 
to amplifiers, strobe lights, slide projectors, and LSD – to bring people together and 
allow them to experience their common humanity’.44 They were the gods now. 
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Modern technology, the seeming antithesis to this back-to-the-land attitude, was 
privileged for its capacity to encourage an imagining of reality as a single and 
interlinked information system; a networked experience of togetherness which would 
‘allow them to become both self-sufficient and whole once again’.45 Thus in the 
Whole Earth Catalog Brand published material from technological researchers next 
to ‘firsthand reports from rural hippies’, offering ‘commune-based subscribers a 
chance to see their own ambitions as commensurate with the technological 
achievements of mainstream America’.46 This understanding of the world seemed 
perfectly exemplified by NASA’s photographs, in which the entire eco-system was 
represented in a holistic image enabled by modern technology.    
 In point of fact, the production of the iconic ‘whole Earth’ image - Blue Marble - 
is popularly related to Brand’s publication and the early Californian counterculture 
from which it sprang. Brand even claims to have come up with the idea of an image 
of the whole earth as seen from space in 1966, whilst gazing at the San Franciscan 
skyline, high on LSD. Neil Maher writes: 
If we had a color picture of the whole Earth, he argued at the time, “no one would 
ever perceive things in the same way.” To spread his idea, Brand printed up 
several hundred badges with the simple question: “Why Haven’t We Seen a 
Photograph of the Whole Earth Yet?,” and hawked them for a quarter apiece to 
college students at Berkeley, Stanford, Harvard, and MIT. He also mailed them 
to members of Congress, United States and Russian scientists, and to Marshall 
McLuhan and Buckminster Fuller. Soon, Brand’s buttons were visible on shirt 
collars and lapels around Washington, D.C., and at NASA. Six years later Apollo 
17 snapped Whole Earth [the photograph known as Blue Marble].47 
The extent to which, or if at all, Brand’s button campaign spurred NASA’s Lunar 
Orbiter spacecraft crew to turn their camera back towards Earth is debatable. 
However, beyond debate is the fact that this image came to represent a new global 
perspective or consciousness, just as Brand had anticipated. This ‘world picture’ with 
its lack of visible political boundaries upset ‘conventional Western cartographic 
conventions’, and seemed precisely to symbolize the collectivizing sense of global 
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harmony that infused Californian counterculture and Brand’s magazine.48 ‘The circle 
of the whole Earth displaces the line of the horizon’, Anselm Franke has written, and 
‘appears to transcend all frames, borders, and preconfigured notions of order, 
dissolving them in an oceanic vertigo’.49 Unlike Earthrise, which triumphantly 
displayed the moon surface as American conquest, Blue Marble shows a planet 
without boundaries as a single interlinked system. This Earth is, to paraphrase Brand, 
‘whole and alive and in hazard’.50      
 The symbol of the whole Earth affirmed the emerging counterculture of late 
1960s California, which eventually came to be known as the ‘Californian Ideology’. 
Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron discuss this in an influential 1995 essay, 
which suggests that this culture paved the way for the tech-industries of Silicon 
Valley. ‘Promoted in magazines, books, TV programmes, websites, newsgroups and 
Net conferences, the Californian Ideology promiscuously combines the free-
wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies. This 
amalgamation of opposites’, Barbrook and Cameron write, was ‘achieved through a 
profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new information technologies’.51 
They conclude the essay with the statement that in 1996 ‘with no obvious rivals, the 
triumph of the Californian Ideology appears to be complete’.52 In this respect their 
essay broadly refers to the co-optation and normalization of the countercultural 
‘Whole Earth’ rhetoric of the ’60s by capitalism, which can now be recognized in the 
work culture of Silicon Valley companies such as Apple, Google and Facebook. 
Diedrich Diedrichson and Franke speak to this effect in a more recent essay that 
relates the ‘Whole Earth’ movement to the development of ‘standards of neoliberal-
era environmental movement, computer culture and post-Fordist corporate 
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management’.53 Therefore, building on these observations, we can suggest a link to 
what is now commonly called (following Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello) the 
‘New Spirit of Capitalism’: a post 1970s shift in corporate work cultures from 
hierarchical structures into more flexible, anti-authoritarian and reactive network-
based organizations.54 Indeed the rhetoric employed to describe the anti-bureaucratic 
work culture of the ‘Whole Earth’ communes of the ’60s and ’70s can equally be 
applied to the twenty-first century Silicon Valley company offices, which playfully 
collapse all boundaries between work and leisure and public and private life to the 
extent that ‘[y]ou literally never have to leave’.55 In point of fact, the Whole Earth 
Catalog has been directly implicated within this genealogy by the iconic Silicon 
Valley CEO, Steve Jobs. The co-founder of Apple computers likened the catalog to a 
primitive version of the Google search engine - ‘overflowing with neat tools and 
great notions’ - in his 2005 Stanford University Commencement Address, which he 
closed with the phrase ‘Stay Hungry. Stay Foolish’.56 This phrase was borrowed 
from the back cover of the Catalog’s final issue (‘it was their farewell message as 
they signed off’).57 Needless to say, Brand’s ‘Whole Earth’ ideology is now 
synonymous with the corporate management-speak of the new economy.  
 This development was to a certain extent anticipated by Jean Baudrillard, who 
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suggested in 1970 - channeling Karl Marx - that the new environmentalist discourses 
merely functioned as another ‘opium of the people’.58 It was, for Baudrillard, a 
mystification created by a capitalist system, which allowed the same system ‘to 
perpetuate itself under the pretext of nature’.59 It did not fundamentally alter our 
relationship to the planet, which was still essentially capitalist; it only gave us 
another lifestyle option. Certainly, Baudrillard’s provocative analysis would seem 
borne out by the intensified pace and strength of capitalist exploitation of natural 
resources since the 1970s, accompanied by ever higher levels of public 
environmental feeling and ‘concern’. In this respect, NASA’s literal ‘world pictures’ 
might be understood to deepen Heidegger’s account of the Earth’s ‘enframing’ or 
‘Total Mobilization’: ordered, organized and instrumentalised for the purpose of 
profit accumulation. This is because it naturalizes our position as a God, looking at 
the world from a distance, and plunging the individual into a realm of illusion within 
which grand expectations are projected onto activities such as, for instance, 
recycling, and the capitalist system is enabled to perpetuate itself as normal. This can 
be understood more precisely as the perspective of the modern consumer, who is 
offered objects he or she can reach out, grasp and consume. Here the world appears 
as just one such object among many. Adorno wrote that ‘[o]nce radically parted from 
the object, the subject reduces it to its own measure; the subject swallows the object, 
forgetting how much it is an object itself’.60 The ‘Whole Earth’ in these ‘world 
pictures’ is an object grasped by modern science, swallowed up whole and reduced 
to the technological will of a ‘Total Mobilization’. Thus we can argue that a new 
consumerist and instrumentalist outlook on the world is born at the moment, and 
from the same images, that spawned its supposed opposite: ecological/environmental 
awareness and concern.         
 Blue Marble’s image of the world appears to capture and contain the Earth’s 
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entirety like a carefully framed commodity object. Space, in this photo, acts as a 
framing device, focusing and isolating the object from its context. The implicit 
positioning of the viewer as someone who can reach out to the object and grasp it is 
commonly employed in advertising photography. In this sense, NASA’s photographs 
fit into a tradition of supposedly objective photography or ‘realism’, which is 
employed to conceal a consumerist ideology. Indeed, these photographs can be 
likened to the Neue Sachlichkeit (New Objectivity) photography of 1920s Weimar-
era Germany. Whilst it might seem a surprising and historically remote comparison, 
New Objectivity provided a language of photographic form and an aesthetics of 
consumerism that is still in use today. This is a visual language that works to enhance 
the tactile and sensual appeal of the objects on display, whilst at the same time 
making them appear clean, new and unused. It claimed an objective and realist vision 
by pursuing a look of exactitude and sharpness. In this respect, I want to suggest, its 
ideological formation may be compared instructively to that of Blue Marble and the 
other NASA photographs, which signalled a claim to objectivity, whilst at the same 
time smuggling within them a consumerist ideology.     
 The New Objectivity photographic paradigm is characterised by strong upwards, 
downwards and diagonal angles and the use of a sharp focus and black and white 
contrasts. It is typically seen as a development of Soviet photographer Alexander 
Rodchenko’s ‘radical formalist photography’.61 Indeed Abigail Solomon-Godeau has 
argued that the aesthetic programme announced by Rodchenko and others in the 
Soviet Union, where it was put to revolutionary purposes, was turned into a 
technique of commercial exploitation in the German New Objectivity trend.62 This 
style, Herbert Molderings writes, appropriated the ‘views from lifts, radio towers, 
cranes and aeroplanes’, which were typical features of Rodchenko’s ‘revolutionary 
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vision’, and presented them in such a way that ‘endowed the world with the curious 
beauty of a diagram’.63 Albert Renger-Patzsch’s 1928 book Die Welt ist Schön (‘The 
World is Beautiful’), for instance, is emblematic of this type of German New 
Objectivity. The book contains one hundred photographs of industrial objects, 
natural objects and commodity objects, pictured in a way that makes them seem cut-
out and isolated from their environment.64 Amongst other things, the series features 
individual images of huge blast furnace chimneys, cacti and glass tumblers. For 
Molderings (who also cites, in support of his critique of the technique, commentators 
who were contemporaries of New Objectivity such as Walter Benjamin) this 
photographic methodology was most successful from the viewpoint of advertising. It 
served to express a certain fetishism, which, in his words, enabled the 
‘ornamentalisation of the objective world’ as a series of abstract aesthetic 
structures.65 Therefore, Renger-Patzsch helped to innovate a consumerist aesthetic: a 
strange and homogenizing photographic language that allowed blast furnaces, cacti 
and glassware to be appreciated according to precisely the same visual precepts. The 
object in the photograph takes on a fetish character, making the ordinary appear 
desirable, and the banal seem rarefied.      
 We might say, following Walter Benjamin’s ‘A Short History of Photography’, 
that this mode of photographic representation is ‘creative’ in a pejorative sense.66 
‘Creative’ photography is problematic for Benjamin because it abstracts the object in 
a manner which fails to ‘grasp a single one of the human connexions in which it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Herbert Molderings, ‘Urbanism and Technological Utopianism: Thoughts on the Photography of 
the Neue Sachlichkeit and the Bauhaus’, in David Mellor ed., Germany: The New Photography, 1927-
1933 (London: Arts Council of Great Britain, 1978), 90. 
64 The saccharine phrase ‘The World is Beautiful’ was given to this series of photographs by the 
book’s publisher, Kurt Wolff. Renger-Patzsch’s original name for the work was more neutral in tone: 
Die Dinge (simply ‘Things’). Renger-Patzsch described his book as ‘an alphabet intended to 
demonstrate how pictorial problems can be solved by purely photographic means’. However his 
publisher Wolff’s assumption of the sentimental moniker for the series of photographs is indicative of 
how the formal style was readily usurped for commercial purposes. See Ute Eskildsen, ‘Photography 
and the Neue Sachlichkeit Movement’, in David Mellor ed., Germany: The New Photography, 1927-
1933 (London: Arts Council of Great Britain, 1978), 105. 
65 Molderings, ‘Urbanism and Technological Utopianism: Thoughts on the Photography of the Neue 
Sachlichkeit and the Bauhaus’, 91. 
66 Benjamin writes that with the Neue Sachlichkeit style the ‘lens now looks for interesting 
juxtapositions; photography turns into a sort of arty journalism’ and that ‘where photography takes 
itself out of context… [and] frees itself from physiognomic, political and scientific interest, then it 
becomes creative’. See Walter Benjamin, ‘Little History of Photography’ [1931], in Michael W. 
Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith eds., Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 2, 





exists’, and instead only brings us an object which looks profoundly significant, but 
whose profound significance is unplaceable.67 Thus, if we look at Renger-Patzch’s 
Kaffee Hag (fig. 1.5), we see an attractive triumvirate of form: gleaming black beans 
spilling generously from their ‘Kaffee Hag’ packet and an intense, rich black coffee 
served in a delicate, clean white cup and saucer. Their tactile qualities are 
emphasized whilst at the same time the arrangement looks new, unused, carefully 
balanced and thoughtfully arranged. This ordinary still life is made to seem 
important. But there is nothing to be interpreted beyond its superficial display. 
Certainly, this was the opinion of Carl Linfert, who commented in the 1930s:  
How seldom photographs tell us anything about the objects they show! But what 
is transmitted as a message to the eye stares at us like a fetish – especially since 
Renger-Patzsch, photographs have become frightening…The urge to look, to 
record all that one sees, is so feverish that, while we grasp at everything, we end 
up holding nothing…The thing itself, however concisely and exactly the camera 
ends up perceives it, has less to say to us than ever before.68 
NASA’s images of the Earth from space, I want to contend, perform a similar effect 
upon their object of study. I have already mentioned that both Earthrise and Blue 
Marble were subject to post-production editing procedures, which served to 
manipulate and abstract their extra-terrestrial perspective into something as if 
grounded in terrestrial perception. This was a process that turned the awesome into 
just another spectacular, but implicitly graspable, commodity object.  
 Benjamin wrote that New Objectivity had the ability to ‘endow any soup can 
with cosmic significance’.69 In this respect, the gleaming spherical representation of 
the coffee cup in Renger-Patzsch’s ‘Kaffee Hag’ can be seen as analogous to the 
opalescent globe in Blue Marble: both invite the viewer to identify themselves as a 
consumer, and to identify the object as something that can be picked up and enjoyed. 
There were thousands of photographs taken of the Earth from space but Blue Marble 
is the one that survived in popular cultural consciousness. This is simply, I suggest, 
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because it is the most aesthetically pleasing. It looks the most like a consumer object. 
For instance, its prominent layer of clouds wraps and obscures geographic details, 
just as protective plastic film does objects on the shop shelves. And its translucent 
appearance encouraged the popular comparison to ‘the most beautiful marble you 
could imagine’.70 The popularly perceived ‘awesomeness’ of the image is expressed 
by the astronomer Carl Sagan, who argued that Blue Marble conveyed the 
inconsequentiality of humans, as ‘a thin film of life on an obscure and solitary lump 
of rock and metal’.71 However, by contrast, we might instead suggest that the Blue 
Marble photograph conveyed the absolute consequentiality of humans, who are 
given a view of Earth as if it were a cup of coffee or a simple marble, designed for 
their pleasure and consumption.        
 On this understanding, these literal ‘world pictures’ deepen Heidegger’s account 
of an Age of the World Picture: they introduce representations of the Earth that 
exclude directly phenomenal experience by limiting our apprehension of the planet to 
that of a marble, toy or jewel. This is a fetishized view of ‘nature’ that arguably best 
serves the mandates of advertising, because it provides a dazzling spectacle, blurring 
phenomenal ‘natural’ representation with the visual language of commodification: 
naturalizing and therefore concealing our Total Mobilization as consumers.   
polke as stupid 
	  
In the same year that Earthrise was snapped as part of Apollo 8’s lunar orbit and 
rapidly cemented in the public’s imagination, the German artist Sigmar Polke made a 
strange small ‘goofball’ style painting titled Polke as Astronaut (fig. 1.6).72 This 
painting produced at the height of public euphoria for space travel provides a 
gleefully caustic perspective that sharply contrasts with the ‘Whole Earth’ ideology 
that had begun to suffuse through NASA’s captivated audience. The small painting 
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comprises a balloon-like grinning face scrawled onto a space-themed patterned 
fabric. The astronaut is depicted as, in the words of Bice Curiger, ‘an aimlessly 
drifting child’s balloon’.73 I saw the work in a major 2014-15 retrospective of 
Polke’s extensive and eclectic catalogue of works (painting, sketches, film, sculpture, 
print) at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, titled Alibis: Sigmar Polke 1963-
2010.74 In the exhibition the work stood out as an especially diminutive and 
remarkably careless painting by the German artist, whose career, Donald Kuspit 
suggests, might be defined by the ‘pursuit of unintelligibility’ and meaninglessness.75 
The work was hung much higher than any other work in the room in what seemed 
like a gesture of curatorial whimsy; the picture mimicking the painted balloon form 
and made to appear as if it were so light, so meaningless and empty, so unaffected by 
the weight of gravity, that it had floated above everything else (fig. 1.7). 
 Polke as Astronaut is one of Polke’s cloth paintings, or Stoffbilder, which 
superimpose painted subjects onto found cloth materials as background support. 
‘Black velvet, fake leopard skin, bed sheets and cheap chinoiserie silk’, are all used, 
Benjamin Buchloh has suggested, to make works of ‘deliriously bad taste’.76 The 
cloth support in Polke as Astronaut is no different: it is most likely decorative 
material intended for use as curtains or bed sheets for a young NASA enthusiast - a 
distinctly mundane representation of the awesome scale of space flight. Polke’s 
treatment of space travel domesticates it, situating it in the realm of mass popular 
consumption. The conquest of space by man is relegated to ‘background’ and made 
to seem entirely banal.        
 This technique of layering paint onto patterned fabric is linked to what is 
commonly seen as an instinctive, supposedly ‘spiritual’, euphoric and drug-fuelled 
period of Polke’s career (from 1966 onwards), which followed his association with 
the Capitalist Realism movement in Germany. However, to my mind, Polke as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Bice Curiger, ‘Accelerated Attention’ in Margit Rowell ed., Sigmar Polke: works on paper 1963-
1974, (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1999), 32. 
74 The show ran from April 9th to August 3rd 2014 at MOMA, and later travelled to the Tate Modern, 
London and then the Ludwig Museum in Cologne. See 
http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2014/polke, accessed 06/06/14.  
75 Donald Kuspit, ‘At the Tomb of the Unknown Picture’ in David Thistlewood ed., Sigmar Polke: 
Back to Postmodernity, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996), 92.  
76 Benjamin Buchloh, ‘Parody and Appropriationin Picabia, Pop, and Polke’ [1982], Neo-Avantgarde 
and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975 (Cambridge, MA; 





Astronaut seems to collapse the two styles, i.e. the so-called ‘spiritual’ mode and 
Capitalist Realism, which are typically evaluated as antithetical.77 Capitalist Realism 
is widely seen as a German correlate to American Pop Art, albeit with a more 
blatantly depressing interpretation of consumer culture. The characteristic works of 
Polke in this period are uncompromisingly bland. In 1963 he drew Seife, a scrawled 
picture of a bar of soap on a beige ground: the bar of soap inscribed with the word 
Seife. And that’s it. ‘Here’, Kevin Power explains, ‘there is nothing of Pop’s hymn to 
commodities, nothing of Pop’s preference for primary colours and nothing of Pop’s 
finished shelf-clean appearance’.78 Instead, postwar German consumerism is pictured 
as just another form of bureaucratic uniformity. With Polke as Astronaut, 
nonetheless, Polke produces an image that holds the ‘banal’ and the ‘sublime’ or 
‘euphoric’ together. The peculiarity of the painting results from its fusing of these 
two tendencies within the artist’s early career. Despite the work’s bizarre, almost-
abstract imagery and ‘deliriously bad’ spaceman-patterned fabric, Polke as Astronaut 
retains much of the character of his Capitalist Realism output. Polke employs an 
image of our planet triumphantly colonized by positivist ‘modern science’, and 
euphorically appropriated by communitarianism (as if it presented material proof of 
our collective ecological consciousness), and turns it into a symbol of stupid 
banality: indicated by the dumb grinning balloon face dominating the surface of the 
painting. The use of a domestic decorative fabric further accentuates this feeling and 
space travel seems no more urgent than the beige bar of soap in Seife.  
 What is at stake here may be drawn out by reflecting on a comparison with 
Edvard Munch’s The Scream (1893): a painting with which it shares a formal 
similarity but starkly opposing ‘world picture’ (fig. 1.8). Munch’s work is discussed 
in Jameson’s seminal essay on ‘Postmodernism’, in which he establishes a contrast 
between the Norwegian artist’s iconic modernist painting, exemplifying ‘great 
modernist themes of anomie, solitude and social fragmentation and isolation’, and 
Andy Warhol’s ‘postmodern’ euphoric style, illustrated by his Diamond Dust Shoes 
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(1980).79 However, in comparison with Polke as Astronaut an alternative 
periodization of the ‘60s and ‘70s emerges that is different from Jameson’s famous 
periodization of ‘postmodernism’. Indeed there is a ‘stupid’ aspect to Polke as 
Astronaut that can be can be contrasted to Munch just as Warhol is contrasted to him 
in Jameson’s essay, albeit to different interpretative effect, with stupidity emerging 
more strongly than euphoria. For Jameson, The Scream is exemplary of an earlier 
modernist aesthetic with which the euphoric subject can no longer properly identify. 
Munch’s gestural and expressionistic Scream represents the ‘unhappy paradox’ of 
the centered subject, whose ‘self-sufficiency’ comes at the cost of closing oneself off 
from the world: ‘buried alive and condemned to a prison-cell without egress’.80 
Warhol, however, Jameson argues, represents an entirely different subject position: 
free floating and impersonal and pitifully incapable of experiencing the alienation 
depicted in The Scream. The subject in Polke as Astronaut is similarly free floating 
and impersonal (it is represented as a schematic face on a balloon), however, it also 
expresses an overt and gleeful dumbness, or stupidity. It is not cold and 
dispassionate, it is funny.       
 The Scream and Polke as Astronaut are both dominated by a single and centrally 
located figure. Indeed the distorted and trembling outline of the screaming subject’s 
schematized mask-like face (in Munch) is repeated by Polke, and both works feature 
a background that seems to revolve around the central figure. Jameson describes 
‘great concentric circles’ in The Scream, ‘as on the surface of a sheet of 
water…which fan out from the sufferer’.81 And in Polke, the background patterned 
fabric composition of astronauts, globes and lunar spacecraft seems to gravitate 
around the central head, as if some great black hole. However, the differences 
between the two works, quite clearly, stand out much more than their similarities. 
Polke’s painting depicts the - here astral - subject as a dumb grinning balloon. And, 
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when looked at side by side, the bad-taste bed-sheet background in Polke’s work 
seems to highlight the obsolescence and historic impossibility of the sort of 
background in Munch’s painting, whose landscape records and transcribes the 
subject’s suffering. The industrially-fabricated bed sheet, replete with graphic 
depictions of astronautical miscellanea, has nothing unique or personal about it. 
Moreover the face is simplified to a point of ridiculousness, where it is only capable 
of grinning and the floating balloon-form of the head, as if filled with helium, 
indicates an extreme emptiness: a subject severed from its bodily context, without 
agency (this concept of headlessness is further explored in Chapter Two in relation to 
the symbolism used to describe online forms of collectivity). The subject depicted 
here as an astronaut has no active role in the exploration of space. Polke’s stupid 
grinning astronaut is not heroic. To the contrary, it is symptomatic of the aimless, 
free-floating consumer in late capitalism: a Heideggerian nightmare, who looks upon 
the fully ‘enframed’ Earth as if it were a beautiful blue marble. This is why, I think, 
Polke as Astronaut is an important representation of the ‘world picture’ – registering 
and making apparent its blurring of science, ecology and consumerism, which was 
embedded, although not immediately apparent, in NASA’s images. Thus Polke as 
Astronaut, I want to claim, contains and accurately materializes, without pretense or 
illusion, the ‘world picture’ theorized by Heidegger and glimpsed in the first image 
of the Earth taken by the Lunar Orbiter 1 spacecraft. In addition, Polke’s painting can 
be seen to anticipate the less heroic and more stupid ‘world pictures’ that we have 
now, which organize and inform our contemporary understanding of the world.   
 It is certainly the case that our current imagining of the world in the societies of 
Control is no longer symbolized by NASA’s shots of the Earth in Earthrise and Blue 
Marble from the ’60s and early ’70s. We no longer see the Earth as a bounty of 
resources (or ‘standing reserve’), uniting us in a global community via a shared duty 
of care. Instead, we have entered a new situation, in which the Earth’s productive 
resources are seemingly exhausted and the planet seems dangerous, threatening and 
hostile to our well-being. In line with this view, it is becoming increasingly accepted 
that our epoch can be correctly understood with the geologic time label 





that, for all intents and purposes, ‘nature’ as we understood it, is gone for good. As 
Robert Macfarlane writes, summarising the idea: 
[H]uman activity is considered such a powerful influence on the environment, 
climate and ecology of the planet that it will leave a long-term signature in the 
strata record...We have bored 50m kilometres of holes in our search for oil. We 
remove mountain tops to get at the coal they contain. The oceans dance with 
billions of tiny plastic beads. Weaponry tests have dispersed artificial 
radionuclides globally. The burning of rainforests for monoculture production 
sends out killing smog-palls that settle into the sediment across entire countries. 
We have become titanic geological agents, our legacy legible for millennia to 
come.82 
This epochal shift has resulted in a definitively pessimistic worldview, or ‘world 
picture’, which anticipates a series of impending catastrophes: as if the Earth will 
begin to reject and attempt to extinguish our destructive human presence. Indeed 
some geologists have suggested that the Anthropocene may also mark the beginning 
of the ‘sixth mass extinction’.83 A 2015 article published in The Anthropocene 
Review outlines the current ‘extinction crisis’ and the possibility of a fundamental 
reshaping of the Earth’s existing ecological makeup: 
We are now living through a phase of rapid acceleration in many geologically 
significant processes, notably as regards climate, ocean chemistry and 
biodiversity, and the changes that already have occurred in the Earth System 
approach those evident in the lead-up to the Cambrian Explosion [an explosion of 
diversity said to begin around 545 million years ago, which precipitated the 
appearance of complex, multi-celled organisms]. Hence, current trends, if 
maintained, would likely result in period - or even era - scale changes to the 
Earth System.84 
In light of these developments, I want to ask what sort of literal ‘world pictures’ we 
have now? The ‘world pictures’ produced by NASA can be seen as a materialization 
of Heidegger’s thoughts on ‘Total Mobilization’ in the Age of the World Picture 
despite their overwhelmingly positive, euphoric reception. Polke as Astronaut, whilst 
authentic of its historical moment, as I have argued, also seems prescient of a ‘world 
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picture’ that, in its simultaneous banality, comedy and stupidity, has much in 
common with our culture today. Indeed we might suggest that Jameson’s account of 
the affectless subject in postmodernism, which coolly moves from sets of affective 
intensity, is insufficient to describe works such as Polke as Astronaut and many 
contemporary cultural phenomenons that are instead suggestive of a depressed 
subject, which finds relief in displays of stupidity. Turning now to the present, I want 
to ask what sorts of ideas are congealed within the ‘world pictures’ produced by our 
current social, technological and ecological conditions? What are the ‘world pictures’ 
that mediate our experience of the Anthropocene, and what sort of collective 
consciousness do they enable?  
planetary dysphoria  
	  
Heidegger suggested that the Age of the World Picture epitomized ‘man’s 
domination of the earth by means of his technological will’. I have argued that this 
was represented in NASA’s photographs, which displayed the Earth as a finite, fixed 
and enclosed resource, or commodity even. Now I want to look at what we might 
understand as literal ‘world pictures’ from the last ten years: Google Earth and Red 
Bull’s Stratos project, both of which share certain points of commonality with 
NASA’s photographs whilst also indicating an entirely different planetary 
consciousness that is related to recent technological innovations and attendant shifts 
in our relationship to the Earth.        
 On start-up, the computer programme Google Earth begins with a slow, rotating 
drift towards the Earth from an unspecified location in outer space. We arrive at a 
view (fig. 1.9) as if from the perspective of the Apollo 17 crew, who in 1972 snapped 
the image that would become Blue Marble. The viewer of Google Earth however is 
given an active role in the planet’s representation: he or she is like an extra-terrestrial 
pilot to whom the Earth is made available as a ‘globe in practice’. By this, I mean 
that this particular image initiates a vision most associated with that of the pilot or 
‘airman’. This idea of a ‘globe in practice’ was first described by American poet and 
essayist Archibald MacLeish, who wrote that, for the airman, the world is conceived 
as ‘a single sphere, a globe having the qualities of a globe, a round earth in which all 





none, is center’.85 This, he explains, is ‘a globe in practice, not in theory’.86 And so 
Google’s Earth comes to us as a sphere: a round object in which all points, spatial 
and temporal (in 2009 a feature was released wherein the user can move back and 
forth in time and thus reveal changes over past decades) eventually meet one another. 
One can scroll from a deep ocean bathymetry to mountainous hypsometry in a 
smooth continuous movement. Moreover, we are given the ability to zoom in from 
the Blue Marble viewpoint, to a point beyond the highest zooming level of its map, 
arriving at the contentious ‘Street View’ level: a panoramic street-by-street 
representation of urban and rural environments stitched together from 360° 
photographic images taken by a fleet of specially adapted cars, tricycles, 
snowmobiles and boats.87        
 Google Earth’s spectacular virtual globe, map and geographical information 
program has been downloaded well over one billion times.88 Its software was 
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originally called EarthViewer 3D, and was created by a private Silicon Valley 
company, Keyhole Inc. This company was funded by In-Q-Tel, a venture-capital arm 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which invests in Silicon Valley technology 
with the purpose of keeping the CIA equipped with the latest technological 
developments.89 This software came to public prominence in 2003 when, in 
exchange for on-air exposure, war reports from Iraq on American news networks – 
CNN, ABC, CBS – were illustrated with its sophisticated 3D maps. For instance, on 
CNN, EarthViewer 3D was used to simulate a flight over Baghdad followed by a 
tour of the streets of the bombing targets.90 The software, whose website was so 
overwhelmed by enthusiastic users following its on-air publicity that it crashed, was 
in 2004 acquired by Google. And, soon enough, EarthViewer 3D’s form of global 
representation, which was primarily accustomed to illustrate and aid modern warfare, 
became a banal, utterly normal and domesticated part of our everyday visual diet. 
Indeed it has become one of the primary means by which we interact with the world. 
 Mark Dorrian’s essay ‘On Google Earth’ makes clear that Google Earth’s 
‘interface works through a principle of grasping’.91 Our interaction with the object 
pivots on a hand icon, with which we can manoeuvre the Earth and navigate our 
perception of it through a process of grabbing and pinching. For Dorrian this 
intensifies the sense of the manipulability of the virtual object, and as such, is 
reminiscent of the ‘cartographic tradition of miniature globes that we place our hands 
on and revolve’.92 Indeed Google Earth might even represent a ‘digital simulacrum’ 
of these ornamental spinning globes.93 This notion of grasping hints at the epistemic 
process Heidegger characterised as essential to ‘modern science’, and intensifies the 
effect of the earlier discussed ‘world picture’. To grasp something refers to a process 
of understanding by seizing and holding on. When we grasp something, we are, to 
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paraphrase Heidegger, ‘the relational centre of that which is as such’.94 In this sense, 
grasping only serves to seize the object within an always-already known object 
sphere. Indeed Google Earth seems the acme of Heidegger’s ‘representation’ [vor-
stellen], or ‘setting in place’ of nature. For instance, this graspable Earth is, unlike 
Blue Marble and Earthrise completely bereft of cloud coverage. ‘The World ceases 
to have a dark side’, Dorrian writes, ‘and instead we have an entirely illuminated 
globe’.95 The lack of clouds distances this Earth from earlier ‘world pictures’, whose 
clouds were interpreted by some commentators as a disorientating element that 
transcended the expected geophysical grid.96 Google Earth enforces another form of 
interface: one that doesn’t emphasise the sublime incalculability of our planet (an 
end toward which the clouds might be seen to operate in Blue Marble), but instead 
displays the apparatus, or non-diegetic space, through which the virtual image is 
achieved. We are always aware that we are observing a mechanically encircled 
Earth: pieced together from various fragments of image data. The preset 
representation of the Earth is covered by thin two-dimensional overlays containing 
icons, numbers, touristic points of interest and links to destination photographs. We 
are forcefully disengaged from any sort of euphoric exhilaration, or sense of awe. In 
other words there is a drain of affect, or loss of cathection to the world, whose 
representation here disavows any significant emotional investment or affective 
charge. Indeed Dorrian claims that even ‘with the program’s informational layers 
switched off, we can be under no illusion that this is any kind of “natural” image’.97 
 What is emphasised by this fragmented collection of geospatial data is a sense of 
total availability, or in Dorrian’s words, ‘searchability’.98 Nothing is out of reach, 
nothing is unknown or beyond our grasp. It is as if the spectacular and readily 
mythologized images of the globe, such as the Apollo images, are now too simplistic 
and insufficiently satisfying. Indeed, four years before Google Earth was released, 
Denis Cosgrove, author of a book on the history of cartography, suggested that 
traditional representations of the globe could no longer signify the ‘abstract values 
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required in corporate advertising at the millennium’.99 Cosgrove explains that the 
emergence of a ‘frictionless capitalism’ and an accompanying impression of the 
Earth as ‘great planetary marketplace’ required a different imagining of the planet.100 
This capitalism was to be conceived as a ‘network of interconnecting lines 
signif[ying] communication between points that increasingly convey no material 
objects…virtual and purely informational, operating through satellites arrayed above 
the global surface and unconstrained by its physical barriers to flow’.101 And as if 
responding to Cosgrove’s analysis of the unconstrained and frictionless imagining of 
the Earth by corporate marketing, Google Earth emerged: offering its user 
uninhibited access to traverse the planet with an absolute absence of any physical 
barrier.          
 Similar to NASA’s photographs, however, the mode of representation offered by 
Google Earth - without cloud coverage, totally searchable and visible, and overcoded 
with non-diegetic data - produces its own ideological mystification. By this, I mean 
that it intervenes in the individual’s perception of the world, putting it in alliance 
with the global system of frictionless capitalism that Google Earth symbolizes. For 
this reason, the subject understands itself as increasingly ‘motile’. This is a condition, 
Paul Virilio writes in Open Sky (1997), where the individual has ‘limited his body’s 
area of influence to a few gestures, a few impulses’.102 This interactive being - 
hooked up to ultra-powerful communication and telecommunication tools - is, Virilio 
suggests, ‘doomed to inertia…natural capacities for movement and displacement [are 
transferred] to probes and scanners which instantaneously inform him about a remote 
reality’.103 Mobility is not important to the Google Earth user who is, more precisely, 
‘mobile on the spot’.104 Virilio cites the rise of home shopping and working from 
home as paradigmatic examples of the emergence of this new subject, whose private 
space offers no sanctuary from the productive time of capital and who is now 
accordingly often confined to his or her home, condemned to immobility, having no 
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good reason to leave. Google’s totally searchable Earth, dense with detail and 
accessible on a personal screen upholds this idea of a ‘motile’ subject. Its user is 
allowed to ‘swoop in like Superman from outer space’, Dorrian writes, ‘flying over 
the planet, while…continuing to fulfil…bureaucratic obligations below’.105 This 
individual, simultaneously superhero and obedient worker, corresponds to what 
Virilio provocatively claims to be a technologically-driven disabilization of everyday 
life: 
this citizen-terminal soon to be decked to the eyeballs with interactive prostheses 
based on the pathological model of the spastic, wired to control his/her domestic 
environment without having physically to stir: the catastrophic figure of an 
individual who has lost the capacity for immediate intervention along with 
natural motricity and who abandons himself, for want of anything better, to the 
capabilities of captors, sensors and other remote control scanners that turn him 
into a being controlled by the machine with which, they say, he talks.106 
Virilio’s claim is premised upon the observation of emerging similarities between the 
technologically well-equipped disabled person and the technologically over-equipped 
able-bodied person. He argues that reduced mobility - in the former - and growing 
inertia - in the latter - is fast collapsing the distinction between able and disabled. 
Virilio draws this conclusion from a seemingly benign remark made by François 
Mitterand, at an international symposium on disability in Dunkirk, regarding the 
need for cities to adapt to and be made completely accessible for the physically 
challenged.107 Virilio infers a technocratic underside to Mitterand’s ‘noble’ display 
of generosity. In this understanding Mitterand’s putative benevolence toward the 
disabled veiled a more general concession to neo-liberalism’s frictionless capitalism, 
which is indifferent to our spatial mobility and only requires that we be connected to 
its network.108 So, by the force of circumstance, the disabled subject becomes an 
imperative of capital. Whilst Virilio’s characterisation is problematic from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Dorrian, ‘On Google Earth’, 164.  
106 Virilio, Open Sky, 20.  
107 Mitterand is quoted: ‘Cities must adapt to their citizens and not the other way round. Let’s open up 
the city to the physically challenged. I ask that an overall policy on the disabled be a firm axis of 
Europe as a social institution’. See Virilio, Open Sky, 21. 
108 This can also be seen as part of the so-called collapse of the former French President’s reformist 
ambitions and social democratic ideals into a sweeping neoliberal program. This is detailed in Jonah 
Birch, ‘The Many Lives of François Mitterrand’, Jacobin (August 2015), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/francois-mitterrand-socialist-party-common-program-





disability studies perspective, we can at least take from his argument the idea of us 
delegating or surrendering our mobility to technical systems. This can be glimpsed, 
for instance, in the Japanese phenomena of hikikomori (meaning acute social 
withdrawal), which like Baudrillard’s analysis of obesity in America in the 1980s, 
can be seen to represent an ‘excess of conformity’ to cultural norms.109 ‘According to 
figures released by the Japanese government, as of 2010’, Franco Berardi writes, 
‘700,000 individuals, with an average age of thirty-one, have made the decision to 
sever all relations with the outside world, in order to live their lives from behind the 
locked door of their own room’.110 Their only point of contact with a world outside 
their cramped and cluttered rooms is via electronic screens. Moreover this motile 
subject is an imperative of the military in the West: its pilots are now operators of 
remote-controlled Predator and Reaper drones. ‘While previously the physical 
prowess of the pilots was an integral part of their public identity’, Hito Steyerl 
writes, now their ‘physical performance has become secondary and their own 
mobility is not a decisive factor’.111 More prosaically, Dorrian also suggests that the 
process by which we engage with Google Earth is symbolic of our contemporary 
consumer habits. This is premised on the fact of the Earth’s ‘searchability’. 
 ‘Searchability’ refers to the way that we engage with Google Earth: clicking and 
zooming into our specified target. This functions as a form of shopping. ‘The 
promise here’, Dorrian explains, ‘is of a kind of virtuous circle of mutual targeting 
whereby Google Earth permits the commodity to target, via advertising, the 
cybertourist cum satellite-consumer, and then in turn to be spatially targeted by 
her’.112 The total illumination of the globe on display and its overt constructedness 
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(here I’m referring to the image’s highly visible apparatus of non-diegetic data) 
enunciates the wholeness of its searchability. For Dorrian, this is how we should 
understand its total dispersal of clouds: ‘for everything that retards vision tends to be 
drained away’.113 We are given a total range of vision that turns everything into a 
potential target or searchable commodity. Furthermore this instrumentalization of a 
‘world picture’ for the purpose of shopping is actively reconfiguring the physical 
landscape as a media surface on which to advertise. For instance, Robert Smithson’s 
topographical intervention Spiral Jetty (1970) which revealed itself predominately 
from an aerial perspective can now be seen as a precedent to a mode of advertising 
that directs itself toward a satellite intermediary, in order to be seen by the consumer 
on Google Earth. This includes KFC’s famous 87,500 square foot Colonel Sanders 
logo in Nevada (removed in 2007, but still visible on Google Earth if the timeline 
scale is scrolled back to circa 2006) and a trend for rooftops as billboards.114 For 
Dorrian, what Google Earth ultimately facilitates is a circle of mutual targeting 
between commodity and consumer, within which the consumer doesn’t have to 
move. Virilio’s disabled person is normalized because we are encouraged to perceive 
the Earth in terms of its ‘searchability’. This feature represents a further advance on 
the way in which, as I earlier argued, NASA’s images of the Earth smuggled within 
them a consumerist ideology.         
 In order to build on Dorrian’s interpretation, I want to ask what other insights 
Google Earth offers into our contemporary understanding of the world: 
acknowledging that it is both empowering, ultra-useful and at the same time 
symptomatic of Virilio’s thoughts on disability. In particular, I want to highlight 
Google Earth’s aesthetic register. I earlier mentioned that its mode of representation 
forcefully removes us from any sense of the euphoric exhilaration that characterised 
NASA’s Apollo images. In this respect, a more likely response to a fragmented 
global image overcoded with non-diegetic tools for instantaneous targeting is not 
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euphoria, but dysphoria: a feeling that refers to the total evacuation of euphoria.  
 There is nothing designed to immerse, wow and exhilarate the user within 
Google Earth. We can experience history on Google Earth through its time slider, 
and access aerial views of local environments from certain ‘acquisition dates’ 
throughout twentieth-century history. ‘Real’ history is not displaced with an 
immersive ‘history of aesthetic styles’, as in, for instance, the nostalgia-trend cinema 
cited as ‘euphoric’ and emblematic of postmodernism by Jameson, but instead 
displaced with a uniform, searchable and nondescript interface. We might say that 
postmodern ‘nostalgia’ imagery operates through evoking a lost object of desire (the 
Lacanian objet petit a): a representation of history as ‘chimerical object of fantasy’, 
which, in the words of Slavoj Žižek, causes ‘our desire and at the same 
time…materializes the void of our desire’.115 This might be the depressing truth of 
the postmodern object and the depressing truth of the postmodern subject’s 
‘euphoria’. However the experience of Google Earth appears to represent an advance 
or stage beyond the postmodern media discussed by Jameson: there is no phantasmic 
register to Google Earth’s imagery, no attempt to achieve or fabricate a sense of 
transparency or immediacy. In their book Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(2000), Jay David Bolter and Robert Grusin write that this ‘immediate’ mode of 
representation is one where the media object operates ‘to make the viewer forget the 
presence of the medium (canvas, photographic film, cinema and so on) and believe 
that he is in the presence of the objects of representation’.116 And so, we might add, 
function as an objet petit a. This for instance, is applicable to NASA’s photographs 
of the Earth from space. However with Google Earth’s mode of representation there 
is no attempt to hide the ‘void behind our desire’. It is ‘hyper-immediate’: a new-
media ‘style of visual representation whose goal is to remind the viewer of the 
medium’.117 The user is constantly made aware of the apparatus: indicating, perhaps, 
Google’s comfort with the knowledge that their user no longer requires a ‘chimerical 
object of fantasy’ in order to cover up the ‘void’ that defines their desire to search its 
globe. The euphoric aesthetic of the ‘world pictures’ of the ’60s and ’70s has 
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disappeared: Google Earth, by contrast, is depressing. It has a dysphoric aesthetic 
that can be seen to correspond to a wider planetary dysphoria, which is itself 
symptomatic of a worldview informed by the Anthropocene.   
 ‘Planetary dysphoria’ is a term coined by the critic Emily Apter that defines ‘a 
variation on Melanie Klein’s ‘“depressive position” [experience of guilt, grief, 
helplessness and dependency towards the object, initially the mother] suffusing every 
aspect of economic, social and terrestrial life’.118 It refers to a process by which the 
Earth’s impoverishment is internalized by the individual, who then – paraphrasing 
Freud on melancholia – experiences a ‘delusional expectation of punishment’.119 
Dysphoria, she writes, ‘denotes an unpleasant or uncomfortable mood: sadness, a 
downer moment, anxiety, restlessness, irritability, spleen, manic swings, 
withdrawal…and the total evacuation of euphoria’.120 The dysphoric individual is 
unreceptive to euphoric intensities because he or she is exhausted or too depressed. 
Apter observes a particular sort of ‘planetary aesthetic’ in contemporary culture: this 
is a ‘world picture’ that ‘captures the geopsychoanalytic state of the world at its most 
depressed and unruhig’.121 This aesthetic is ‘informed by a newfound sensitivity to 
the real and imagined processes of the earth’s destruction and the end of life as we 
know it’.122 The planet is conceived as ‘an environmental death-trap afflicted by 
radiation, pandemics, dust and stellar burnout’.123 Google Earth provides a 
comparably depressing conception of the planet: an image of the Earth that has come 
to replace the increasingly cataclysmic world around us – one that is fully explored, 
mediated and rendered as a 3D interactive world, locking us in as pitiful consumers, 
symbolizing our increasingly total immobilization.  
suicide from the edge of space 
	  
To further demonstrate this ‘planetary dysphoria’, I’m going to come to my final 
example: Red Bull’s Stratos project (2012) and the cultural phenomenon of extreme 
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sports. I want to read these popular activities as symptomatic of the ‘delusional 
expectation of punishment’ that results from an increasingly dysphoric worldview. In 
effect, they dramatically exemplify this dysphoria with progressively more suicidal-
seeming experiments, which can be seen to put our contemporary culture in touch 
with the history of sacrifices, suicide and death that was theorized by Georges 
Bataille in the 1930s and also addressed more recently by Baudrillard. All great 
world-historic events appear twice, Marx writes, ‘the first time as tragedy, the second 
time as farce’.124 Red Bull’s Stratos, I want to claim, is the ‘farce’ that corresponds 
to NASA’s iconic ‘world pictures’. Indeed it produced a picture of the world whose 
sheer spectacle rivals, and arguably exceeds NASA’s images from the ’60s and ’70s.  
However, with Red Bull the state-sponsored conquest and photographing of the 
Earth from space for political purposes (Cold War posturing) and modern scientific 
advancement shifts to a corporate-sponsored conquest for the purpose of a marketing 
exercise-cum-Jackass-type stunt.       
 On 14th October 2012 Red Bull achieved their goal to drop someone from the 
edge of the stratosphere (or as the event was marketed – ‘from the edge of space’) 
into freefall without vehicular support.125 The stunt was streamed in real-time on 
YouTube, and in doing this the Austrian parachutist, skydiver and BASE jumper 
Felix Baumgartner set a number of world records.126 These records were ratified by 
the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale and accounted for ‘Maximum Vertical 
Speed’, ‘Exit Altitude’ and ‘Vertical Distance of Freefall’.127 Baumgartner’s journey 
began in Roswell, USA, where he lifted off in a pressurized capsule attached to a 
large helium balloon. At an altitude of 38969.4m (24 miles), he exited the capsule 
and fell down to earth towards a specific target zone. Baumgartner, wearing a 
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specially designed pressurized suit, fell without the aid of any support other than air 
for a distance of 36402.6m (22.6 miles). He reached the maximum speed of 1357.6 
km/h (843.6 mph) before opening his parachute and drifting down to his target. This 
speed also made him the first person to break the sound barrier without vehicular 
power or support.        
 Red Bull is an Austrian company whose product (a globally popular energy 
drink) is fairly insignificant. More important than the drink they produce is the brand 
or lifestyle they market, which involves consuming the drink. The eponymous 
beverage was based on a pre-existing Thai drink: Krating Daeng, whose logo 
displays two charging red bulls against a backdrop of the sun. Red Bull’s co-founder 
Dietrich Mateschitz encountered the drink in 1982 and slightly rebranded the product 
for distribution on the global market (it was initially released in Austria in 1987 and 
became globally popular in the late 1990s and 2000s). ‘We don't bring the product to 
the people’, Mateschitz explains, ‘[w]e bring people to the product. We make it 
available and those who love our style come to us’.128 An article in The Economist 
glosses Mateschitz’s marketing, which ‘launched the brand by persuading students to 
drive around in Minis and Beetles with a Red Bull can strapped on top, or to throw 
Red Bull parties around weird and wonderful themes. The company’s only 
advertisements are a series of whimsical television cartoons’.129 In this respect, Red 
Bull is a fundamentally post-industrial enterprise in that all the company produces is 
symbolic value. It is a marketing machine for the brand’s self-promotion through 
extreme sports events, sponsorship and sports team ownerships. The Stratos project 
was one such event. They streamed the freefall ‘from the edge of space’ live on their 
YouTube channel, and broke another - non-sporting – record: becoming the ‘live 
stream with the most concurrent views ever on YouTube’ (at peak it had over eight 
million concurrent views).130 The stunt was estimated to be worth ‘tens of millions of 
dollars’ for Red Bull. Indeed, an article in Forbes magazine claimed that the 
‘sponsorship transcended sports and entertainment into Pop Culture, hitting new 
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consumers that Red Bull does not usually capture, and on a global scale’.131 Sports, 
entertainment and media-marketing mogul Ben Sturner, quoted in the article, 
enthused that the project’s ‘value for Red Bull is in the tens of millions of dollars of 
global exposure, and Red Bull Stratos will continue to be talked about and passed 
along socially for a very long time’.132     
 However, I want to suggest that the most striking aspect of the jump was the way 
in which it pictured the Earth (whilst the stunt did not technically take place outside 
of the Earth’s atmosphere, the exit altitude provided the impression of looking down 
on the Earth from space). Rather than the fixed perspective of NASA’s photographs 
or the continuous aerial viewpoint operative in Google Earth, here we had access to a 
much more dynamic perspective. Baumgartner’s capsule was equipped with nine 
high-definition (HD) cameras, and his pressure suit with three HD cameras, one on 
each thigh and one on the chest pack. An optical ground tracking camera system with 
high power zoom lenses was also used to track Baumgartner’s descent. From the 
perspective of the viewer, we were able to see Baumgartner fall towards the Earth’s 
surface; the panoply of HD real-time imaging equipment allowing for a spectacularly 
embodied representation of the zoomed-in targeting that takes place on Google 
Earth. At the exit altitude we were streamed footage of Baumgartner: the camera 
positioned within the confined - six-foot diameter - spherical capsule so that we saw 
over the jumper’s shoulder. As the capsule’s rotational door rolled open we were 
given a remarkable view of the Earth: its curvature visible, dividing an aerial view of 
the Earth’s surface from the mesosphere portion of the planet’s atmosphere (above 
the stratosphere), which appears as black as deep space. Before Baumgartner’s 
departure, he stood precariously on a platform outside the capsule. From here it was 
possible to glimpse a Google Earth-style aerial view from just above the jumper. So 
we saw Baumgartner, as if on a diving board, with the Earth’s surface stretching to 
the edges of the screen’s space (fig. 1.10). Baumgartner here seemed to occupy a 
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viewpoint normally the privilege of unmanned communications satellites. After a 
short premeditated speech (‘sometimes you have to get up really high, to see how 
small you are; I’m coming home now’) that recalled Neil Armstrong’s famous words 
during the moon landing, albeit a more individualistic version (Armstrong referenced 
mankind, Baumgartner references only himself), he stepped off the platform and fell. 
Mission control confirmed over the radio ‘Jumper away’. As Baumgartner entered 
his freefall, the image switched to the chest-pack mounted HD camera, which 
provided a near-enough point of view (POV) style representation of the Google Earth 
zoom toward a target zone. The Earth’s spherical surface had the effect of twisting, 
heaving and mutating as Baumgartner dropped through its atmosphere: gravity 
pulling the mass of his body towards its terminal velocity. Interestingly, our 
perception of the Earth did not open up in accordance with Baumgartner’s position 
relative to the Earth’s surface, rather the streamed image generated a much more 
dizzy perspective: a point of view totally alien to Google Earth’s linear zoom. The 
view was distorted and wavered between geographic detail and abstract fluidity (fig. 
1.11).          
 Virilio describes, in Open Sky, the perspective of a ‘freefall specialist’. He writes 
of the sudden magnification of vision that results from drastic acceleration. This is 
what seems to account for the bizarre representation of the Earth from Baumgartner’s 
chest-pack mounted camera as he rushes towards terminal velocity – a speed of 
843.6mph reached in 42 seconds. Virilio mentions the particular rush of perception 
induced by a parachutist’s freefall as a metaphor for the shifts in perception that 
occur within the spatiotemporally accelerated conditions of experience provided by 
the telepresence of electronic screen-based technologies. He includes a description of 
‘eyeballing’ the fall in progress (‘eyeballing’ is a parachuting term which refers to 
the assessment during free fall of the moment the parachute should be opened 
without reference to the altimeter) that, I think, helpfully illustrates the POV 
experience of Baumgartner’s jump: 
Eyeballing consists in visually assessing the distance between you and the ground 
the whole time you are falling. You evaluate your height and work out the exact 
moment you need to open your parachute based on a dynamic visual impression. 
When you are flying in a plane at an altitude of 600 metres, you don’t have 





high-speed vertical fall. When you are at 2,000 metres, you can’t see the ground 
approaching. But when you reach the 800 to 600 metre mark, you start to see it 
“coming”. The sensation becomes scary pretty quickly because of ground rush, 
the ground rushing up at you. The apparent diameter of objects increases faster 
and faster and you suddenly have the feeling you are not seeing them getting 
closer but seeing them move apart suddenly, as though the ground were splitting 
open.133  
So the freefall appears as a ‘headlong rush of perception’, where ‘all geometric 
dimensions connect: at first the ground seems to come up, then to open up; the 
arrival of a surface is followed by the spreading of the vanishing lines of a volume, 
anticipating flattening at the point of impact’.134 In this respect, Virilio’s compelling 
description of the freefall specialist’s view can also be seen to describe the view of a 
suicide jumper: the ‘point of impact’ signifying for the viewer the vicarious thrill of 
death. Whilst Baumgartner’s perilous exercise seems to share Google Earth’s 
representation of the planet (an embodiment of its dynamic search process), it does 
not share its impression of an Earth ‘grasped’ and made manipulable (exemplified by 
its small hand icon, with which one can take hold of the earth and spin it). By 
contrast, the eyeballer-type view creates the impression of ‘the ground splitting 
open’. Whilst we might argue that there is an implicit euphoria in this experience 
related to an overcoming of our fears, perhaps, I want to maintain that the thrill 
offered up to us is bound up with the real-time of a freefalling body, the real-pull of 
gravity and impending death. Virilio writes of the freefall as an ‘experiment on the 
inertia of a body pulled by its mass: it is what happens prior to its indefinite 
annihilation upon ground impact’.135 In this understanding, the extreme sensations 
offered by extreme sports, such as BASE jumping, are suicidal experiments ‘with no 
other aim than that of experiencing the heaviness of the body’.136   
 The allure of Red Bull’s Stratos, and arguably all other extreme sports in this 
account, resides in its performance of a suicidal action. In this respect, I am echoing 
Baudrillard’s argument in America (1986) about the New York marathon. ‘I would 
never have believed that the New York marathon could move you to tears’, he 
writes: 
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In driving rain, with helicopters circling overhead and the crowd cheering, 
wearing aluminium foil capes and squinting at their stop-watches, or bare-
chested, their eyes rolling skywards, they are all seeking death, that death by 
exhaustion that was the fate of the first Marathon man some two thousand years 
ago. And he, let us not forget, was carrying a message of victory to Athens. They 
also dream no doubt of bringing a victory message, but there are too many of 
them and their message has lost all meaning: it is merely the message of their 
arrival, at the end of their exertions, the twilight message of a futile, superhuman 
effort…The marathon is a form of demonstrative suicide, suicide as advertising: 
it is running to show you are capable of getting every last drop of energy out of 
yourself…137  
Likewise, Red Bull’s sponsored extreme sports events can be seen as forms of 
‘demonstrative suicide’, which allow its participants to act out or perform their own 
death, and allow viewers to do so by proxy. Indeed, for some unfortunate extreme 
sport specialists their acts of ‘demonstrative suicide’ have been realised whilst under 
Red Bull’s employ: thus pitifully falling short of its famous company slogan – ‘Red 
Bull Gives You Wings’. In a trailer for Red Bull’s Human Flight 3D film, a group of 
proximity flyers (a variation of BASE jumping, where the jumper wears a ‘wingsuit’, 
the aim being to fly as close to the faces and ridges of mountains as possible) are 
gathered around a table discussing the next perilous jump:  
 C’mon we don’t need to do this. It’s insane, it’s suicide guys! 
 We got an obligation to push the envelope in this sport… 
 Don’t be such a wuss! 
 We gotta’ do it 
 It’s true.138 
Needless to say, the jump was suicide. The individual who claims an ‘obligation to 
push the envelope’ despite the overwhelming threat of suicidal death was freefall 
specialist Eli Thompson, who was later killed on a jump in the Swiss Alps. This so-
called obligation to complete the stunt, or to just do it - to not be ‘a wuss!’ - is also 
referenced in Baudrillard’s observations of the New York marathon. It is, he writes, 
‘the mania for an empty victory, the joy engendered by a feat that is of no 
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consequence’.139 This is about doing something to merely prove to yourself that you 
can do it: a maniacal desire to prove that you exist, or in the case of Thompson, 
existed. However, Thompson’s was not an isolated occurrence of death under Red 
Bull’s supervision. In 2009 the ‘extreme-skier’ and BASE jumper Shane McConkey 
died in the Dolomite Mountains in Italy, after freefalling for 12 seconds and failing 
to deploy his parachute.140 And, again in 2009, BASE jumper Ueli Gegenschatz died 
after making a ‘PR parachute jump from 88 metres high’ as part of the launch of Red 
Bull’s venture into mobile phone technology.141 The actual threat of death, it seems, 
is essential to the marketing of the energy drink. And this, communications scientist 
Norbert Bolz explains, is a highly lucrative ‘marketing strategy where there is no 
competition, nobody else dares endorse the dangerous life like this’.142 For all intents 
and purposes, Red Bull has fully realised Baudrillard’s notion of ‘suicide as 
advertising’.         
 Stratos did not result in death. Furthermore, as one would expect, efforts were 
made to subdue this potential outcome from the overall spectacle. Firstly, the initial 
launch date was aborted because of unfavourable weather conditions: a display of 
caution not always demonstrated by Red Bull, who have come under criticism for 
pressuring their athletes to perform in adverse weather conditions. Secondly, the 
jump was made for live-viewing on YouTube. However it was streamed with a 
twenty second delay, in case of accident. This is called ‘broadcast delay’ and is 
commonly used for live television in order to prevent profanities or violence from 
making it to air. Whilst the stunt surely had viewers staring in open-mouthed horror 
at the jump’s absurd exit altitude, from which the Earth’s atmospheric edge appeared 
visible, a direct experience of death was never in the offing for the viewers. For 
instance, when Baumgartner enters a potentially fatal uncontrolled spin after the first 
minute of the jump, we don’t feel anxious or overly concerned: it is merely a brief 
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period of heightened drama in a journey whose success is already assured. What we 
see are images that have already been screened, OK’d and verified by a team of 
supervisors. In this respect, there isn’t anything immediately at stake. Nonetheless, 
Red Bull does seem to inherit the iconography and sadomasochistic pleasure that is 
historically associated with death and ritualistic sacrifice. In the late 1930s Georges 
Bataille wrote an essay on the ‘joy’ one might feel before death. Bataille conceives 
this joy as a kind of epiphylogenetic retention: something that is retained and passed 
on throughout the generations despite historical change.143 Thus, he writes, the 
practice of joy before death rediscovers ‘naïve forms that antedate the intrusion of a 
servile morality’.144 Indeed, a short passage of Bataille’s essay might be seen to 
describe the joy felt by the ‘eyeballing’ freefall specialist who witnesses the Earth 
splitting open:  
“I AM joy before death.                                                                                                   
Joy before death carries me.                                                                                                                                                                                         
Joy before death hurls me down.                                                                                                               
Joy before death annihilates me.” 
“I slowly lose myself in unintelligible and bottomless space.                                                                                    
I reach the depths of worlds.                                                                                              
I am devoured by death.                                                                                                          
I am devoured by fever.                                                                                                                  
I am absorbed in somber space.                                                                                             
I am annihilated in joy before death.”145 
 This idea of an epiphylogenetic joy and pleasure in death is also referenced in 
Michael Serres’s writing on the trace of ritualistic sacrifice in contemporary times. 
He discusses this in Statues (1993) and in his published conversation with Bruno 
Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time (1995). Serres’s argument is 
premised on the NASA Challenger disaster (January 28th 1986), when a Space 
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Shuttle broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all crew members, whilst being 
streamed live on CNN. The cause of this disaster was famously demonstrated by 
theoretical physicist, Richard Feynman, in a televised hearing. Feynman simply 
plunged a sample of the Shuttle’s (not fit for purpose) sealing material into a beaker 
of liquid nitrogen to show its lack of resilience. This served to illustrate that the 
integrity of the Shuttle’s fuel rocket booster was critically impaired by the sub-zero 
weather conditions during launch. Feynman argued that this fault was known and, in 
an appendix to a commissioned report on the accident, he explained that ‘there are 
enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure with loss of vehicle 
and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The 
high figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from 
management’.146 This point, that the potentially suicidal risk was known and 
internalised by management, allows Serres to draw parallels between this explosion 
and the ancient Carthaginian practice of enclosing humans in a giant statue of the 
god Baal (who is, incidentally, symbolically represented with an image of a bull), 
and immolating them. ‘Denial’, Roxanne Lapidus writes in the book’s translator’s 
note, ‘played a large role in both events. Since the Carthaginians incinerated both 
animals and children in their statue of Baal, even the parents of the sacrificed 
children allegedly denied that the cries they heard were those of humans’.147 Lapidus, 
glossing Serres’s argument, asserts that ‘[w]e are engaging in a similar form of 
denial…when we say that the Challenger explosion was an accident; such accidents, 
he insists, are predictable, according to the laws of probability’.148   
 Seen from this perspective, Feynman’s statistics regarding the differences of 
opinion between the engineers and NASA’s management figures reveal that modern 
science and its technologies contain shadowy traces of archaic violence. Serres 
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concludes that ‘Baal is in the Challenger, and the Challenger is in Baal’.149 Other 
similarities between the two events ‘include the immense cost to the respective 
societies in erecting these “statues”, the active role of “specialists” (scientists/priests) 
in setting the event in motion, the presence of a large crowd of onlookers, who 
witness the events open-mouthed in horror, and the repetitive nature of the event 
(replayed again and again on television screens; actively repeated in Carthage 
whenever national events seemed to require it)’.150 And so, whilst we typically 
understand ‘modern science’ to have overcome archaic forms of consciousness and 
behaviour, Serres suggests that these are in fact sedimented within our social 
structures, systems and apparatuses and destined to repeat themselves. Indeed he 
provocatively claims that ‘[w]e are ancient in most of our actions and thoughts’.151
 Certainly, the moving image streamed onto our computer screen of Felix 
Baumgartner exiting his support vehicle and perched on the edge of a horrific 
precipice carries a trace of archaic violence and ritualistic sacrifice. He then falls for 
our pleasure - a ‘joy before death’ by proxy. However, Stratos doesn’t have the same 
heroic aspect as Bataille’s account of death. For Bataille the ‘practice of joy before 
death’ enacts a resistance to social servitude: tragically representing, he writes, the 
‘only intellectually honest route in the search for ecstasy’.152 By contrast, there was 
nothing at stake for the Stratos project as a whole; it was not done in pursuit of any 
great hope or ambition. It was done for publicity. The jump was a massively 
expensive, extraordinarily innovative and absolutely empty gesture: a feat of no 
consequence. For the viewer, however, it allowed the vicarious experience of a 
suicide jump: the thrill of plummeting to your point of impact and annihilation whilst 
sat at a computer screen. This re-emergence or revival of an epiphylogenetic ‘joy 
before death’ can be seen as a symptom of our dysphoric ‘world picture’ - a sign of 
the ‘delusional expectation of punishment’ that comes with a depressed outlook on 
the world.         
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and Time, no page reference.  
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 Perhaps this is also true of the enthusiasm for extreme sports within white collar 
corporate work culture, which is sometimes referred to as ‘extreme work’ due to its 
tendency to overwhelm and dominate people’s lives with ‘relentless bottom-line 
pressures’.153 This ‘extreme work’ is arguably what Red Bull’s energy drink really 
fuels. Recent market research data suggests that the ‘millennials - specifically the 
older millennials in the 27–37 years age group - have emerged as the key consumers 
of energy drinks…According to a recent survey by Mintel, 64% of the older 
millennials are consuming energy drinks’.154 These are the workers enmeshed in an 
‘extreme work’ culture, whose long hours and relentless demands are galvanized by 
Red Bull’s potent mix of caffeine, taurine, B vitamins, sugar and Alpine spring 
water. It is these workers who also pursue extreme sports in their ‘downtime’ - 
bungee jumping on the weekend or skydiving during a short holiday. ‘Marilyn, a 
senior banker at a London-based investment bank, was captivated by extreme sports’, 
Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce write in an article on ‘extreme work’ in 
the Harvard Business Review:  
skydiving, snowboarding, triathlons, bungee jumping, surfing, mountaineering - 
anything that provided a rush of adrenaline and an element of danger. She 
eagerly recommended Jon Krakauer’s Into Thin Air (an account of an ill-fated 
trip by amateur mountain climbers) as a window into why people push 
themselves to the limits of their physical endurance. Marilyn saw parallels 
between extreme sports and her life as an investment banker. First, there were the 
extraordinary time demands and performance stressors. Seventy-hour 
workweeks, grueling travel requirements, and relentless bottom-line pressures 
constantly pushed her to her limits—both physically and intellectually. Second, 
there was the allure of the job. Much like extreme sports, investment banking was 
exhilarating and seductive. Marilyn told us, “It gives me this rush. Like a drug, 
it’s addictive.”155  
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In this respect, extreme sports seem to be enthusiastically pursued by ‘extreme 
workers’ because it allows them to repeat the aspects of their job for which they 
receive the most praise and reinforcement: testing one’s limits, taking voluntary 
sacrifices and risks, confronting high stakes and danger. Or perhaps, bungee jumping 
or sky diving is pursued, more basically, in order to perform and demonstrate (like 
Baudrillard’s marathon runner), the suicide that they truly desire.   
 Viewed in this way, the Stratos jump acts as a metonym for a contemporary 
‘world picture’. Like Polke’s grinning astronaut in the ’60s, it figures our 
predicament accurately, without heroism or glow, but with a sort of gleeful, fatalistic 
energy. This illuminates, for instance, the idea that technological progress might 
complement, rather than oppose, a dysphoric worldview. This is encapsulated 
precisely in Red Bull’s stunt. It is a display of extraordinary technological innovation 
put to vapid use, appealing to a population whose life is work and whose culture is 
impressed upon them by an energy drink. In this respect, suicidal experiments might 
be pursued for the same reason that Baudrillard observed of the New York marathon 
runner (the ‘mania for an empty victory’). The sheer excess of the modern marathon 
was, for Baudrillard, a blatant overcompensation for something – an ‘international 
symbol’ of ‘fetishistic performance’.156 In the case of extreme sports, it might be 
argued that this overcompensation is symbolic of an extreme work culture of long 
hours, increased stress, anxiety, risk, and - returning to Virilio - an increasing 
sedentariness facilitated by the instantaneous reach of electronic communications.  In 
extreme sports, the experience of extreme work continues after work as a form of 
hysteresis: like an afterimage that won’t leave your vision. And so, quite 
depressingly, the pleasure one takes in extreme sports is ultimately synonymous with 
the pleasure one takes in ‘extreme work’.      
 The theme of tragedy repeated as farce received a further twist in 2014, when 
Google's vice president Alan Eustace took a break from work in order to reenact 
Baumgartner’s BASE jump from the stratosphere. In doing so he broke the freefall 
specialist’s world altitude record. Eustace is not a dedicated athlete like 
Baumgartner: he is a middle-aged, computer scientist, with a classic business haircut 
and the sort of complexion one associates with a life spent behind a screen and under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





fluorescent tube lighting (fig. 1.12). The impression is that Eustace’s jump was, in 
effect, just another day at the office; however this time he wore ‘a specially designed 
spacesuit…[and] jump[ed] from 130,000ft over the southern New Mexico desert, 
reaching a top speed of 822mph during a freefall that lasted four-and-a-half 
minutes’.157 Red Bull’s farce was therefore followed by another farce, rendering it 
even more banal and ridiculous. Eustace’s jump was simply a more extreme version 
of the extreme sports enjoyed by extreme workers. I want to suggest we understand 
these as expressions of a Baudrillardian ‘hyper-conformity’ - a stupid, non-
productive, or seductive (as in to divert or lead astray) version of work, in which you 
keep conforming to work protocols even though you are not at work. Hyper-
conformity can be seen to function, similar to Polke as Astronaut, as a figure of 
stupidity: it seems to confuse and mock Red Bull’s spectacular stunt, making it seem, 
to my mind, unimpressive and ordinary. However, an important difference between 
Eustace’s jump and Polke’s work is that Polke’s intervention was an artistic 
commentary from an external position. Eustace’s stupid jump, by contrast, came 
from within the selfsame system of extreme work and extreme sports. His was a form 
of enthusiastic participation in this culture, which inadvertently resulted in something 
stupid, mocking and parodic. Indeed it seems to affirm an idea of hyper-conformity 
as a ‘paradoxical participation that does not justify but destroys’.158     
 This might be seen to represent a development of Heidegger’s account of our 
age: for Heidegger technology allowed us to order and control the world, destroying 
our relationship with nature by compelling us to see it as a standing-reserve, 
something from which to extract and accumulate profit. Now, by contrast, under the 
sign of the Anthropocene, technology has facilitated a different relationship to the 
world and, by extension, a different ‘world picture’. Whereas the world pictures of 
the ’60s and ’70s inspired a euphoric sense of global community, now our world 
pictures either symbolize our immobility, as in Google Earth, or induce a sense of 
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stupid individual competition as in Stratos, through feats of little consequence, which 
repeat the customs of an ‘extreme work’ culture. Our images of the Earth do not 
evoke the heroic achievements and conquests of modern science and our duty to 
protect the planet, as NASA’s images did. Instead, they symbolize a planet whose 
use has, to a certain extent, been exhausted, or a planet to which we no longer have 
any ‘useful’ relationship. Whilst Google Earth retains the Heideggerian idea of 
grasping the world as an object, albeit skeuomorphically with its hand icon, it is Red 
Bull’s Stratos that seems to play out the full implications of our contemporary ‘world 
picture’. By this I mean to say that, with Stratos, we are made the object of 
technology: we see the world splitting open, we are the victims, acting out the 
fundamentally destructive drive of our dysphoric ‘world picture’. This seems to 
signal a different relationship to technology: reversing perhaps (or at least blurring) 
the subject-object relationship, whereby we have become the object of technology as 
opposed to technology being the object of our intentions, as Heidegger theorised it. 
This does not, however, signal our arrival at an epistemological ‘proper place’, 
where, Adorno writes, ‘the relationship of subject and object would lie in a peace 
achieved between human beings as well as between them and their other…[a] state 
of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each 
other’.159 Instead, it signals a subject-object relationship more like the one described 
in Vilém Flusser’s writing on our ‘post-industrial’ age. Flusser argues that ‘human 
beings are subjects to objects which stand in their way. They must change the 
objects. This changing of the objects becomes increasingly better understood 
theoretically and can be improved in practice, that is until human beings no longer 
need to confront objects [arguably indicating a completion of the Earth’s 
Heideggerian ‘enframing’] while advancing toward the future: then humans can be 
replaced by apparatus. From this point on, humans are no longer true subjects’.160 In 
the suicidal stupidity of extreme sports there is, I think a kind of enthusiastic hyper-
conformity to the object position claimed for us in our new ‘world picture’, in which 
we have no useful relationship to the Earth. And, as we have seen with Alan Eustace 
(an unexceptional man, just doing his job) this suicidal stupidity is inherent to our 
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‘world picture’ - a seductive and pseudo-sacrificial reversal of its productive logic. 
For Adorno and Horkheimer (in their historical moment, discussing the rise of 
Nazism), it is at the height of enlightenment rationality that we are most vulnerable 
to stupidity – ‘[t]here is a historical tendency’, they write, ‘for cleverness to prove 
stupid’.161 David Jenemann expands on this idea, suggesting that when the ‘products 
of rationality are at their most refined, we are most liable to them tipping into 
mindlessness’.162 This idea of there being a reversible aspect of technological 
advancement, when it is suddenly liable to regress or tip into absurdity, seems 
exemplified by Red Bull’s Stratos, and then even more so, by Eustace’s jump. 
Indeed, such instances of stupidity expressing itself within apparatuses of Control are 
not uncommon. For all intents and purposes, it seems to mark much of the visual 
culture and collective forms that have emerged on the internet, as I shall explore 
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Fig. 1.1 Lunar Orbiter 1, the first ever photograph of the Earth from the distance of 





































































	   	  



































































































Fig. 1.5 Albert Renger-Patzsch, Kaffee Hag, 1925. Gelatin silver print, 16.8 x 22.5 
cm.	  Sprengel Museum Hannover. 
 
 
Fig. 1.6 Sigmar Polke, Polke as Astronaut, 1968. Dispersion paint on fabric, 90 x 25 














































Fig. 1.7 Sigmar Polke, Polke as Astronaut, 1968 (top right, in exhibition MOMA 






Fig. 1.8 Edvard Munch, The Scream, 1893. Tempera and casein on cardboard, 91.3 x 





















































































Fig. 1.11 Red Bull, ‘Red Bull Stratos - World Record Freefall’, 2012. Video credit: 
Red Bull. Screenshots taken from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOoHArAzdug, accessed 15/05/14. 
 
 
Fig. 1.12 Alan Eustace, Senior Vice President of Engineering & Research at Google, 

































Super-Enthusiastically Working Together: Internet Memes and Free 
Time on 4chan 
	  
The template for one of the most popular images produced and circulated online 
(other than pornography) is a picture of a cat overlaid with some cute or funny text: 
lolcats. These images have come to be synonymous with online culture and 
epitomise one of the key ways that we interact online. The composite term lolcat 
(‘lol’ being an acronym for the phrase ‘laugh out loud’) refers to a type of internet 
meme comprising a photo of a cat with a large caption set in bold sans serif font: 
typically, the ‘Impact’ typeface is used. The lolcat that is normally credited with 
spawning this hugely popular cultural phenomenon is an anonymously authored 
picture of a grey cat with an open mouth fixed in an awkward smile and a glazed 
expression on its face (fig. 2.1). It appears to make a muddled request for a 
cheeseburger: I CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER? It was on the basis of his appreciation 
for this image that Eric Nakagawa set up icanhascheezburger.com in 2006 in order to 
act as a repository and forum to share similar images. Soon after the website went 
public, it began to receive ‘around 200,000 unique visitors and a half-million page 
views each day’.1 Moreover, ‘Nakagawa says he receives up to 500 [new lolcat] 
submissions a day’.2 These images however circulate within and beyond dedicated 
platforms like Nakagawa’s. They are reported to have emerged in obscurity on the 
online image sharing board 4chan in 2005 and have since become a fixture of the 
popular cultural landscape: shared daily on social media and incorporated into 
various commercial advertisement campaigns.3 Other notable lolcats include a black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Aaron Rutkoff, ‘With 'LOLcats' Internet Fad, Anyone Can Get In on the Joke’, The Wall Street 
Journal (August 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118798557326508182, accessed 04/04/16.  
2 Rutkoff, ‘With 'LOLcats' Internet Fad, Anyone Can Get In on the Joke’, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118798557326508182, accessed 04/04/16.  
3 For instance, the cat in a series of lolcats affectionately known as ‘grumpy cat’, which became 
popular online in 2012, has become a bankable commercial brand. An article in Adweek details how 
grumpy cat became the official ‘spokescat’ for the American cat food brand Friskies and has an 
endorsement deal with Cheerios cereal.  Grumpy cat has also starred in a Lifetime original movie on 
network television, titled Grumpy Cat's Worst Christmas Ever. This lolcat is now also a ‘million-
dollar cat’. See Emma Bazilian, ‘Ad of the Day: Grumpy Cat Gets Stung by the Honey Nut Cheerios 
Mascot, Unimpressed by a famous face’, Adweek (July 2014), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/ad-day-grumpy-cat-gets-stung-honey-nut-





and white cat sitting behind a desk in a generic office, I’m in ur office earnin ur salry 
it explains (fig. 2.2), a small ginger cat dressed up in a fluffy chicken outfit as if in 
fancy dress, I’M A CHIKIN LOL (fig. 2.3), a big ginger cat sat on a laptop keyboard, 
IF IT NOT FOR SITS, it asks, WHY IS IT MADE OF WARM? (fig. 2.4). Indeed the 
ostensibly cute imagery of cats in unusual or ridiculous situations seems to produce 
an equivalently ‘cute’ response from us, as our language in the captions lapses into 
something similarly ridiculous or absurd.       
 The association of cute cats and cute captions can be traced back to the 1870s, 
with photographer Harry Pointer’s anthropomorphic pictures of cats with twee 
annotations. The image shown in fig. 2.5 might be seen as the nineteenth century 
equivalent of I CAN HAZ CHEEZBURGER?. It shows a cat sat in a high chair like a 
baby, looking distressed, a caption set in capital letters and applied directly to the 
photograph asks WHAT’S DELAYING MY DINNER?. The appeal of 
anthropomorphic cats, it would seem, is firmly embedded in our culture. The 
aesthetic allure of these images seems to typify what Sianne Ngai calls ‘the 
deverbalizing effect’ that ‘prototypically cute objects – babies, puppies, and so on – 
often have…on the subjects who impose cuteness upon them’.4 Certainly, lolcats 
seem inherently infantile and infantilizing. We might go further to suggest that the 
popularity of internet memes in general is premised on their essential ‘cuteness’. 
They are typically simple, small and insignificant objects online that are designed to 
be manipulated, customised and edited: images that rarely have one stable form but 
are always in flux. Ngai writes that ‘it is crucial to cuteness that that its diminutive 
object has some sort of imposed-upon aspect or mien – that is, it bears the look of an 
object not only formed but all too easily de-formed under the pressure of the 
subject’s feeling or attitude towards it’.5 This fits the malleability of internet memes, 
which are shared and used by thousands or millions of people. Internet memes 
encompass a wide range of shared information online, including simple image 
macros (usually captioned photographic images like lolcats), YouTube videos that 
are shared and imitated, reaction gifs and ironic Amazon reviews; all of which are in 
a continuous process of circulation and ‘de-formation’ as they are shared and posted 
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on social media, message boards, forums and more mainstream media outlets. All of 
these memes are cute. They don’t withstand the subject’s pressure, they have no 
value, it seems, other than their designed appeal to the viewer: their stupid cuteness.
 Nonetheless, internet memes have in recent years become the focus of serious 
academic discussion, particularly in the field of media and communication studies. In 
December 2014 the Journal of Visual Culture published a themed issue on ‘Internet 
Memes’.6 In 2013 the MIT Press published Limor Shifman’s Meme’s in Digital 
Culture as part of their ‘essential knowledge’ series.7 And various academics, such as 
Kate Miltner, Michelle Calka and Ryan Milner have been involved in research 
projects that interrogate the distinctive use of language and linguistic play embedded 
within this culture of image making.8 Much of this literature celebrates these images 
for their participatory impulse and inherent playfulness: signaling the emergence of 
self-determining communities of users via a technology that we are often told 
fragments and separates individuals. However, I want to claim that these often 
positive arguments are premised upon a conceptualization of an active, co-operative 
or co-productive user that has been outmoded and functionalized by modern 
technology. The current dominant critical perspective recapitulates the kind of claims 
made for the avant-garde in the early twentieth century, albeit applied to mass 
popular culture. Such accounts belong to a tradition of finding empowerment from 
below, as with the sociological analyses of ‘subcultures’ in the 1970s and ’80s that 
were particularly prominent in what was known as the Birmingham School for 
Cultural Studies.9 However, I want to question whether the forms of collective 
agency represented in internet memes are empowering, whether the forms of 
sociability established on social media are emancipatory, whether the images 
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9 Here I’m thinking of, for instance, Dick Hebidge’s research into punk, reggae, hipster and glam in 





themselves offer examples of subversive play and, in short, to examine precisely 
what sort of pleasure we take in them. These problems are explored in the belief that 
the internet meme, and the culture that it symbolizes, is important and that there is a 




We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of 
cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable 
Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like ‘gene’. I hope my 
classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any 
consolation, it could alternatively be thought of as being related to ‘memory’, or 
to the French word même. It should be pronounced to rhyme with ‘cream’.10  
Memes have long been an object of study in evolutionary biology. The term was 
coined by Richard Dawkins in 1976 as a general name for units of cultural 
transmission (such as fashion trends) that spread from person to person, or are 
propagated by imitation. They are usually distinguished from viruses, as in when 
something ‘goes viral’, because they are subject to change or mutation in the 
transmission process. As Susan Blackmore explains, memes produce unpredictable 
replications, like Chinese whispers: ‘a friend tells you a story and you remember the 
gist and pass it on to someone else…[y]ou have not precisely imitated your friend’s 
every action and word, but something (the gist of the story) has been copied from her 
to you and then on to someone else’.11 The term is now predominately associated 
with the internet (a development that Dawkins has wholly embraced).12 Here it refers 
to units of cultural information that are circulated, imitated and transformed online 
and that gradually scale up into a shared social phenomenon. They are, Limor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene [1976] (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
192.  
11 Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4. 
12 I say this in reference to Dawkins’s appearance in a film shown at the Saatchi and Saatchi's New 
Directors’ Showcase 2013 that celebrated the term’s appropriation by internet culture. Dawkins 
delivered a speech about the word's original intention and explained its hijacking by the internet. He 
argued that ‘an internet meme is a hijacking of the original idea. Instead of mutating by random 
change and spreading by a form of Darwinian selection, internet memes are altered deliberately by 
human creativity. There is no attempt at accuracy of copying, as with genes and as with memes in 
their original version. In the hijacked version, memes are deliberately altered, with the full knowledge 
of the person doing the changing’. Dawkins quoted in Olivia Solon, ‘Richard Dawkins appears in 
psychedelic show celebrating internet memes’, Wired (June 2013), 





Shifman explains, ‘highly compatible to the way culture is formed in the so-called 
era of Web 2.0, which is marked by application platforms for facilitating user-
generated content’.13         
 I want to focus on image macros, one of the most widely shared memes, which 
also emerged on 4chan. They often appear in series and pair appropriated photograph 
and text, as we have already seen with the lolcat. It is a simple template that invites 
user participation. Indeed Clay Shirky writes that ‘Lolcat images, dumb as they are, 
have internally consistent rules…captions should be spelled phonetically…[and] the 
lettering should use a sans-serif font’.14 We can add to this set of rules, a clearly 
stunted syntax or nonstandard English dialect, which partly replicates the ‘leet’ 
(otherwise known as 1337) speak of online computer gaming/hacker culture.15 The 
‘closest approximation’, Michelle Calka writes ‘would be to imagine English put 
through an automatic translator into another language and then translated back and 
spelled phonetically’.16        
 In some respects, the form of the image macro is prefigured in a canonical avant-
garde work: Marcel Duchamp’s captioned Mona Lisa appropriation, L.H.O.O.Q. 
(1919) (fig. 2.6). This is because Duchamp’s ‘multi-layered pun’ was a similarly 
straightforwardly replicable image; a postcard reproduction of the artistic 
‘masterpiece’ plus scrawled facial hair with sexually objectifying caption.17 It might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Limor Shifman, ‘Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual Troublemaker’, 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, volume 18, iss. 3 (March 2013), 365. 
14 Clay Shirky, Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age (London; New 
York: Penguin Books, 2011).  
15 ‘Leet’ speak replaces some letters in words with numbers, icons or other letters that create a similar 
sound or appearance. This style of writing was originally used to bypass word-filtering and 
censorship on mail servers. More recently the method is mostly used to abbreviate words for faster 
typing. See ‘1337 speak’, Know your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/1337-speak, accessed 
04/06/15. 
16 Michelle Calka quoted in Lauren Gawne and Jill Vaughan, ‘I can haz language play: The 
construction of language and identity in LOLspeak’, Proceedings of the 42nd Australian Linguistic 
Society Conference – 2011, eds. Maïa Ponsonnet, Loan Dao and Margit Bowle, 
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/9404/8/AustLinguisticSocConf42_2012.pdf, 
accessed 15/05/15.  
17 Donald Kuspit writes of Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q as a ’multi-layered pun’ that ‘de-idealizes a woman 
into a sex object in the act of vandalizing a world famous masterpiece. On its phonetic caption, he 
explains, ‘the letters become words which become a devaluing male comment on the beautiful, 
dignified woman – she’s just another slut. She’s smiling because she’s thinking of being fucked – 
more probably of masturbating, that is, fucking herself’. Certainly in this understanding, Duchamp’s 
manipulation of the Mona Lisa significantly altered its normal reception. See Donald Kuspit, ‘A 





seem an irreverent comparison, which perhaps dumbs down Duchamp, but surely 
this is exactly in the artist’s spirit: recapturing his own dumbness, disposability and 
fascination with mass media distribution. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
L.H.O.O.Q. was a meme in its own time. Francis Picabia, in 1920, manufactured a 
second L.H.O.O.Q. for the March 1920 cover of his magazine 391. As if in 
anticipation of the meme’s tendency to spread via mutation, Picabia mistitled the 
image as Tableau Dada and omitted the goatee, adding only a moustache. This then 
prompted Duchamp to return to the image, providing further changes.18   
 With the image macro we can identify a large-scale return to this avant-garde 
form of image production, technology now having caught up with and claimed 
dominion over Duchamp’s avant-garde concept. The image is, in Shifman’s words, 
‘hyper-significant’.19 This is to say that image macros reveal their processes of 
signification. ‘They are’, Shifman explains, ‘more about the process of meaning-
making than about meaning itself’.20 For this reason image macros, like Duchamp’s 
L.H.O.O.Q., emphasize simplicity, interchangeable elements and ease of replication. 
They have a fixed form, an image that is superimposed with capitalized and bold 
font, and usually use the same ‘Impact’ typeface. This is not an accidental choice: 
Impact imposes a particular form of user engagement, its regularity means small 
amounts of text can be read instantaneously.21 While they can seem ill-considered, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Decade’, Artnet Magazine, http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/features/kuspit/kuspit3-17-06.asp, 
accessed 18/05/15.  
18 Arturo Schwartz records this meme-like process of transmission in The Complete Works of Marcel 
Duchamp. He writes: ‘Francis Picabia published a “reproduction” of L.H.O.O.Q. on page one of the 
March 1920 issue of his journal 391. Although headed “Tableau Dada by Marcel Duchamp,” it was 
actually by Picabia himself. Earlier, Picabia had asked Duchamp to send him L.H.O.O.Q. so that he 
could reproduce it in his “Manifeste Dada” issue. According to Duchamp: “My original did not arrive 
in time and in order not to delay further the printing of 391, Picabia himself drew the mustache on the 
Mona Lisa but forgot the beard.” Some time later, Hans Arp came upon this issue of 391 while 
browsing in a bookstore. He called the omission to Duchamp’s attention, whereupon Duchamp drew 
in the missing beard and added an inscription at the bottom: Moustaches par Picabia, barbe par 
Marcel Duchamp’. See Arturo Schwartz, The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1997), 671. 
19 Shifman, ‘The Cultural Logic of Photo-based Memes’, Journal of Visual Culture, vol. 13, no. 3 
(December 2014), 341. 
20 Shifman, ‘The Cultural Logic of Photo-based Memes’, 344. 
21 The font was first designed in 1965 by Geoffrey Lee for a foundry in Sheffield. In an essay on the 
cultural history of ‘Impact’, Kate Brideau and Charles Berret write about the effect of Lee’s 
peculiarly rectangular design. ‘Impact and other similar typefaces are not useful for large selections of 
text’, they write, ‘[w]e can read Impact perfectly well, but we are unlikely to want to read even a 
paragraph of text in this face. This is a typeface designed for small amounts of text, brief ideas, 





amateurish or crude in their appearance (again like Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q.), these 
aspects of the meme’s construction highlight its processual nature; the fact that it is 
never a finished article. They are the features of the image that make it available for 
replication or imitation. Indeed memes have been critically praised for their enabling 
of collaborative relationships. This is because they function in an economy that 
forms and perpetuates a supposedly non-hierarchical community of peers, as images 
are exchanged back and forth, with each repetition producing variation or difference. 
For instance, Lauren Gawne and Jill Vaughan consider the language play that takes 
place in this exchange economy (particularly with lolcats) and discuss its 
contribution to online ‘identity construction and in-group cohesion’.22 And, similarly, 
Kate Miltner reasons that the lolcats’ nonstandard English internet dialect functions 
as a way of constructing and maintaining social boundaries. For Miltner, memes are 
‘changing the way people engage in cultural participation, creative engagement, 
community interaction, and identity construction’.23 For instance, Miltner introduces 
the example of ‘in-jokes’, which often help to institute symbolic boundaries around a 
mass of people, in order to clarify how memes might fulfil this role.24 And in her 
book Memes in Digital Culture (2014), Shifman argues outright that meme images 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
black contour will appear legible over any colour combinations, meaning that ‘there is no need…to be 
concerned with the [font’s] integration…into your image’. Thus it suits the meme’s 
interchangeability. Brideau and Berret explain that the ‘extreme regularity of this typeface lends itself 
well to the automated generation of internet memes…[and furthermore that] this bold condensed sans 
serif typeface, white with a black contour, may be the most successful meme among image macros’. 
Reflecting the meme’s origin in Dawkin’s evolutionary biology, they suggest that we might think that 
the ‘image macro…is in the end merely a means for Impact to copy itself’. See Kate Brideau and 
Charles Berret, ‘A Brief Introduction to Impact: ‘The Meme Font’’, The Journal of Visual Culture, 
vol. 13, no.3 (December 2014), 310 – 312. 




23 Kate Miltner, ‘“There’s no place for lulz on LOLCats”: The role of gender, genre and group 
identity in the interpretation and enjoyment of an Internet meme’, First Monday, vol. 19, no. 8 
(August 2014), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5391/4103#author, accessed 
15/05/15.  
24 ‘The notion of the in–joke’, Miltner writes, describing her own research experiment that studied 
communities of lolcat enthusiasts, ‘was raised repeatedly throughout the groups. The MemeGeeks 
[one of the test groups] especially prized LOLCats for the fact that they were “a bit of an insidery 
club, which is cool”… Similarly, MemeGeek JE explained that “the funniest thing is being part of the 
group that understands the joke. Having to explain it to my boyfriend always makes it sound really 
rubbish”. In this respect, the notion of the in-joke helps to construct a sense of community amongst 
online users. See Miltner, ‘“There’s no place for lulz on LOLCats”: The role of gender, genre and 
group identity in the interpretation and enjoyment of an Internet meme’, 





‘spread the notion of participatory culture itself’.25      
 Through this process of peer-to-peer collaboration, memes are increasingly 
considered to be an exemplary means by which communities are built and 
consolidated amongst dispersed networked individuals, in a way that is self-
determining and thus partly independent of the controlling infrastructures of normal 
social media platforms, such as, for instance, Facebook, which track, surveil and 
regulate behavior. This is seen, by some, to be apparent in their aesthetic form. For 
Patrick Davison the rushed and protean appearance of memes, often put together on 
anachronistic programs such as MS Paint, functions as ‘a counterfactual to the 
dominant ideology of technological progress’.26 Similarly Nick Douglas finds a 
humanistic element in the meme’s inherent sloppiness: a pointed reminder of human 
messiness and a continued propensity for inaccuracies and failings to emerge in the 
interface between humans and highly advanced systems. We might also see the 
meme’s casual disregard for technological standards as evidence of the increased 
availability, for non-professional use, of expensive photo editing software in the form 
of pirated free downloads. It is as if the meme incarnates a spirit of joyful 
amateurism that is at odds with, and resists, the perfectibility associated with 
technological advancement. Further to this, memes have been singled out as an 
important and surreptitious vehicle for political speech, particularly in regimes where 
the expression of oppositional sentiment is brutally quashed. A popular example of 
this is the mythical Grass Mud Horse, a Chinese internet meme resembling an 
alpaca, widely used on chat forums in China as a form of symbolic defiance against 
Internet censorship. Again, like Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q., its name has a double 
meaning: in Mandarin the name Grass Mud Horse also reads as ‘Fuck your 
mother’.27        .  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: MIT Press, 2014), 
89. 
26 Patrick Davison, ‘Because of the Pixels: On the History, Form, and Influence of MS Paint’, The 
Journal of Visual Culture, vol. 13, no.3 (December 2014), 292.  
27 An article in The New York Times writes that while ‘“grass-mud horse” sounds like a nasty curse in 
Chinese, its written Chinese characters are completely different, and its meaning —taken literally — 
is benign. Thus the beast not only has dodged censors’ computers, but has also eluded the 
government’s own ban on so-called offensive behaviour’. Quoting Xiao Qiang (a professor of 
journalism), the article explains the memetic spread of the symbol as follows: ‘the grass-mud horse 
“has become an icon of resistance to censorship…The expression and cartoon videos may seem like a 





 Against this, however, I want to argue that internet memes can be considered 
agents of cultural reproduction, meaning that they reproduce the logic of our existing 
society rather than rising against or opposing it. Indeed we might think that these 
images have the capacity to silence expression as much as they enable it, by globally 
disseminating and reinforcing a specifically coded form of subjectivity. In this spirit, 
Ryan Milner points out that memes are often ‘premised on xenophobic essentialisms 
of a homogenized outgroup’ and tend to reinforce ‘oppressive ideologies’.28 The 
implication is that the online communities that produce these images assume a white, 
masculine and western identity-type as normal and standard. From this perspective, 
the typically ‘anonymous’ author nevertheless becomes a gendered and racially 
coded subject. Thus we might suggest that this culture works, partly, to repress, 
rather than liberate difference. Furthermore, Shifman, writing with Hadyn Levy and 
Mike Thelwall, has commented on the cultural bias in memes, arguing that they have 
a function as ‘powerful agents of globalization and Americanization’.29 Building on 
these more critical perspectives, I want to argue that memes are tied to, and revealing 
of, contemporary forms of labour: a culture of participatory activity that provides 
little to no gain for its participants.      
 The cult of participation and concept of the viewer or user as active, co-operative 
and co-productive - which seems to be inherited in such accounts - can be seen to go 
back to the avant-garde rhetoric of the 1920s and 1930s. In this sense, we can suggest 
that the current framework for critical validation tends to repeat the heroic language 
of critical positions that arose within industrial culture – particularly, for example, 
that of Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht. For Benjamin (here writing about 
Brecht’s ‘epic theatre’); a successful work hinged on an understanding of 
participation that redeemed the work from an increasing aestheticization of life and 
politics in the 1930s. In his essay ‘The Author as Producer’ (1937) he argues that 
‘the author’s production must have the character of a model: it must be able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
chorus, from serious scholars to usually politically apathetic urban white-collar workers, shows how 
strongly this expression resonates.”’ See Michael Wines, ‘A Dirty Pun Tweaks China’s Online 
Censors’, The New York Times (March 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/world/asia/12beast.html, accessed 18/05/15. 
28 Ryan M. Milner, ‘FCJ-156 Hacking the Social: Internet Memes, Identity Antagonism, and the 
Logic of Lulz’, The Fibreculture Journal, iss. 22 (2013), 72.  
29 Shifman, Haydn Levy and Mike Thelwall, ‘Internet Jokes: The Secret Agents of Globalization?’, 





instruct other writers in their production and, secondly, it must be able to place an 
improved apparatus at their disposal. This apparatus will be the better, the more 
consumers it brings in contact with the production process – in short, the more 
readers or spectators it turns into collaborators’.30 The point of this is that it shakes 
the audience out of a passive sort of consumption. Indeed Benjamin argued that 
Brecht ‘compels the spectator to take up a position towards the action, and the actor 
to take up a position towards his part’.31 And Brecht himself stresses the importance 
of making literature and theatre ‘intellectually available to the broad masses’.32 This 
was vital for both in a cultural moment inflected with a New Objectivity style, which 
as we saw in Chapter One, was criticized for transforming objects into articles of 
passive consumption: in the process distancing the consumer from the production 
process. While some present-day writers maintain this language of avant-garde 
valorization when describing memes (regarding the significance of the participant in 
critical practice), I want to claim that it has become outmoded in a specific way: 
historical reality having absorbed and swallowed the model by turning it into a 
productive commercial reality. Specifically, Brecht’s idealism is outmoded by the 
reality of the ‘prosumer’: a user of new media who consumes and produces content 
at the same time. This is the user who, as if stuck in a never-ending circle, evokes the 
ancient ‘ouroboros’ symbol, giving new meaning to its image of a snake devouring 
its own tail. The meme is symptomatic of this culture of active consumption: it 
mediates collaborative relationships amongst users who consume the image and are 
prompted to produce an alternative version, in order to consolidate their place in the 
group. It follows that the apparatus - here, the Internet - in which memes are made 
and shared and remade, functions in an economic paradigm that is sustained by the 
actions of its consumers, or prosumers, who are not allowed to be passive.  
 Lisa Nakamura points out that collaboratively produced ‘[m]emes are the grist 
that allows these [new media economy] mills to grind; yet somehow the political 
economic critique of the social networking industries seems not to have tainted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’ [1934], Understanding Brecht, tr. Anna Bostock 
(London; New York: Verso, 1998), 98.    
31 Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’, 100. 
32 Bertolt Brecht, ‘Against Georg Lukács’, in Theodor Adorno et al, Aesthetics and Politics (London; 





them’.33 This is because, Nakamura explains, ‘they invoke pleasure and fun’, and so 
‘float free of the networks that they fuel’.34 The whimsy of captioned images of cats, 
in this account, works to conceal the true nature of participation in social networking 
industries. Moreover, in an article about the short-lived ‘ROFLCon’ (a biennial 
convention and conference dedicated to memes and internet culture that ran from 
2008 to 2012 at MIT), Laura June suggests that the event’s indefinite hiatus might be 
due to a realization amongst its organizers that the meme, and the online culture 
surrounding memes, have become indissociable from commercial culture, and 
perhaps offer very little in excess: 
The problem is that internet celebrities and memes are now making up a greater 
part of our “culture” than ever — and for some of us, they are almost the entirety 
of it. We consume them: we watch their videos millions of times, we caption 
their images freely and exuberantly… Many of the attendees whom I spoke to, 
once I talked to them long enough, mentioned that they weren’t really better off 
financially than they had been before creating whatever they created, or 
becoming a meme, or finding their little corner of celebrity… The attendees at 
ROFLCon all agree, these people are treasures to a certain segment of the 
population. But increasingly, they are also a nearly endless fount of money-
making possibilities, coming at little to no cost, with little to no gain for their 
subjects and creators.35 
The cute captioned images of cats, in this understanding, function to conceal the true 
nature of online participation. Regardless of how fun, stupid or insignificant it might 
seem, it is a form of value generation that offers little to no gain for its creators. In 
this respect memes are emblematic of what Tiziana Terranova calls the ‘valorisation 
of free (user) labor’ in the new economy: 
…which is to say unpaid and undirected labor, but which is nonetheless 
controlled… in exchange for their participation, the user-collaborators receive 
some type of more or less immaterial return (being part of a community or social 
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network; or, much more materially, having access to credit and various free 
products)36   
The extent of our involuntary participation and embeddedness within this new 
economy and its 24/7, constantly active, temporality has recently become much 
clearer. A 2015 study by the Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research found 
that over 20% of secondary school children wake at night in order to check or post 
on social media.37 The dynamic flow of online media interrupts their circadian 
rhythms, compelling their participation even while they are unconscious.38 This, 
perhaps, realises Slavoj Žižek’s remarks on the ‘real threat’ of new media: namely, 
that it ‘deprive[s] us of our passivity, of our authentic passive experience [such as 
sleep], and thus prepare[s] us for mindless frenetic activity - for endless work’.39  
 In sharp contrast to this account of online participation the economist Jeremy 
Rifkin has hypothesised a global economic shift away from capitalism with these 
new participatory technological infrastructures. From this point of view we are 
heading towards a new ‘collaborative commons’ economic paradigm. For Rifkin, 
this has the potential to free human beings from pecuniary interests. He writes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Tiziana Terranova, ‘New Economy, Financialization and Social Production in the Web 2.0’, in 
Andrea Fumagalli and Sandro Mezzadra eds, Crisis in the Global Economy: Financial Markets, 
Social Struggles, and New Political Scenarios (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010), 156.  
37 This study was detailed in an article by Sally Weale in The Guardian, which links the nocturnal 
phenomenon to increased rates of depression and fatigue amongst school children. Weale summarises 
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often they wake at night to use social media, 22% of year 8 pupils, and 23% of year 10s, said “almost 
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38 This would seem to indicate a deepening of Jonathan Crary’s influential discussion of late 
capitalism’s 24/7 temporality and the contemporary condition of sleep. Crary writes that: ‘In its 
profound uselessness and intrinsic passivity, with the incalculable losses it causes in production time, 
circulation, and consumption, sleep will always collide with the demands of a 24h universe. The huge 
portion of our lives that we spend asleep, freed from a morass of simulated needs, subsists as one of 
the great human affronts to the voraciousness of contemporary capitalism. Sleep is an 
uncompromising interruption of the theft of time from us by capitalism. Most of the seemingly 
irreducible necessities of human life - hunger, thirst, sexual desire, and recently the need for 
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profitability, and thus remains an incongruous anomaly and site of crisis in the global present’.  It 
would seem, following this study, that sleep is increasingly being harnessed as productive time by the 
constant flow of social media. See Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep 
(London; New York: Verso, 2013), 10-11. 
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contemporary economists are currently preoccupied by the ‘contradictory workings 
of the capitalist system, unsure of how to make the market economy function without 
self-destructing in the wake of new technologies that are speeding society into a near 
zero marginal cost era’.40 Rifkin suggests that our contemporary technological 
moment reactivates and arguably realises the themes of an essay by economist John 
Maynard Keynes, titled ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’ (1930). 
Keynes believed, Rifkin writes: 
that “a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are all of us 
aware of, when these [economic] needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to 
devote our further energies to non-economic purposes.” He looked expectantly to 
a future in which machines would produce an abundance of nearly free goods and 
services, liberating the human race from toil and hardships and freeing the human 
mind from a preoccupation with strictly pecuniary interests to focus more on the 
“arts for life” and the quest for transcendence.41 
Memes might seem an epitome of this kind of paradigm, which is predicated on free 
sharing and peer cooperation. However, following Terranova, we might think, by 
contrast, that the collaborative production and consumption of free products, like 
memes, equally works to construct an unfree individual. If we think about memes 
like this, then it is possible to compare their culture of participation and collaborative 
working to the shockworkers of Soviet Russia. It seems that, in this respect, already 
in the 1930s, these ideals of collaboration were being outmoded by historical reality. 
 The shockworkers were famously super-productive and super-enthusiastic 
workers who followed the lead of mineworker Aleksey Stakhanov. In 1935 
Stakhanov was reported to have mined 102 tons of coal instead of a planned seven 
tons, in less than six hours.42 He was rewarded by the state as a model worker, and 
his image and exploits were promoted in the press, literature and film as an act of 
heroism; he even appeared on the cover of Time magazine in December 1935 (fig. 
2.7). Hito Steyerl, in an essay employing the symbolism of the shockworkers to 
describe unpaid labour in the art world, suggests that the shockworkers’ ‘super-
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productive contribution to socialist construction was supposedly voluntary, heroic, 
based on enthusiasm and affect, but overseen by a growing security apparatus’.43 
Whilst their engagement was genuine and their enthusiasm sincere, these super-
productive workers apparently remained blind to a harsh reality of intensifying 
exploitation. Now, ‘Stakhanovite’ has turned into a derogatory term for people who 
are overachievers in their jobs, or more simply put, workaholics.44 This analogy, 
between the shockworker and the prosumer, can be summed up by the comparison 
proposed in fig. 2.7 and 2.8. Here we have a pair of Time magazine cover images: 
Aleksey Stakhanov in 1935 and 2006’s Person of the Year – ‘You. Yes you’. This 
comparison suggests that we have become the super-productive, enthusiastic 
collaborators with the existing economic regime.     
 The internet, in this understanding, can be defined as an apparatus. It operates as 
an instrument of Control, facilitating an adoption of social norms and values that 
maintain and reproduce its conditions of production. For instance, various 
commentators have argued that the internet has generated a new form of subjectivity: 
as we shall see, Giorgio Agamben labels us all ‘desubjects’ and Deleuze writes of 
individuals as ‘dividuals’, which simply refers to, as Seb Franklin glosses, ‘the 
subject digitized’.45 In this respect, the internet, I will argue, has produced a new 
concept of the ‘public’ that we automatically conform to, and a new sense of the 
‘public sphere’ that must be dealt with if we are to properly interrogate emerging 
forms of online social and cultural practice. 
 ideological post-state apparatus 
	  
A common way of attacking the perceived lack of autonomy and passivity in the 
general public has been to say that they, or we, are like sheep. This accusation 
suggests that all of our decisions are in some way marked or informed by a dominant 
societal norm, to which we indifferently conform. In today’s world, we might 
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propose, by contrast, that we are more like ants. This description would also refer to 
our perceived lack of autonomy. However, responding to recent economic shifts and 
technological trends, the ant’s super-activity (in contrast to the sheep’s passive 
consumption) comes to the fore as perhaps the most lucid zoomorphic symbol of our 
relationship to dominant social and economic norms. Indeed, the harnessing and 
controlling of our attention in and by networked technologies, for the philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler, ‘leads to a becoming-arthropod (anthill)’.46 In this anthill-like 
apparatus ‘the consumer becomes the producer of the network where he consumes 
and which consumes him (which consumes and exhausts his desire)’.47 And because 
we reside in this anthill, we become more and more like ants. Stiegler provocatively 
claims, moreover, that technological devices surround us like skeletal prostheses, 
covering our muscles in a way that resembles the segmented body and jointed 
appendages of the ant’s exoskeleton. He uses the image of the ‘car where the 
consumer resembles a ridiculous hermit crab in its shell’ to make this analogy 
clear.48 Building on Stiegler’s attention to the way in which machines impact upon 
the body and its behaviour, I want to propose a theorization of the internet as a 
technology that produces the conditions for our subjectivity.    
 The idea of a society of ants produced or constituted as such by the dominant 
technological system can be fruitfully compared to Søren Kierkegaard’s conception 
of the ‘public’ in his essay ‘The Present Age’, published in 1846. Kierkegaard’s 
essay is an early example of a critical response to mass distribution technologies. For 
Kierkegaard the ‘public’ was something created by the printing press. This apparatus, 
on his account, served to destroy social and cultural difference, in order to enable the 
smooth and frictionless dissemination and reception of standardized printed 
materials, such as newspapers. Kierkegaard’s ‘public’ was a side-effect of the 
technology: an abstract concept that nevertheless produced normative roles to which 
people would adhere, or else they would – to quote Kierkegaard - ‘sink’.49 He writes: 
‘In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all 
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necessary to procure a phantom… a monstrous abstraction, an all-embracing 
something which is nothing, a mirage - and that phantom is the public’.50  
 The internet, I propose, must be thought in similar terms: a machine, or 
apparatus, which to a certain extent, brings everything to the same level and mediates 
what we know as the ‘public’. In this respect it is alien to the commonly accepted 
idea of a liberal ‘public sphere’, based upon the eighteenth century bourgeois 
blueprint: the European coffee houses, salons and table societies where, Jürgen 
Habermas explains, ‘a social intercourse’ was supposedly preserved that disregarded 
status, rank, power, prestige, hierarchy, economic dependencies and the laws of the 
market.51 Instead, this phantom ‘public’ I think can be interpreted in relation to Louis 
Althusser’s analysis of Ideological State Apparatuses in his pivotal essay ‘Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1970), albeit with an important difference to 
which I will return. In this essay, Althusser described the ways in which capital 
reproduces its conditions of production. He distinguishes between two apparatuses: 
the State Apparatus (which is repressive and operates through violence) and the 
Ideological State Apparatus (which encompasses churches, schools, legal systems 
and various cultural forms). It is the Ideological State Apparatus which is of most 
interest here. This apparatus is involved in the process of turning individuals into 
subjects who reproduce the relations of production and are harnessed as productive 
force, or labourers. Regarding this process, Althusser writes that the ‘individual is 
interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the 
commandments of the Subject [we can relate this capitalized Subject to 
Kierkegaard’s phantom ‘public’], i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his 
subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 
“all by himself”’.52 Althusser’s account of the Ideological State Apparatuses and 
their role in the reproduction of the conditions of production has influenced many 
prominent analyses of film and the workings of cinema in the late twentieth 
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century.53 Moreover we can identify its import in some critical writing about more 
contemporary technologies. For instance, Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker 
argue that an Althusserian interpellation of the individual is, inadvertently, 
implicated in console gaming. In their co-authored book The Exploit: A Theory of 
Networks (2007), they suggest (in terms reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s comments 
on film as a sort of training ground in ‘The Work of Art in the age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’ essay; albeit in a dystopian reversal of Benjamin’s 
more utopian spirit) that ‘games from State of Emergency to Dope Wars are training 
tools for life inside the protological network, where flexibility, systemic problem 
solving, quick reflexes, and indeed play itself are as highly valued and commodified 
as sitting still and hushing up were for the disciplinary societies of modernity’.54 
Furthermore, Giorgio Agamben has claimed that a defining truth of our technological 
moment is ‘the massive accumulation and proliferation of apparatuses’.55 For 
instance, he describes his ‘implacable hatred’ for the mobile phone, because as well 
as making ‘the relationship between people all the more abstract’, he writes, the 
individual ‘captured by the “cellular telephone” apparatus - whatever the intensity of 
the desire that has driven him - cannot acquire a new subjectivity, but only a number 
through which he can, eventually, be controlled’.56 For Agamben, this electronically 
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interpellated individual is harmless as a political subject: this is because ‘his 
everyday gestures and his health, his amusements and his occupations, his diet and 
his desires…[are] commanded and controlled in the smallest detail by apparatuses’.57  
 However, State of Emergency, Dope Wars, other computer games and mobile 
phones cannot be directly interpreted as Ideological State Apparatuses. Whilst they 
facilitate the maintenance of a particular capitalist mode of production (clearly 
illustrated by Galloway and Thacker as a form of training for fully-functional life in 
post-disciplinary capitalism), they are not necessarily implicated in a general form of 
state power. Instead they are proprietary devices owned by corporations. Thus, I 
want to propose we might call them Ideological post-State Apparatuses. This is to 
acknowledge a shift in power, which is increasingly becoming a part of the popular 
cultural consciousness. In 2010 Brad Burnham (a managing partner of a New York 
based venture capital film) made a provocative blog entry that illuminates the 
relocation of power away from state interests. He focuses on the relationship between 
web service providers on the internet and web service users. Burnham claims that 
these platforms – he cites, for example, Google, Twitter, Facebook – must be 
considered a form of government and that, therefore, their users must be considered 
citizens. In reference to the web service providers’ strict parameters for content 
production and user communication, and their sophisticated models for capital 
accumulation, he argues that these new ‘governments’ are not democratic, but 
‘oligarchic’.58 This echoes and, in part, fulfils the science and technology journalist 
Richard L. Brandt’s fervent remark from 1998 that he expected ‘to see the overthrow 
of the U.S government in…[his] lifetime’.59 The software Microsoft provided for the 
World Wide Web, he believed ‘will gradually make the U.S. government obsolete’.60 
 And yet, we might see the idea of Ideological post-State Apparatuses as going 
even further back. In Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1980), they 
describe a new formation of power that pre-empts Deleuze’s later essay ‘Postscript 
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on Control Societies’ (1990). Here they write of a networked system that transcends 
state borders and regulatory control. ‘Today’, Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘we can 
depict an enormous, so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through 
foreign exchange and across borders, eluding control by the States, forming a 
multinational ecumenical organization, constituting a de facto supranational power 
untouched by governmental decisions’.61 This monstrous image was also already 
anticipated in pop cultural forms; it is most vividly expressed in a famous scene from 
Sidney Lumet’s 1976 motion picture, Network. Here Arthur Jensen, the chairman of 
the Communications Corporation of America, gives the meddling TV personality 
Howard Beale a lesson in the workings of a post-state networked capital.  
You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no 
nations! There are no peoples! There is only one holistic system of systems, one 
vast and immane, interwoven, interacting, multi-variate, multi-national 
dominion… The world is a college of corporations, inexorably determined by the 
immutable by-laws of business…62 
In line with these insights, it is possible to identify the internet as the de facto 
Ideological post-State Apparatus, which reproduces the conditions of production for 
the present age (where global corporate service providers are increasingly operating 
as the locus of power and subject production). Like Kierkegaard’s printing press, this 
technology needs to destroy social and cultural difference in order to enable its 
smooth and frictionless dissemination of information: indeed Agamben touches upon 
this, arguing that the new apparatuses are instigating an ‘eclipse of politics’.63 The 
process of subjection, Agamben suggests, is threatened by these apparatuses: because 
they operate by ‘desubjectification’.64 By this account, the kind of subjectivity that 
we acquire through our acquiescence to Althusserian Ideological State Apparatuses 
is diminished – this subjectivity now having been shrunk to a number by which one 
can be contacted. The interpellated subject in Althusser is exploded, as is the 
attendant formation of a collective subject from which to form a counter-politics. 
Whilst Agamben notes that earlier historic periods produced ‘real [or collective] 
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identities’ such as the workers’ movement and the bourgeoisie, the desubjectification 
by new post-state apparatuses tends to atomize and disperse individuals. In this 
respect, Agamben writes that the new apparatuses have produced the ‘most docile 
and cowardly social body that has ever existed in human history’.65 This is the 
‘public’ enabled by contemporary machines, and the ‘public’ that is required to 
reproduce contemporary capital’s conditions of production: that is to say, some have 
argued, a concept of the ‘public’ in which we are not subjects but ‘desubjects’. 
 The processes of interpellation by the new apparatuses, I think, are made clear by 
Facebook and its variety of social games, which are often criticized for 
instrumentalizing user behavior and content production. Indeed, we might suggest 
that these apparatuses promote a type of ‘machinic enslavement’, in which the 
subject is defined purely by the actions that use of the machine demands.66 In 
Habermas’s theory of the ‘public sphere’, the idea of critical discourse figures 
strongly: he writes of an ‘autonomy that turns conversation into criticism and bons 
mots into arguments’.67 However, this idea of critical, parodic or even subversive 
discourse is to a certain extent disavowed in the ‘public sphere’ defined by our 
current technological apparatuses, such as on Facebook. This aspect of internet 
services is exposed in the game designer and cultural critic Ian Bogost’s Facebook-
based social game platform Cow Clicker, which involuntarily revealed that when 
online, even directly critical or subversive cultural forms are coopted by the 
technology, which swallows up all ‘intention’ according to the homogeneity of its 
function. The game was released in July 2010, initially for a seminar on social 
gaming at New York University. It was made in order to reveal and make apparent 
the mechanics of online social games, which Bogost argued worked by dumbing 
down the user’s interactions in order to be more efficiently monetized. Cow Clicker 
was made to be fully-functional on Facebook. But Bogost employed Brechtian-type 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Agamben, ‘What is an Apparatus?’, 22. 
66 This understanding of ‘machinic enslavement’ is taken from Maurizio Lazzarato’s discussion of 
television. Lazzarato understands the TV as a machine that captures the viewer to the extent that ‘we 
function as components of the televisual device, as its input/output element, its simple relays, 
facilitating and/or blocking the transmission of information, communication and signs. In machinic 
enslavement we literally form one body with the machine’. See Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘The Machine’, 
The European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies (October 2006), 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/lazzarato/en, accessed 05/01/13. 
67 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 





‘alienation effects’ in order to introduce a parodic element: exaggerating and 
attempting to make plainly obvious the dumbness and essential vacuity of social 
gaming. However, Bogost’s game, as I shall show, underestimated its apparatus: 
Cow Clicker inadvertently revealed more than Bogost had intended, by achieving a 
level of success comparable to the games it sought to criticize.  
 Bogost summarizes the way his game was designed to work in a post on his 
website titled ‘Cow Clicker: The Making of Obsession’:  
You get a cow. You can click on it. In six hours, you can click it again. Clicking 
earns you clicks. You can buy custom “premium” cows through micropayments 
(the Cow Clicker currency is called “mooney”), and you can buy your way out of 
the time delay by spending it. You can publish feed stories about clicking your 
cow, and you can click friends’ cow clicks in their feed stories. Cow Clicker is 
Facebook games distilled to their essence.68   
The games that Cow Clicker supposedly ‘distilled’ are, primarily, those made by 
social game developer Zynga, whose most popular titles include FarmVille, 
ChefVille and CityVille. Eighty percent of Zynga’s revenue is reported to come from 
in-game payments by Facebook users, and Facebook reported in 2012 that twelve 
percent of its $3.7 billion revenue came from Zynga.69 Cow Clicker is based on 
Zynga’s FarmVille, which allows users to tend to a plot of farmland with click-based 
gameplay. FarmVille is Zynga’s best-known game and emblematic of the online 
social game phenomenon. It was launched on Facebook in June 2009, and reached 
ten million daily active users within six weeks. By January 2013, its sequel 
FarmVille 2 had a reported 8.1 million daily active users and 43.5 million monthly 
active users.70 The game, like Cow Clicker, operates through users’ clicks. Players 
begin with a simple farm, which they are given the opportunity to personalize and 
expand. They are allowed to plant virtual crops that can be harvested – with clicks. 
Online friends can also be invited to become their neighbors, meaning that they can 
help each other by sending gifts or charitably assisting - via clicks - each other’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ian Bogost, ‘Cow Clicker: The making of Obsession’, Ian Bogost [personal website] (July 2010), 
http://bogost.com/blog/cow_clicker_1, accessed 02/03/13.  
69 See Ryan Nakashima, ‘Facebook filing lifts Zynga, other recent IPOs’, Yahoo News (February 
2012), http://news.yahoo.com/facebook-filing-lifts-zynga-other-recent-ipos-224608214.html, 
accessed 01/08/2013. 
70 See Mike Thompson, ‘The Top 25 Facebook games of January 2013’, Inside Social Games 
(January 2013), http://www.insidesocialgames.com/2013/01/01/the-top-25-facebook-games-of-





harvest. The technology journalist Doug Gross explains that there is ‘no way to 
“win”’, instead ‘players take satisfaction in building big, fancy farms that they can 
showcase to their friends’.71 To cater to this demand FarmVille offers a range of 
desirable commodities (for instance, cute farmyard animals) that can be purchased 
with clicks. The ‘click’ is the most significant commodity in FarmVille’s economy. 
Players are assigned a limited number of clicks, but can buy more. An article in 
TechCrunch magazine reported that as of February 2013, FarmVille (which is 
initially free to play) had generated over $1 billion dollars through such in-game 
purchases.72 By creating consumer desire for the ability to click, Zynga established a 
wildly successful business model. Brian Reynolds, Zynga’s chief game designer, 
outlines the approach in simple terms: ‘We’ll give you, whatever, 50 clicks today, 
and tomorrow you can have 50 more’, Reynolds explains, ‘[b]ut if you want 100 
clicks today, we’ll sell you more clicks’.73     
 This restricted form of pleasure has led to numerous comparisons between online 
social games and the ‘Skinner Box’ (otherwise known as an Operant Conditioning 
Chamber). This was a cage developed in the 1930s by the behavioral psychologist 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner that illustrates the manipulation of behavior through simple 
stimulus and reward mechanisms. The Skinner Box revealed that a rat would become 
ensnared in an open cage that was fitted with a lever, which it could hit in order to 
receive a jolt of reinforcement – i.e. a food pellet. Skinner’s test went on to show that 
the rat became conditioned by this process and continued to remain in the cage even 
when the reinforcement stopped. For critic Nick Yee, this manipulation takes place 
in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPG), in which clicking 
is a predominant part of the gameplay. Yee suggests that people on MMORPG 
games begin to ‘feel achievement through continuous mouse-clicking’, despite there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Doug Gross, ‘The Facebook games that millions love (and hate)’, CNN News (February 2010): 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/TECH/02/23/facebook.games/?hpt=Sbin, accessed 02/08/13. 
72 See Anthony Ha, ‘Zynga’s Pincus Says FarmVille Has Passed $1B In Total Player Purchases’, 
TechCrunch (February 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/02/05/farmville-1-billion/, accessed 
01/08/2013. 
73 Brian Reynolds quoted in Jason Tanz, ‘The Curse of Cow Clicker: How a Cheeky Satire Became a 
Videogame Hit’, Wired (December 2011), 





being no reward or substantive incentive.74 This means that the gamer’s autonomy is 
compromised by the highly controlled system in which they are playing.   
 On this understanding, the players of FarmVille are ensnared like rats in an open 
cage. The ‘alienation effects’ employed in Bogost’s game function to make this 
Skinners Box analogy clear. The game restricts interaction to merely clicking on a 
cow (by contrast, FarmVille’s clicking involves various aspects of farm management 
such as plowing land, planting, growing, and harvesting crops and raising livestock), 
thereby foregrounding the prescriptive and monotonous labour required to play a 
game like FarmVille. All you can do in Cow Clicker is click on a cow. Furthermore, 
as in FarmVille, Cow Clicker allowed players to purchase in-game currency – 
‘mooney’ – that could be used to buy more cows and more clicks. When a player 
clicked a cow, their profile would announce ‘I’m clicking a cow’ on the Facebook 
newsfeed, advertising the application and instigating competition in other gamers. 
‘As a play experience’, Bogost explains in an article in Wired magazine, 
‘it[s]…nothing more than a collection of cheap ruses, blatantly designed to get 
players to keep coming back, exploit their friends, and part with their money’.75 
Bogost makes clear that he ‘didn’t set out to make it fun…Players were supposed to 
recognize that clicking a cow is a ridiculous thing to want to do’.76 So, by glibly 
drawing attention to the phrase ‘cash-cow’, Bogost’s application was intended to 
present the online social game for what it really is: simply, an industry with no gain 
for the player.77          
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75 Ian Bogost quoted in Tanz, ‘The Curse of Cow Clicker: How a Cheeky Satire Became a 
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 At root Cow Clicker was determined to reveal that our clicks (in a more general 
sense) have a material exchange value: they are a form of free labour exploited by 
service providers like Zynga. To help illustrate this observation Bogost implemented 
absurd restrictions on Cow Clicker’s gameplay. A player was allowed only one click 
every six hours, and rewards required excessive dedication: for instance, a player 
would receive a ‘golden cowbell’ after reaching 100,000 clicks. Despite these 
limitations and the simple fact that the game was designed to create dissatisfaction 
rather than pleasure, it became hugely popular. It even maintained its popularity after 
Bogost announced the ‘Cowpocalypse’. This was an attempt, ultimately in vain, to 
kill interest in the social game. Bogost removed all the cows and left only patches of 
grass (the resulting environment can be seen in fig. 2.9). Post-‘Cowpocalypse’ 
players could only click on blades of grass, and 100,000,000 clicks would be 
rewarded with a ‘diamond cowbell’. The fact that players continued to play – despite 
the overwhelmingly meaningless, disappointing and fundamentally dissatisfying 
experience - exposes a strange and unexpected effect of the interpellation that takes 
place in the internet’s technological apparatus: a form of radically empty 
consumption and radically empty pleasure indicated by our repetitive clicking on a 
schematic representation of grass that looks like a plain green rectangle for minimal 
gain. This can be seen as symptomatic of Maurizia Boscagli’s diagnosis of 
contemporary mass culture in her book Stuff Theory: Everyday Objects, Radical 
Materialism (2014). ‘[W]e are finally consuming the unconsumable’, she writes, ‘the 
very meaninglessness of life, and the impossibility of finding satisfaction in the 
commodity…now we consume both their immateriality and our recognition of their 
ineffectuality as commodity fetishes’.78 And, as in Cow Clicker (particularly after the 
Cowpocalyspe), we ‘consume the acknowledgement that we see through them’.79  
 Bogost did not anticipate this new form of radically empty consumer pleasure. 
His critique was not experienced as critique, but as just another game. Ironically, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
applications are divorced from any sense of challenge or effort, and therefore represent ‘actuations of 
operations on expired timers…social games’, he argues, ‘are games you don't have to play’. 
‘Destroyed Time’ - this point is self-evident. See Bogost, ‘Cow Clicker: The making of Obsession’, 
http://bogost.com/blog/cow_clicker_1, accessed 02/03/13.  
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Bogost himself also became ensnared in the social game environment that he had 
created. He admits taking pleasure in designing new cows for people to buy. It is as 
if he couldn’t help but willingly participate in the machine of repetitive, meaningless 
and empty consumption that he had knowingly established as such.80 ‘I was spending 
more time on it than I was comfortable with’, Bogost admits. ‘But I was compelled 
to do it. I couldn’t stop’.81 We might suggest, then, that Cow Clicker’s critical game 
was ultimately no different from FarmVille, or anything that Zynga has produced. In 
support of this, we can look to an unironic review of the game on a gaming 
aggregation website, which praises Cow Clicker as:   
a wonderful and addictive Incremental Clicking/Tapping video game…It allows 
you to buy a Cow and keep on clicking it to earn money that will help you buy 
more cows and upgrades. You keep on clicking on the cows to earn more clicks, 
use them to buy upgrades or send them to your friends and enjoy playing this 
brilliant time killing game. Cow Clicker is a great source of entertainment for all 
those who want to spend time clicking and clicking and clicking. If you love 
playing Idle clicking video games, you should definitely check it out. With all the 
wonderful visuals, involving and addictive game-play and easy touch, tilt and 
click controls, Cow Clicker offers plain clicking and tapping fun.82 
 In order to understand how the Facebook apparatus subsumed the purportedly 
oppositional Cow Clicker platform, and made it the same as everything else, we can 
examine Facebook’s EdgeRank system. This is a tool, or algorithm, by which 
Facebook structures its content. EdgeRank arranges all objects existing in each user’s 
network of relations (friends, liked products, associated groups, and general activity) 
and orders them on the user’s ‘Newsfeed’. Objects are ranked according to their 
‘edge’. This refers to the amount of interaction that the object has been subject to. 
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house and office. “I was spending more time on it than I was comfortable with,” Bogost says. “But I 
was compelled to do it. I couldn’t stop.” See Tanz, ‘The Curse of Cow Clicker: How a Cheeky Satire 
Became a Videogame Hit’, http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/12/ff_cowclicker/all/, accessed 
02/03/13. 
81 Bogost quoted in Tanz, ‘The Curse of Cow Clicker: How a Cheeky Satire Became a Videogame 
Hit’, http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/12/ff_cowclicker/all/, accessed 02/03/13. 
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More interaction means a stronger ‘edge’ and a more prominent position on a 
Newsfeed.83 EdgeRank shows how Facebook orders, restricts and frames user 
generated content. It gives information a statistical value that is wholly indifferent to 
Bogost’s critical intention. Therefore, whilst the Cow Clicker project went ‘viral’, it 
did so, we can suggest, only according to the rules of an EdgeRank system that 
ironed out its critical intent and parodic import. People played, and maybe people 
played sarcastically, but it all inevitably led to the standardized Newsfeed advert: 
‘I’m clicking a cow’ - a disclosure, then, of the user’s recognition of its meaningless 
and empty sort of consumption, which they nevertheless go along with. Presumably, 
this recognition has always been a part of Zynga’s applications. It seems, therefore, 
that Bogost’s game worked too well. And, despite his best intentions, each morning, 
‘millions of farmers around the world rise’ to continue toiling in the digital fields of 
FarmVille and the empty pastures of Cow Clicker.84     
 It is important to note, however, that the monetization of our content and clicks 
by these Ideological post-State Apparatuses does not necessarily symbolize a 
wholesale transition from industrial modes of production. The idea of there being a 
simple transition, we can argue following Stiegler, is a ‘myth’ of the present age. 
Instead, glossing Stiegler’s thinking, Johann Rossouw explains that a key 
development of the so-called ‘post-industrial’ period in Western countries was ‘the 
attempt to not only control the means of production (industrial capitalism), but also 
and simultaneously the patterns of consumption – what Stiegler refers to as hyper-
industrial capitalism’.85 So, we can still identify the continuation of exploitative 
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hate)’, CNN News (February 2010), 
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modes of industrial capitalism. For instance, Google has spread its infrastructure 
physically across the globe with a vast network of huge data centers and deep-sea 
optic cables installed at the bottom of the world’s oceans.86 Moreover the industrial 
scale of the post-industrial economy’s operations, in many cases, maintains 
exploitative industrial labour conditions. The working conditions of Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese firm that manufactures Apple iPhones, iPads, Macbooks and various 
other computing devices, were exposed in 2010 after a number of employees 
committed suicide. Foxconn was found to withhold wages, force unpaid overtime 
and lack basic facilities.87 The manufacture of such devices also requires the mining 
of rare-earth minerals, which, in turn, has environmental impacts. The journalist Jay 
Greene investigated, in 2012, the so-called ‘mines where iPhones are born’ - Baotou, 
North Mongolia.88 Here the biggest hazard is the dumping of toxic waste materials 
into ‘tailing lakes…Radioactive waste has seeped into the ground’, he writes, and 
‘farmers have complained that their plants can’t grow…and that their animals have 
become sick’.89 Furthermore villagers near the tailing lakes suggest that the toxic 
environment has caused their teeth to fall out and their hair to turn prematurely white 
(an inadvertent branding, perhaps, of Apple’s signature colour on their body). 
Alongside this, however, is ‘the control of patterns of consumption to the point’, 
Stiegler writes, where millions of people are connected every day simultaneously’ to 
the same apparatuses.90 This is what we observed with Facebook and Cow Clicker: 
the control of consumption to the point that the most banal action can be monetized 
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speakers vibrate to create sound. Europium is a phosphor that creates a bright red on an iPhone 
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assembly line’. See Jay Greene, ‘Digging for rare earths: The mines where iPhones are born’, CNET 
(September 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/digging-for-rare-earths-the-mines-where-iphones-are-
born/, accessed 07/08/13. 
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and, more strangely, experienced as a form of pleasure.   
 The study of online user monetization has been gaining traction in various fields 
of critical studies. Publications on this issue, such as Trebor Scholz’s edited 
collection Digital Labor: The Internet as Playground and Factory (2012), tend to 
argue that dominant modes of consumption have been altered by the internet to the 
extent that consumer activities are now more correctly understood as a form of 
labour.91 Some commentators, however, maintain that service providers like 
Facebook repeat more traditional modes of production. Dave Beech, for instance, has 
argued that ‘Facebook is Edwardian’.92 He makes this claim on the basis that the 
‘Edwardian period [1901-1910] was the…era in which advertising became central to 
the capitalist mode of production’.93 Facebook’s revenue (and other major web 
services) is predominately income from advertising.94 Indeed ‘all it sells is 
advertising space…From an economic point of view, Facebook is an Edwardian 
venture…a brand that is also a medium through which other brands advertise their 
products’.95 By this logic, Facebook’s users are potential customers of the brands that 
choose to advertise on the site: they are no different to a person casually wandering 
through a billboard-laden street. This argument, however, does not account for the 
complexity of Facebook-like systems of feedback. By contrast, Joëlle Farchy 
contends that the accumulation of data by a user allows for an interactive and 
targeted form of advertising, thus turning, Farchy explains, a ‘mass-media model into 
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something that is much more individualized’.96 User behavioral patterns become a 
rich source of data, ready to be mined: realizing, perhaps, Deleuze’s prognosis of 
Control society that ‘masses become samples, data, markets, or “banks”,’ and 
marketing ‘the instrument of social control’.97 Similarly, Mark Andrejevic writes that 
online marketing is not only structured on ‘the ability to target users based on an 
expanding range of information about their backgrounds, tastes and behavior, but 
also the ability to conduct ongoing controlled experiments to determine which forms 
of consumer inducement are most effective in managing and channeling audience 
behavior’.98           
 It is partly because of Facebook’s accumulation and valorisation of quantitative 
data rather than qualitative content that Bogost’s Cow Clicker did not achieve its 
intended impact. As long as it produced data (which it did), it was OK: it didn’t 
cause any friction in Facebook’s system, despite aiming to criticize its lucrative 
social game industry. This is perhaps because all activity and communication on 
Facebook falls under the rubric of ‘immaterial labor’, which, in Franklin’s words, 
‘describes a radical dispersal of value production into all activity that adds value to 
an object or service’.99 These are activities not normally recognized as work, but that, 
in Facebook’s system of production are apprehended as purposeful or productive 
behavior. Moreover, Bogost’s game was based on the premise that the users identify 
themselves as alienated. But this clearly was not the case. The user of Facebook, or 
YouTube for instance, owns the means of production of their product (i.e. video, 
photograph, personal profile), thereby, arguably, overcoming any possible alienation 
between the user and the object of his or her labour. Indeed Andrejevic speculates, 
albeit with some irony, that if ‘anyone is promoting Marx in the current conjecture, it 
is not the critical theorists, but the commercial promoters of the interactive 
revolution’.100 And yet, he argues, this control over productive activity ends up 
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redoubled and harnessed as a form of exploitation: the work a user does in building 
up online community and sociality in a proprietary network is recompense for the 
free services offered. This process of monetizing the banal minutiae of a user’s daily 
activity seems to validate Agamben’s seemingly paranoiac statement that ‘today 
there is not even a single instant in which the life of individuals is not modelled, 
contaminated, or controlled by some apparatus’.101    
 However these observations about free time as something controlled and 
functionalized were already remarked upon by Theodor Adorno in the 1960s. ‘Free 
time’, a term that had originated, he argued, ‘only recently’, ‘has already expanded 
enormously… [and] is tending toward its own opposite…a parody of itself. Thus 
unfreedom is gradually annexing “free time”, and the majority of unfree people are 
as unaware of this process as they are of the unfreedom itself’.102 These comments, 
we can speculate, might go back to Adorno’s employment in New York in the 1930s 
and ’40s when he worked with Paul Lazarsfeld’s Princeton Radio Research Project 
(PRRP), which carried out administrative research on the radio industry. At the time, 
David Jenemann makes clear in his account of Adorno’s years in America, 
‘audience-testing and audience-measurement techniques were already an inescapable 
part of the economic and intellectual fabric of the mass-media’.103 Jenemann details a 
1946 report by the A.C. Nielson market research company, which described a highly 
influential instrument called the Nielson Audimeter that was designed to be fitted in 
the home and to track domestic radio listening habits. In many ways this instrument 
might be seen as a precursor to the current Ideological post-State Apparatuses, in that 
it represented the penetration of corporate surveillance technology into the domestic 
space. ‘As a document’, Jenemann writes ‘it represents a moment in the history of 
capitalism when leisure time is transformed into a time of maximum productivity and 
efficiency. Even when engaged in such innocuous activities as knitting, the audience 
member is on the clock, creating surplus value for the sponsor’.104 Jenemann’s 
suggestion that Adorno would have found this ‘irksome’ does not come as a surprise. 
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The market research technologies established for radio appear similar to those 
implicated in Facebook’s monetization of ‘free time’. We can only suggest that these 
marketing techniques have gradually intensified with each successive technology of 
information production and dissemination (i.e. television and now the internet).105 
Indeed the contemporary ‘Neilson Audimeter’ – i.e. the internet – is operating all the 
time and we are constantly interacting with it. Thus it is more thoroughly able to 
extract, control and induce particular behaviours from its user. In an essay published 
in Scholz’s Digital Labor volume, Andrejevic argues that without its ever-updating 
veneer of newness and convenience, we would see the internet, and the growing 
architecture of interconnected objects known as the ‘Internet of Things’, for what it 
really is: a ‘surveillance-based commercial infrastructure’.106  
 The commercial aspect of the apparatus is such that the user is always subjected 
to a form of measurement or surveying. We cannot casually use the internet, because 
at the same time we are always revealing ourselves, our interests and our desires to 
the system. These interests, desires and needs are estranged from the user and 
packaged as data, so that they no longer belong to him or her. This captured data is 
then returned to its producer as an external shadow-like object, which follows them 
around, mostly suggesting what they would next like to purchase or consume (as in, 
for instance, Amazon.com’s recommendations based on your purchasing and 
browsing history). This is, I think, not unlike a peculiar situation detailed in Marc 
Augé’s Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (1995). 
Here Augé describes the existential experience of non-places, which like various 
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internet services, require frequent checks of the identity of ‘the user of the non-
place’.107  
What he is confronted with, finally, is an image of himself, but in truth it is a 
pretty strange image. The only face to be seen, the only voice to be heard, in the 
silent dialogue he holds with the landscape-text addressed to him along with 
others, are his own: the face and voice of a solitude made all the more baffling by 
the fact that it echoes millions of others.108 
This passage can be adopted as a vivid description of the type of alienation or 
disaffection that accompanies a user’s estrangement from their data: reality 
becoming disconcertingly conflated with the said user’s preferences, habits and 
desires. This might be usefully understood in relation to Marx’s unnerving definition 
of alienation, in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Marx writes 
that the ‘alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, and external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently, as something alien to him, and that it has become a power on its own 
confronting him’.109 Thus, the ‘life’ that the worker has conferred on the object is 
remade as ‘something hostile and alien’.110 However, with the alienation of the user 
from his or her data in the present conditions of production, the external object is not 
hostile: it is remade as something much more chilling. It is overly familiar. The user 
is confronted by something friendly, cheerful and eager to help with their consumer 
needs.           
 This appropriation of the user’s data as an external object, I think, supplements 
Stiegler’s understanding of the contemporary subject (or desubject) as antlike, and 
the apparatus as anthill-like – or arthropod. In the anthill ‘the consumer becomes the 
producer of the network where he consumes and which consumes him’.111 Likewise, 
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the estrangement of the user from their data enables a situation where the user has 
produced the landscape that addresses him/her, and where he/she consumes. In doing 
so, it consumes them: for Stiegler, consuming and ‘exhausting their desire’.112 Here 
we can think of the experience of going online and being confronted by numerous 
familiar advertisements, or logging into a social media platform and being 
confronted by numerous bits of content that are all predetermined by our previous 
activity: our interests, desires and stimulations are worked out before we have even 
enunciated them, and offered back to us for repetitive consumption. Stiegler argues 
that our capture by what he calls ‘industrial temporal objects’, such as the internet, 
allow for an ‘intimate control of individual behaviour, transformed into mass 
behaviour’.113 It is an industrial system that ‘discretize[s], affect[s], reproduce[s] and 
transform[s] every flux and flow (well beyond just language)…the totality of which 
results in generalized traceability and trackabilty’.114 However, unlike the earlier 
conditions of production that gave us the sheep analogy, this economic system 
requires our constant work, and it is because of this work (production of data) that 
we are controlled. Moreover the application of critical claims to its social and 
cultural forms, as we have seen with Cow Clicker, is problematic because critical 
‘intention’ appears to evaporate on its platform. One outcome of the Cow Clicker 
experiment is the idea that critical discourse online is inevitably flattened out and to a 
certain extent functionalized. Thus we cannot presume any critical impulse to survive 
online, despite the technology facilitating, for many, a reprisal of the avant-garde 
notion of an empowering active, co-operative or co-productive user. For all intents 
and purposes, it seems that this notion has been outmoded and functionalized with 
the online monetization of user activity and ‘free time’.     
 However, the new ‘public’ generated by the apparatus also reveals new and 
unexpected forms of pleasure, expressed in, for instance, the disappointment and 
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meaninglessness of Cow Clicker. As we have seen, this was related to the failure of 
Bogost’s critical project, since users willingly and enthusiastically participated in its 
unsatisfying experience: gleefully affirming the stupid role designated to them by the 
click-based social game and not taking on the critical position imagined by Bogost. 
The complex form of this new ‘public’, which confuses and confounds rather than 
reflects and criticizes, can also be glimpsed in 4chan, the anonymous online image-
board upon which the internet meme first appeared. The website appears, on the 
surface, to represent an antithesis to commercial platforms, such as Facebook. It 
maintains a determinedly anti-commercial or a-commercial (it can be more correctly 
understood, I think, as indifferent to commercialism rather than expressly against it) 
spirit, which undergirds the unfettered nature of its chat, exchanges and eclectic 
image production. Put simply, the site is too unpredictable for most companies to 
want to associate their brand with. Indeed, 4chan’s founder, Chris Poole, has argued 
that his system is unique in that it gives users ‘a space to be wrong’.115 In this 
respect, the site’s aggressively policed anonymity, non-hierarchy and ephemerality 
encourages us, I think, to make historical links with the thinking behind Georges 
Bataille’s early twentieth-century secret society Acéphale, and its celebration of a 
‘chiefless crowd’ and ‘loss of sovereignty’.116 As it happens, Poole has recently, in 
January 2015, retired from his duties as 4chan’s administrator; thereby relinquishing 
his status as the proxy figurehead of the site and further emphasizing the site’s 
horizontal and ‘chiefless’ organization - this notwithstanding the fact that his retiring 
was due, in part, to financial concerns. ‘Poole has never made money with 4chan’, 
journalist David Kushner writes in a Rolling Stone feature, ‘he tried to monetize the 
site’s extraordinary traffic, but advertisers were always too wary of the site’s content. 
Not long ago, he was $20,000 in debt and had moved back in with his mom’.117 
4chan, nevertheless, has continued to thrive. Whilst 4chan has been subject to 
various critical claims, focusing on its playful and transgressive aspects, I want to 
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argue that it can be seen, by contrast, to precisely conform, or excessively conform, 
to the protocols of our existing society rather than opposing them, as is often argued. 
However, it is in this aspect that it is most interesting: revealing a form of the 
‘collective’ that does not meet the revolutionary social expectations of the avant-
garde and that does not altogether toe the line of the new economy’s system of 
production.   
i hate u…  
	  
Man has escaped from his head just as the condemned man has escaped from his 
prison, he has found beyond himself not God, who is prohibition against crime, 
but a being who is unaware of prohibition. Beyond what I am, I meet a being 
who makes me laugh because he is headless…He is not a man. He is not a God 
either. He is not me but he is more than me…and in which I discover myself as 
him, in other words as a monster.118 
4chan has been called ‘the asshole of the internet’.119 It has also been referred to as 
the ‘ninth circle of hell’.120 And a New York Times journalist describes it as ‘one of 
the darkest corners of the web’.121 Essentially, it is a simple image-based forum 
where anyone can post comments and images anonymously. And they do: super-
enthusiastically. The online wiki Encyclopedia Dramatica describes 4chan’s 
anonymous community in terms that are suggestive of Bataille’s abovementioned 
1936 description of the anonymous Acéphal, exclaiming that their ‘co-existence has 
created a fucking monster’.122 Indeed, I want to consider 4chan in relation to 
Bataille’s Acéphal in order to analyse the historical differences between their shared 
forms of anonymity, transgression and violence. Whist I have argued that some 
contemporary cultural forms, such as internet memes, aspire to express continuity 
with one aspect of the historic avant-garde (that of socially engaged praxis), 4chan, 
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by contrast, recalls a lesser mentioned negative aspect.    
 The site is split into more than sixty generically themed message boards, but it is 
one board in particular that is the source of 4chan’s notoriety and critical interest. 
This is the random board, ordinarily identified by the last character of its website 
address: /b/. When commentators refer to the internet’s ‘asshole’, it is safe to assume 
that they are referring to /b/. Its community is described by anthropologist Gabriella 
Coleman as ‘obscene and frequently barely literate – a nonstop stream of language 
and imagery that’s often racist, sexist and homophobic’.123 The message board is 
experienced as a flood of wilfully incendiary imagery, comments and pranks, and 
functions, in some ways, like a game: with users seemingly attempting to outdo one 
another in terms of provocation. Recently, for instance, an advertisement was 
distributed for a (false) feature of the new iPhone i0S8 called ‘Wave’. This software 
update encouraged iPhone users to ‘Wave-charge your device by placing it within a 
household microwave for a minute and a half’. This resulted in various new iPhone 
owners microwaving and destroying their phones. The hoax gained so much traction 
that the Los Angeles Police Department felt obliged to tweet about the sham-
advert.124 Also, in August 2014 a cartoon mascot/internet meme for the Ebola virus 
called Ebola-chan was uploaded and shared on 4chan. Ebola-chan is a wide-eyed, 
grinning anime-style nurse holding a bloody skull, with pink pigtails that morph into 
the symbol of the virus (fig. 2.10). On the forum, through various stages of 
competitive collaboration, this mascot eventually scaled-up into a full-blown myth 
about a Western cult who worship and idolise Ebola-chan - the so-called ‘viral 
goddess of love and afrocide’.125 ‘Wherever she’s posted’, an article in The 
Washington Post explains, ‘users are expected to reply with choruses of “I love you, 
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Ebola-Chan” or “thank you, Ebola-Chan”’.126 Moreover, various photos appeared 
online that documented shrines for the cartoon nurse, showing purported Ebola 
doctors (recognizable by the white medical bodysuits and yellow gloves often seen 
on news footage of the epidemic) gathered around in hand-clasped veneration. 
Rumours of a new Western racist cult were subsequently reported by some major 
news outlets.127 Further to this, /b/ is the birthplace of the ‘Anonymous’ international 
network of activists (famous for their Guy Fawkes mask disguise) and in August 
2014 its platform facilitated the hack and distribution of a series of private celebrity 
photographs, known as ‘The Fappening’.     
 Because of its reckless and rebellious sense of humour, 4chan - particularly /b/ - 
can, I suggest, be likened to Bataille’s ‘Secret Society of Acéphale’, which sought to 
establish a community that was not, in any way, constrained by normal social and 
political obligations. Both /b/ and Acéphale abandon individual being in favour of a 
headless, amorpohous anonymity; and in doing so, Bataille writes, realise ‘a universe 
which exists in a state of play rather than one of obligation’.128 In an eleven point 
programme given to new members of Acéphale, Bataille implored the recipient to 
‘assume within oneself perversion and crime, not as exclusive values, but as a 
prelude to their integration into the totality of humanity’.129 He continues: 
‘Participate in the destruction of the world as it presently exists, with eyes open wide 
to the world which is yet to be’.130 We can frame the activity that takes place on 
4chan in relation to Bataille’s demand to integrate crime and perversion into the 
human totality. The ethical stakes of this integration are glossed by Benjamin Noys, 
who explains, by way of contrast, that the exclusion of ‘crime and perversion from 
the human totality is an act of violence that does not destroy crime and 
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perversion’.131 And, moreover, that ‘if we take on perversion and crime as exclusive 
values then we celebrate them as such and thereby increase their violence’.132 Thus, a 
more authentic community would integrate these values rather than exclude them. 
This is because the exclusion of violence, in Noys’s words, ‘does not lessen the 
power of violence, it increases it’.133 Indeed, Bataille’s account of a deindividuated, 
anonymous and exaggeratedly perverted form of being, which assisted a new 
conception of community, is paralleled in some of the critical reception of 4chan. For 
some commentators, the website’s mediation of its users seems to hold out the 
promise for a utopian form of post-racial and post-gender community, by scorching 
out any possibility for identity politics with its aggressive anonymity and playfully 
indiscriminate insulting of any and all forms of individuated identity.   
 4chan.org went live in October 2003. Its teenage creator, Poole, had set it up as a 
forum for discussing anime and sharing fan-art with a small community of friends. 
He acquired the source-code from a simple Japanese image board called Futaba 
Channel, whose web address was 2chan.net, and rewrote the site in English. The only 
thing that was altered was the translation of the kanji signifying Futaba’s default 
username - ‘Nameless’. Poole changed it to ‘Anonymous’.134 Following Futaba’s 
model, 4chan offered fully anonymous posting with no required login or 
membership. It has expanded massively since its release. Poole began by sharing the 
site with a group of twenty friends, and without ‘any effort or marketing’ the image 
board grew exponentially.135 At the time of writing 4chan boasts 615,000,000 page 
impressions per month, 22,000,000 unique site visitors per month and 1,000,000 
unique posts per day.136 The random /b/ image board accounts for nearly half of the 
1,000,000 daily posts, and is responsible for ‘thirty percent of the site’s total 
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traffic’.137 In an interview with TechCrunch magazine Poole suggests that the basis 
of the site’s success are two features that were inadvertently appropriated from 
Futaba: user anonymity and its lack of an archive.138 ‘We don’t have recognised user 
accounts, there are no structural barriers to entry, and anyone can go in and post a 
comment within five seconds’.139 There is an option to use a pseudonym on 4chan, 
but it is uncommon. In an article for Triple Canopy magazine, David Auerbach 
observes how the technical aspect of anonymity has grown into a self-declared virtue 
amongst users, which is protected by a collective form of user policing. ‘[I]rritating 
the community can result in a member being deanonymized and “doxed” by having 
their personal information published’, he writes: this is ‘A-culture’s [anonymous 
culture] form of ostracism’.140 Moreover, it is common for users to remind one 
another that one should not behave egotistically. The practice is pejoratively known 
as ‘leaderfagging’ or ‘name fagging’.141 It follows that roughly ninety per cent of all 
messages on 4chan are posted under the site’s default tag ‘anonymous’. By 
maintaining this culture of anonymity, 4chan allows for an alternative way of being 
online, which differs from platforms such as Facebook. Anonymity was, Julian 
Dibbell writes, ‘once thought to be a defining attribute of online interaction’.142 
Nowadays, however, it is ‘widely approached as a bug to be fixed’.143 He argues that 
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‘the clearest demonstration of the internet’s move away from anonymity has been the 
rise of social-networking sites like Facebook, whose appeal to both users and 
marketers rests on a closing of the gap between online and offline identities’.144  
 In the earlier discussion of Ideological post-State Apparatuses, I emphasized the 
promotion of a user-mentality of constant self-publication. This leads us to produce a 
mirror image of ourselves as a dynamic set of consumer preferences in order that we 
can be more easily surveilled and marketed at. This idea of our subjectivity being 
reducible to datasets was something anticipated by Deleuze, who wrote that 
individuals had become dividuals and socially recognizable according to certain 
metrics of data.145 Anonymity, therefore, has no place in this system. Indeed Dibbell 
writes that Facebook is built on a model of ‘radical transparency’.146 Its founder and 
CEO, Mark Zuckerberg confirms this in an oft-cited statement that ‘having two 
identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity’.147 As a result Coleman 
has described the necessarily anonymous user of 4chan as a ‘provocative antithesis to 
the logic of self-publication, and the desire to attain recognition or fame’.148 In 
support of this she introduces the idea of ‘possessive individualism’, which, in this 
context, refers to the normal identity that is expected of us by corporate service 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Dibbell, ‘Radical Opacity’, http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/420323/radical-
opacity/, accessed 24/07/13. 
145 Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, 5. Deleuze’s ‘dividual’ is the direct result of an 
individual’s categorisation and functionalisation within electronic systems; however the term had 
already been used in a different sense by Brecht in regard to the representation of collectives in 
antique tragedy. For Brecht the ‘dividual’ represented a positive counterpoint to the over-privileging 
of the individual in bourgeois society. Summarising this point of view, Devin Fore writes that: 
‘Through its distinctive depictions of collective destiny, in particular, antique tragedy supplied a 
“representation of human coexistence” that conveys the profound interdependence between the person 
and the society in which he lives. These plays depicted not the individual-an autonomous unit that, as 
the etymology of the word suggests, cannot be further divided into smaller units-but what Brecht 
instead proposed co call the “dividual,” a social being whose existence is defined through the public 
life of the collective: if the individual subject is produced through a process that Brecht designated as 
Teilung, a procedure of mere abstract mechanical division, the dividual subject, by contrast, emerges 
through the operation of Einteilung, a word also meaning “division,” albeit division into an aggregate 
body. It is only through Einteilung, Brecht wrote, that communal existence is transformed from 
something that is merely “tolerable” a mass of isolated individuals-to something that is wholly 
“sensual” and properly collective’. See Devin Fore, Realism after Modernism: The Rehumanization of 
Art and Literature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 181. 
146 Dibbell, ‘Radical Opacity’, http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/420323/radical-
opacity/, accessed 24/07/13. 
147 Mark Zuckerberg quoted in Miguel Helft, ‘Facebook, Foe of Anonymity, Is Forced to Explain a 
Secret’, The New York Times (May 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14facebook.html, accessed 13/05/15. 






providers: encouraging us to view ourselves and everything around us primarily as 
commercial property. Coleman’s argument, by contrast, suggests that anonymity 
enables users to practice a kind of individuality that pushes beyond this, and is 
perhaps closer to some sort of Keynesian utopia, free from pecuniary interests.149 Lee 
Knutilla makes a similar claim in his essay ‘User Unknown: 4chan, anonymity and 
contingency’ (2011). ‘The actions by uncontrolled and anonymous others’, he 
argues, ‘continually push beyond the simple binaries of you and I, self and single 
other, troll and victim, joker and audience member’.150 And so the centrality of 
anonymity on 4chan is crucial to its so-called resistance of dominant forms of new 
media capital accumulation.         
 4chan’s lack of an archive is also significant. ‘The way the software works’, 
Poole explains, ‘is that you can only have something like 160 threads that exist at 
any given time on a specific board, and for every new thread that’s posted, an old 
one gets bumped off’.151 This leads to a flowing waterfall of information and image 
feeds. Every time a user refreshes the web page, they are confronted with a whole 
new thread of posts. The lack of an archive means that the content is both 
anonymous and ephemeral – once it’s bumped off it disappears (unless it gets 
reposted by someone else).152 This means that any one user’s experience of the site is 
likely to be unique. Images and messages vanish as new ones are posted. User-
generated content on 4chan has something like the quality of quicksilver: as soon as 
a trend or normative identity is established, it quickly slips out of grasp when the 
user refreshes the page – revealing a new iteration of the thread with new 
arrangements of content. Knutilla compares this experience to ‘an encounter with 
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anonymity, with a stranger in passing’.153      
 The archive is often understood to be synonymous with the bureaucrat: ‘an agent 
of death’, Boris Groys writes, ‘who wields the chilling power of documentation to 
render life grey, monotonous, uneventful and bloodless – in brief, deathlike’.154 It is 
in accordance with this line of thinking that 4chan’s lack of archive appears radical: a 
preservation of vital life in an environment of total control. For instance, Knutilla 
celebrates the ‘unique instance, event and state of becoming’ on 4chan and applauds 
its ‘complete absence of certainty’.155 The experience of contingency enabled by the 
non-administered, non-archived and non-bureaucratic /b/ board, Knutilla writes, is 
‘truly radical and historically unparalleled’.156 However, far from being historically 
unparalleled, we might understand this radical contingency in relation to  Bataille’s 
Secret Society, which was attracted to the symbolism of headlessness and sacrifice 
because both represent the severing of one’s productive faculties (i.e. one’s head) 
and, therefore indicated an unwillingness to invest in the present, as a reserve for the 
future. Instead the Acéphale opens itself to an experience of contingency, to the 
present, by destroying all ties to the existing conditions of production. For Knutilla, 
4chan’s imposition of anonymity and ephemerality operates towards a similar aim.
 Nonetheless, it is typical for the critical commentary on 4chan to maintain careful 
distance from the website’s specific content. Characteristic of this is Knutilla’s 
remark that 4chan and anonymous culture ‘holds promise beyond the often repugnant 
content generated by the site’.157 An example of a characteristically ‘repugnant’ 
exchange on 4chan’s /b/ message board is transcribed here: 
 Anon - sup faggots this is my puppy sleeping     
 it makes cute noises and shit and watches me play xbox    
 jealous? 
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 Anon - im jealous im not there fucking that dog so hard…158 
In his 2012 article ‘Anonymity as Culture: Treatise’, David Auerbach confronts the 
content of anonymous culture and its tendency to manifest in aggressive hate speak. 
In his understanding this form of sociability is playful:      
Anyone entering into an A-culture [anonymous culture] forum is likely to witness 
a nonstop barrage of obscenity, abuse, hostility, and epithets related to race, 
gender, and sexuality (“fag” being the most common, often prefaced with any 
trait, e.g., “oldfag”, “straightfag”). Anyone objecting to this barrage will 
immediately attract a torrent of even greater abuse. These forums maintain an 
equilibrium of offense…This is not to say that the participants are not racist; the 
point is that there’s no way to know the views of the participants, even more 
given the self-referential irony in constant play. A-culture is hardly a utopia of 
free speech, but neither is it a fulcrum of hate speech. Yet the barrage inoculates 
against sincere, extreme hatred by making it harder for genuinely virulent views 
to stand out…159  
We might suggest that in A-culture’s willful abuse of civility, Auerbach discerns an 
aspect of ‘sacred seriousness’. This is to say that A-culture generates intense 
involvement amongst its participants by establishing spatial and temporal borders 
(between the sacred and the profane or banal) that designate specific excessive 
affective conditions. In his 1938 book on play, Johan Huizinga argues that this sort 
of ‘sacred seriousness’ is the foundation of ‘play’. ‘Formally speaking’, he writes, 
‘there is no distinction whatever between marking out a space for a sacred purpose 
and marking it out for purposes of sheer play. The turf, the tennis court, the chess 
board and the pavement-hopscotch, cannot formally be distinguished from the temple 
or the magic circle’.160 These spaces, to which 4chan’s message-board corresponds, 
produce intensive affects that Huizinga (writing in the 1930s) suggests counters the 
anti-play of ‘our worship of technological progress, which was itself the fruit of 
rationalism and utilitarianism [and caused people to]…mould the world after the 
patterns of their own banality’.161 In 4chan, this sacredly observed (thus seemingly 
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irrational) ‘play’ fosters a spatial and temporal zone that counters the productive 
drive of the new economy. For instance, the ‘equilibrium of offense’ that Auberbach 
mentions, abuses the sort of singular identities that can be so efficiently mined and 
monetized by marketing technologies. This ‘equilibrium of offense’ - elsewhere 
referred to, by Auerbach, as an ‘economy of offense’ - ensures that no idea or act 
exists outside of irony, and that nothing can be taken more seriously than anything 
else. It can also be seen, I think, as synonymous with the logic of ‘lulz’, which is 
more commonly equated with online behavior on message boards.162 On /b/ this 
sense of equilibrium is forcefully maintained. If not, the unwilling user will be 
alienated from the group. This is identifiable in the emotional distress recounted by 
users who have unwittingly mistaken this language and abuse as sincere animosity. 
When a user threatens to take severe action in response to abuse - such as suicide - a 
normal response in A-culture is to further ridicule said user until they leave the 
conversation thread.163        
 This form of play might be seen to epitomize an acting-out against the apparatus 
and an increasingly dysphoric ‘world picture’ (as explored in chapter one). Indeed 
the playful nastiness that is associated with the aforementioned logic of lulz, 
Enyclopedia Dramatica argues, ‘is engaged in by Internet users who have witnessed 
one major economic/environmental/political disaster too many’.164 As a result they 
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adopt ‘a state of voluntary, gleeful sociopathy over the world's current apocalyptic 
state’.165 Further to this, we might add the extreme commodification of one’s identity 
in social media (what Virno has called the the ‘valorization of all that which renders 
the life of an individual unique’ and the subsequent ‘fetishistic cult of differences’) 
as another antagonizing variable: on 4chan there is an uncompromising abuse of 
identity, the extremity of which produces no surplus or exchange value for the 
apparatus, only waste.166 This is also reflected in the ephemeral condition of memes 
on 4chan, which are posted with the express knowledge that they will soon disappear 
and become inaccessible.        
 The key to why these communities are seen as creative forums of potential 
dissent is their supposed recovery of a playful, spontaneous mode of activity and 
interaction. Play has an important history of theorization on the left. Indeed /b/’s 
‘equilibrium of offense’ might seem to reactivate the surrealist writer and sociologist 
Roger Caillois’s conceptualization of ‘play’ in his book Man, Play and Games 
(1961), which builds upon Huizinga’s account. Caillois considers the way in which 
play serves to suspend direct engagement with normal social and political life, 
allowing for a separate, uncertain and unproductive occupation. Caillois notes 
Huizinga’s remark that play is what ‘we might call…a free activity, standing quite 
consciously outside ordinary life as being not serious, but at the same time absorbing 
the player intensely and utterly…an activity connected with no material interest, and 
[from which] no profit can be gained…proceed[ing] within its own proper 
boundaries of time and space…’167 Following this Caillois explains that play 
crucially ‘creates no wealth or goods, thus differing from work or art…[n]othing has 
been harvested or manufactured, no masterpiece has been created, no capital has 
accrued. Play is an occasion of pure waste; waste of time, energy, ingenuity, 
skill…’168 This Cailloisian sense of play, which is fully negative and non-productive, 
can be identified in Auerbach’s ‘equilibrium of offense’, and is present, for instance, 
in the site’s use of the epithet ‘fag’.       
 The term is employed as a label that denotes group membership. So, everyone is 
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a ‘fag’. It is one of the rules of 4chan’s game, which creates a sense of indifference to 
normal social codes. A new user is sometime referred to as a ‘newfag’, a 
compassionate user, a ‘moralfag’, someone who only contributes in the summer 
months, a ‘summerfag’, a homosexual user, a ‘gayfag’. Users also self-identify with 
this term. There is an attempt to preserve the stigma of the word, but drain it of 
historical meaning, leaving an excessive and abstracted sign of abuse. In doing so, 
the possibility of a genuine identity politics is cancelled out, through aggressively 
policed anonymity and a playfully indiscriminate smearing of all forms of 
individuated identity. Within this framework the possibility of establishing genuine 
intentionality collapses.169 When used in this way, ‘fag’ does not come across as 
truly violent. Instead, it seems stupid and meaningless. Needless to say, the 
reclamation of the term in this context is different from the reclamation of other 
hateful slur words, as in, for instance, queer theory, where the insult is given a new 
positive meaning. The reclamation of the term at issue is specifically mediated by the 
social and technological parameters of 4chan: its anonymity and ephemerality giving 
full reign to a headless culture of sociopathy and involuntary hate without 
accountability. On 4chan the term is reclaimed only for its offense and offensive 
associations – it is treated with ‘sacred seriousness’ in that it does not refer to 
ordinary or profane life but instead to the specific spatial and temporal demarcation 
of the image board. It functions negatively, with the purpose of outraging and 
removing anyone not willing to comply with the site’s incendiary culture.  
 For Auerbach, this form of play is a legitimate means of self-determination for 
that community of users. He writes that ‘in making their own contributions to that 
[4chan’s] world (however unreal), participants establish ownership; the world 
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becomes their own because it is distinct and detached from the real one’.170 
Furthermore this idea of an uninhibited community of collaborating participants has 
prompted the artist Brad Troemel to write an essay titled ‘What Relational Aesthetics 
can learn from 4chan’.171 In this article Troemel draws attention to an inherent 
contradiction in the trend for participatory event-based artworks, as described in 
Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics: namely that they proposed a contingent 
form of social exchange via highly regulated situations in art galleries and museums. 
Instead, Troemel argues, 4chan’s dynamic is more conducive to the desire for 
immediate social encounter assumed by Relational Aesthetics. The image Troemel 
uses to illustrate the essay is indicative of the argument: an image macro of one of 
Liam Gillick’s colourful aluminium and Plexiglas ‘functional utopias’, entitled 
Rescinded Production 2008 (fig. 2.11). These ‘functional utopias’ were supposed to 
transform the gallery into a communal space, so it might operate, Gillick proposes, 
‘as a site for research, hanging out, viewing and production’.172 Bourriaud celebrates 
Gillick’s work for the priority it gives ‘to the space of human relations’.173 In 
opposition to this, the image Troemel uses simply emblazons Gillick’s ‘functional 
utopia’ with a slab of Impact font, reading: ‘Art produced from the social interactions 
of a network of participants. You’re doing it wrong’. The implication being that 
4chan is doing it right.          
 However, it seems too simple to heroise 4chan in these terms: as a site of 
‘playful’ resistance to the internet apparatus. Indeed, as we have already seen with 
Cow Clicker, even expressly critical or subversive cultural forms are integrated 
easily into the protocol of the apparatus. In this respect, I want to challenge these 
narratives on the basis that 4chan simply does not fit its designated role. Indeed to a 
certain extent we can understand 4chan and its distinctive form of sociability to be 
precisely symptomatic of the internet apparatus. Although it appears to operate 
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beyond the internet’s system of value generation (in that it is not monetised and 
fosters an environment of wasteful Cailloisian ‘play’), its form of activity can be 
considered an expression of our functionalization within this system - ‘play’ 
representing the precise form of our functionalization. Indeed, 4chan seems 
representative of a kind of collective stupidity that is generated from our engagement 
with the apparatus. This stupidity is not, I want to argue, an expression of resistance, 
nor is it an expression of compliance. Instead it appears as a non-productive and 
negative epiphenomenon: produced specifically by the internet as apparatus. Digging 
deeper into the history of computing and online communities, we find a useful study 
published in American Psychologist in 1984 that observes similar behaviour patterns 
amongst networked computer users. Indeed this paper proposes a perspective that 
can be applied to 4chan’s ‘equilibrium of offense’. The article, titled ‘Social 
Psychological Aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication’, claims that the type 
of uninhibited and violent humour that is common in computer-mediated 
communication might, more simply, be a result of that mediation. For them, it is a 
consequence of a user’s integration in the machine. The authors suggest that:  
using the computer tends to be absorbing and conducive to quick response, which 
might reduce self-awareness and increase the feeling of being submerged in the 
machine. Thus, the overall weakening of self- or normative regulation might be 
similar to what happens when people become less self-aware and submerged in a 
group, that is, deindividuated.174 
This early paper on computer mediated behaviour, quite remarkably, comments on 
‘flaming’: a tendency to express oneself more strongly on the computer than in other 
settings. They write about the earliest internet, ARPANET, which was a 
collaborative research project between a subdivision of the U.S department of 
defence, MIT and Berkeley. ARPANET was initially designed as a means to transfer 
files and electronic mail between multiple organizations in separate geographical 
locations, which might serve to maintain government and military communications 
during a nuclear war.175 Sara Kiesler, Jane Siegl and Timothy W. McGuire describe 
how the discussion on this modest peer network of strictly scientific and academic 
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computers nevertheless required policing for offensive content. Every few days it 
needed ‘manually screening [for] messages…deemed in bad taste’.176 Further to this, 
the paper contains details of an experimental study carried out with groups of people 
who were asked to reach consensus on a choice-dilemma problem in three different 
contexts, one of which physically separated each person and allowed them to use a 
computer anonymously. The data showed ‘that computer-mediated communication 
had marked effects on communication efficiency, participation, interpersonal 
behavior, and decision making’.177 Of particular interest in relation to 4chan, is the 
detail that while the group members using the computer participated more equally, 
they nevertheless exhibited what appeared to be ‘uninhibited verbal behavior, 
defined as frequency of remarks containing swearing, insults, name calling, and 
hostile comments’.178 Like the users of ARPANET, it is as if they just could not help 
themselves. The same might be said of 4chan’s users.    
 This returns us to the concept of ‘play’. Caillois maintained that play was a ‘free 
activity’ and therefore was consciously decided by the players in advance. However, 
this would not account for the involuntary abuse that emerges in computer-mediated 
communication and on 4chan. Instead it brings us back to Huizinga’s analysis, which 
was in part based on the idea that play ‘casts a spell over us; it is “enchanting”, 
“captivating”’.179 Moreover, its ‘sacred seriousness’ is only maintained on the 
condition that the participant knows that it is ‘only pretend’ or ‘only for fun’.180 So, 
as Robert Pfaller summarises, ‘the excitement aroused by play can be achieved only 
by knowing better – by knowing that it is all ‘only’ play…we will be absorbed by the 
illusion of play only if and when we see through it’.181 This accounts for the thrill of 
the participant sat behind the computer in Kiesler, Siegel and McGuire’s 
experimental study and it accounts for the joy of the anonymous user of 4chan – they 
are captivated and play along on the condition that they see through its illusion, 
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otherwise, as Pfaller writes, ‘forgetting that it is “just” play would cause one to be 
only as interested in it as one is in other areas of life’.182    
 In this respect, I want to claim that any heroising of 4chan as a site of 
transgression, or for providing access to an experience of pure contingency, is 
overstated. Kiesler, Siegel and McGuire’s observations indicate that the computer’s 
screen-mediated communication actually induces the sort of unfettered play and 
economy of offense prevalent on 4chan. This would mean that the 4chan user’s 
unpredictability and rebelliousness is partly an involuntary expression of their 
participation in the protocol of the apparatus. Huizinga’s thesis that the ‘sacred 
seriousness’ of ‘play’ forms the ‘origin of culture’ can be reformulated as the origin 
of cultural reproduction on the internet – tying the user to its surveillance-based 
commercial infrastructure. This is to say that our relationship to the internet 
apparatus is fundamentally playful: it is in play that we reproduce the protocols of 
existing society. We see through the illusion of Cow Clicker but play along anyway, 
we see through the dumb illusion of our targeted Amazon recommendations but 
carry on shopping, we see through the illusion of Facebook’s social system but 
nevertheless join in. It is all a dumb game and the apparatus gambles on our 
apparently inherent playfulness. Whilst we might contend that the playful notions of 
anonymity and anti-individualism have a history in leftist political organisation, here 
it only seems to display a sort of functionalization conditioned by technology and the 
requirements, perhaps, of our current situation, a defining feature of which is, for 
Stiegler, an all-pervasive stupidity or règne de la bêtise.183   
 Stiegler suggests that contemporary capitalism amounts to a rule of bestial 
stupidity, whose technological systems entrench us in a perpetual present, divesting 
us of the capacity to imagine any alternative. In this context, memes and the sort of 
acephalous community established on 4chan signal our adaptation to this system of 
bestiality. For instance, in support of the idea that we are locked into an 
‘interminable present’ by the internet apparatus, we can look at Shifman’s analysis of 
the orientation of photo-based memes toward the present. ‘In contrast to the use of 
photographs as memory enhancers that enable people to unfold the narrative 
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constituting them’, she writes, describing photography’s more traditional orientation 
to the past, ‘photo fads [like internet memes] are markedly a-historic: no relevant 
happening occurred before or after the moment the photo was taken’.184 In this sense, 
Shifman continues, ‘photo fads are not part of a larger story that is waiting to be told: 
they are the story itself’.185 The presentism, or a-historic nature, of these images is 
further supported by Shifman’s observations regarding the normally mundane 
content of the meme. Mundanity, in this reading, has its own temporality: in 
opposition to the event or major happening, the image of which would be anchored 
in a shared past, the ‘mundane circulation of shifting images stresses the present’.186 
And, we might add, resists the idea of a shared collective consciousness with which 
to imagine a future. This is emblematic of Stiegler’s règne de la bêtise, wherein 
humans are reduced to proletarianised bêtes, and lose the ability to, in Gerald 
Moore’s outline, ‘construct the promise of humanity’.187 This proletariat carries no 
revolutionary promise. Indeed this is something observed by Virno, who suggests 
that the ‘theory of [teleological] proletarianization fails when intellectual (or 
complex) labor cannot be equated with a network of specialized knowledge, but 
becomes one with the use of the generic linguistic-cognitive faculties of the human 
animal’.188 Perhaps this reveals a deep and uncomfortable truth behind our 
fascination with the cute anthropomorphised animals in internet memes: we 
recognize our own life in them, because we, like cute animals, have little ability to 
question our participation in this system of production. Instead, this orientation to the 
present fits consumer capitalism’s channeling of desire into the purchasing of short-
term pleasure and other sorts of expenditure, which have intensified with the new 
non-stop and always available temporality of online consumption. Moreover, we can 
see the aggressively antagonistic humour of 4chan, and computer-mediated 
communication more generally, as a form of orientation and adaptation towards the 
present. This is because it is entirely negative: it belittles, abuses and burns out any 
idea of a positive future. We can here look back to the comparison I proposed 
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between Bataille’s Acéphale and 4chan’s community of collaborators. Acéphale 
implored its accomplices to ‘participate in the destruction of the world’.189 However, 
4chan does not have this agency. Its acephalous anonymity and aggressive humour 
only seems to signal a perverse participation in the protocol of the machine and with 
the new temporality of online consumption, which has a vested interest in locking us 
into the present. Indeed our archetypal online cultural forms have a strong underlying 
negative aspect that is often downplayed in favour of positive and productive 
conceptions of computer-mediated collaboration, as discussed earlier with internet 
memes. By contrast, as we have seen with 4chan and early instances of ‘flaming’ in 
Kiesler, Siegel, and McGuire’s psychological study, the way we typically interact 
and communicate as an online ‘mass’ seems marked by Bataillian concepts of 
collectivity. More remarkable, however, is that the implicit oppositionality of 
Bataille’s acephalous community is now prescribed by the technologies we use, 
which seem to produce us as Bataillian subjects: anonymous, willfully transgressive, 
violent and perverse.  
coda, heads in freezers 
	  
In 2009 the contemporary artist David Horvitz initiated a meme as part of a project 
titled 241543903. This artwork can be unpacked in a way that crystalizes the themes 
of this chapter and reveals how certain aspects of online culture point to the full 
realization of Adorno’s notion of ‘free time’. It also, I think, points beyond this 
analysis and draws attention to an aesthetic of stupidity in contemporary art and 
visual culture. With 241543903 Horvitz distributed an open request online for people 
to photograph themselves with their head in a freezer, and post the resulting photo 
online with a specific numeric tag, so that they would be automatically collated into a 
group. Horvitz’s request read: 
Take a photograph of your head inside a freezer. Upload this photo to the internet 
(like Flickr). Tag the file with: 241543903. The idea is that if you search for this 
cryptic tag, all the photos of heads in freezers will appear. I just did one.190   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Bataille quoted in Brotchie, ‘Introduction’, 15. 
190 Transcribed from Uncredited author, ‘241543903 / Heads In Freezers’, Know your Meme, 





Like most memes, Horvitz’s project is mundane, immediate and has the same 
meaningless or disappointing promise of ‘fun’ seen in Cow Clicker. The choice of 
numeric tag comes from an appropriately whimsical source. It is a combination of 
the serial number of Horvitz’s refrigerator and the barcodes on some frozen food 
packaging that was in the freezer. The artist’s idea for the work also escalated from a 
dumb suggestion Horvitz made to a sick friend: that she should put her head in a 
freezer in order to feel better. However, the inhumane or mechanical nature of the 
nine-character numeric tag, to my mind, belies the contingency of its source: instead 
disclosing an identification code, similar to Agamben’s understanding of the phone 
number or even a prison camp identification number, by which we can be tracked. 
This observation is crucial to my reading of the work. I want to suggest that the sort 
of playful and unrestrained community that is enabled by 4chan and the cultural logic 
of its imagery - memes - fits an Adornian conception of participation: according to 
which, organized participation (specifically popular team-sports) operates to 
functionalize the body for work.191 Thus sport and leisure activities are associated 
with the ‘shadowy continuation’ of the labour process – there is an element of this in 
the participatory meme created by Horvitz, to which people contributed in their ‘free 
time’.          
 The management and organization of labour in ways that maximise efficiency, 
profitability and accumulation have always been important aspects of technological 
innovation. David Harvey explains that throughout its history, ‘capital has invented, 
innovated and adopted technological forms whose dominant aim has been to enhance 
capital’s control over labour in both the labour process and the labour market’.192 
Crucial to this is the preservation and promotion, via innovative technological 
development, of ‘the necessary mental conceptions of the world that facilitate 
productive activity, guide consumer choices and stimulate the creation of new 
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technologies’.193 This corralling of labour is contained in Horvitz’s 241543903 
meme, which promotes a conception of the world - infantile and stupid - that 
conforms to the mindless frenetic activity fueling the new economy. Adorno further 
argues in his writing on the annexation of ‘free time’ by capital, that frequently it is 
in their leisure time that ‘people first inflict upon themselves (and celebrate as a 
triumph of their own freedom) precisely what society inflicts upon them and what 
they must learn to enjoy’.194 This is what takes place in the participatory meme 
created by Horvitz: a self-inflicted stupidity. 241543903 thus reveals a fulfilment of 
Adorno’s comments about an endemic and enforced ‘free time’ that has become its 
own opposite, a parody of itself.      
 Horvitz’s appeal for head-in-freezer photographs was extremely successful. A 
Google image search for the numeric tag reveals a mass of imagery: each showing an 
individual at leisure, with their head concealed and body awkwardly contorted to fit 
inside a freezer compartment (fig. 2.12). All participants follow Horvitz’s lead: not 
quite like sheep, perhaps more like ants. In this respect, the project has generated a 
vivid and very accurate image of our functionalization for the new economy: since 
headless bodies (or bodies with their head in a freezer) can’t speak, here we have 
anonymity without agency, and evidence of feverish, incessant and super-
enthusiastic activity. The Google image search reveals to us an unforeseen 
representation of the contemporary Shockworker or workaholic: an apt image of the 
user inflicting upon themselves precisely what the new economy inflicts upon them, 
and what we are increasingly learning to enjoy. Perhaps there has not yet been a 
better time in which to update Adorno’s pointed assertion from Minima Moralia 
(1951): namely that, every occasion I am on the internet leaves me, against all my 
vigilance, stupider and worse.195      
 Adorno’s claim is popularly taken as a sign of the author’s cultural elitism.196 
Therefore my appropriation of it might be taken as a sign of my own. However, I 
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want to clarify my use of the phrase, which partly results from Jenemann’s useful 
analysis of stupidity in Adorno’s work.      
 Adorno views stupidity as a ‘symptom of domination’, as opposed to a 
‘disability’.197 Indeed Adorno and Horkheimer, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
write that: ‘Stupidity is a scar’.198 It is a mark of the subject’s domination resulting 
from the inhibition or arresting of what Adorno refers to as ‘thought’. Cinema was 
implicated in this process by Adorno, Jenemann writes, because it ‘forecloses the 
two-in-one conversations that are essential to thought’.199 It precludes dialogue with 
the viewer. A sense of self-doubt or reflection becomes less likely and the viewer is 
liable to fall back on their own, or societal, preconceptions. Nevertheless Adorno, 
Jenemann reminds us, enjoyed the cinema. Even his use of the word ‘every’ suggests 
that he frequented the cinema often and found some sort of pleasure in its ‘inhibition 
of thought’ and ‘foreclosure of the two-in-one conversations’.  
 Therefore, Adorno’s lament that ‘every visit to the cinema leaves him stupider 
and worse’ ‘is not a statement of scorn but rather’, Jenemann suggests, ‘a confession 
of seduction’.200 And again, explained differently, Adorno’s admission ‘that some 
cultural product renders him stupid is not a statement of elitism, but a profession of 
solidarity’.201 For this reason Jenemann can claim that stupidity ‘is always inherently 
political’, because it provides evidence of our domination.202 Likewise with my own 
analysis: whilst the internet user is clearly not equivalent to the cinema viewer, in 
that he or she is not a passive consumer, its form of user engagement nevertheless 
carries with it the threat of stupidity that affects us all. In this respect stupidity has a 
political aspect. Indeed, even though it is dialogical - encouraging conversation and 
exchange - the internet can be said to preclude Adorno’s idea of a ‘two-in-one 
conversation’ by pinning us to our first-order impulses. Certainly the culture of 
4chan can be understood in these terms. Its anonymity and ephemerality removes any 
sense of self-doubt or reflection from the process of participation; instead facilitating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 David Jenemann, ‘Stupider and Worse: The Cultural Politics of Stupidity’, Parallax, vol. 19, no. 3 
(2013), 35. 
198 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, tr. John Cumming (New York: 
Continuum, 1989), 257. 
199 Jenemann, ‘Stupider and Worse: The Cultural Politics of Stupidity’, 44. 
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201 Jenemann, ‘Stupider and Worse: The Cultural Politics of Stupidity’, 35. 





a culture of impulsive and dynamic hate. Furthermore, the meaningless data 
continuously produced on 4chan without reflection can be seen as a repetition of the 
processes by which we are made productive within the current system of production. 
These first-order impulses and preferences are tapped into by companies in order to 
capture our consumer habits. An article by Charles Duhigg in The New York Times 
details that ‘almost every major retailer has a “predictive analytics” department 
devoted to understanding not just consumers’ shopping habits but also their personal 
habits, so as to more efficiently market to them’.203 Duhigg continues, explaining 
that:  
over the past two decades, the science of habit formation has become a major 
field of research in neurology and psychology departments at hundreds of major 
medical centers and universities, as well as inside extremely well financed 
corporate labs…As the ability to analyze data has grown more and more fine-
grained, the push to understand how daily habits influence our decisions has 
become one of the most exciting topics in clinical research, even though most of 
us are hardly aware those patterns exist. One study from Duke University 
estimated that habits, rather than conscious decision-making, shape 45 percent of 
the choices we make every day.204 
Thus a lucrative industry has established itself around these unthinking and 
unconscious habits, which are recorded in minute detail when, for instance, we click 
on this or that link, Google this or that thing, or repost this or that message: to the 
extent that one data analyst claims to know what ‘you want before you even know 
you want them’.205          
 ‘What is “stupid” for Adorno’, Jenemann writes, ‘is not the misguided individual 
in contemporary society, rather it is the way that the intelligence of the autonomous 
subject, when confronted by the demands of a technologically mediated society, is 
always threatened with transforming into its opposite’.206 This stupidity is also 
contained, as a threat, in the internet’s Ideological post-State Apparatus. It scars our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Charles Duhigg, ‘How Companies Learn Your Secrets’, The New York Times (April 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoing-habits.html?pagewanted=6and_r=1andhp, 
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visual culture, marking the pressure put upon the idea of an autonomous individual 
by the demands of the apparatus. It scars Horvitz’s 241543903 meme and, indeed, 
scars memes in general; certainly it scars 4chan, which seems for all intents and 
purposes, a stupid, or automated (rather than autonomous), version of Bataille’s 
Acéphale. This scarring stupidity, however, is also a sign of an implicit reversibility 
in the apparatus, which whilst appearing ultra-useful and super-productive also, as 
we have seen, produces a new collective subject that is passive, indifferent and 
involuntarily aggressive; reversing and confounding the fiction of a positive online 
community of active participants. To a point, this stupidity is simply the form of our 
functionalisation in the current system of production, however at the same time, this 
stupid mass can be seen to display what Baudrillard calls an ‘immanent form of 
humour’, which neutralises, confuses and contradicts any attempt to project a fixed 
identity onto its collective form.207 Without doubt, this is the humour that 
inadvertently emerged on Bogost’s Cow Clicker; not the humour of Bogost’s satire, 
but the humour of its users, playing along despite the shoddy experience offered by 
the game, in the process stumping and negating the critic’s subversive project. This is 
also why 4chan falls short and disappoints any attempt to conceptualize it as in some 
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Fig. 2.1 I CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER?. Image taken from 




Fig. 2.2 I’m in ur office earnin ur salry. Image taken from 















































Fig. 2.3 I’M A CHIKIN LOL. Image taken from 




Fig. 2.4 IF IT NOT FOR SITS WHY IS IT MADE OF WARM?. Image taken from 










































Fig. 2.5 Harry Pointer, WHAT’S DELAYING MY DINNER?, 1872. Carte-de-visite 





Fig. 2.6 Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q., 1919. Pencil on reproduction of Leonardo da 






























































































Fig. 2.9 Post-Cowpocalypse pasture, Ian Bogost, Cow Clicker. Image taken from 





Fig. 2.10 Ebola-chan. Image taken from http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ebola-













































Fig. 2.11 Illustration for Brad Troemel’s essay, ‘What Relational Aesthetics Can 
Learn From 4Chan’, 2010. Image taken from http://artfcity.com/2010/09/09/img-
mgmt-what-relational-aesthetics-can-learn-from-4chan/art-produced-from-the-social-
































































Jpegs and the Horror of Digital Photography 
	  
In 2015 I visited the archives of the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, in order to 
view two works from the Jpegs series by the German photographer Thomas Ruff: 
jpeg ny06, a nine by six foot picture of New York in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
(fig.3.1), and jpeg wd02 (fig. 3.2), a seven by five foot picture of a sun-dappled forest 
scene. At the time of my visit, these extremely large-format framed digital prints 
were in an industrial-scale refrigeration unit at the museum’s depot in the 
Gyroscoopweg area, roughly six kilometres outside Amsterdam city centre. Here 
they are kept in the dark and at three degrees Celsius. This is normal for valuable 
digital chromogenic C-prints, which can degrade badly if not kept in appropriate 
conditions (they are significantly more fragile than analogue prints, which are not as 
light sensitive, and which the Stedelijk keeps at seventeen degrees Celsius).1   
 It goes without saying that I saw Ruff’s photographs in an unusual environment. 
At first sight (with the lights flicked on), they are a contradiction in terms: the worst 
standard of picture quality preserved in highly fastidious conditions. The image 
quality is so bad that it is only by standing far back, or squinting your eyes, that the 
photograph’s representational content coheres into something recognisable. Instead, 
what we see is evidence of the photograph’s digital compression: blocks of opaque 
pixels (these are visible in fig. 3.3). Ruff achieved this look by downloading already 
‘bad’ quality thumbnail-type images from the internet and then further reducing their 
quality using photo-editing software. In this sense, Ruff explains, the work 
‘explores…the aesthetics of an invention that has made it possible for images to be 
widely distributed via the internet’.2 The resulting picture is then printed in limited 
edition at the largest available scale and at high resolution, giving the pixel blocks a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I was informed of this in conversation with Anne Ruygt, one of the curators of photography at the 
Stedelijk. She also discussed the limitations for exhibition that are placed upon this type of digital 
print: such is their fragility (and financial value) that the Stedelijk’s conservators have stipulated that 
digital chromogenic prints (the collection also includes some highly valuable Andreas Gursky 
photographs) can be exhibited for three month periods, with the proviso that the photograph will be 
subsequently returned to the depot’s dark and chilled environment for three years before possible 
future exhibition.      
2 Max Dax, ‘An Interview with Thomas Ruff’, in Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev ed., Thomas Ruff, 





perfect, crystal-like clarity. The photograph is also housed in a heavy-looking dark 
wood frame: encapsulating the seeming contradiction that these works represent, the 
compressed and disposable structure of digital imagery collapsed together with the 
big money objet d’art status of contemporary art photography in one incongruous 
object. Indeed, my viewing of the ‘bad quality’ photograph in the depot’s 
meticulously protective environment only served to intensify its incongruity. 
 This chapter is about the look of close-up digital photographs, as revealed by 
Ruff. Based partly on my experience at the Stedelijk depot, I will argue that this 
aesthetic represents a collapse of production values, in which the lo-fi becomes high 
end. Altogether I shall claim that Ruff’s series of works turns data compression into a 
‘data sublime’: taking and developing this term from Julian Stallabrass’s analysis of 
the aesthetics of large scale contemporary art photography.3 The ‘data sublime’, as 
manifested in Ruff’s Jpeg series undoes the traditionally avant-garde category of the 
‘poor image’: here understood as a form of image production associated with a 
certain set of values, such as, for instance, non-conformist, oppositional, democratic 
or agitprop. However, the poorness in Ruff is seemingly valueless, solely the result 
of a technical operating protocol. Its degradation is a pre-programmed function of 
image compression. In this sense Ruff’s Jpeg series helps crystallise a key question 
of this thesis: what becomes of the avant-garde when its traditional markers have 
become co-opted as an orthodox protocol of our social and technological 
environment?   Ruff is associated with a group of German photographers known as 
the ‘Düsseldorf School of Photography’, who studied under the tutelage of Bernd and 
Hilla Becher and achieved international prominence in the 1980s and ’90s.4 This was 
an important period in which photographs came to be accepted by art institutions 
and, crucially, by the market, as equivalent to painting. And yet, this development 
was, in part, prompted by a basic formal decision made by Ruff in 1986 after he left 
the Kunstakademie: a decision that ultimately also ushered his work into dark and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Julian Stallabrass, ‘What’s in a Face: Blankness and Significance in Contemporary Art 
Photography’, October, no. 122 (Fall 2007), 82. 
4 This group, which also includes Andreas Gursky, Thomas Struth and Candida Höfer, all studied at 
the Kunstakademie Düsseldorf in the 1970s under the photographers Bernd and Hilla Becher (who 
became famous for their extensive photographic typologies of industrial buildings and structures). 
Ruff attended the Kunstakademie from 1977 to 1985 and also held a teaching post at the institution 






cold refrigeration (as in the Stedelijk depot in Gyroscoopweg). Simply put, he 
printed his images at the largest available scale. This represented a break from the 
Bechers’ style, since their work was printed small and presented in a grid format in 
order to encourage a close, comparative reading of the industrial typologies that 
formed the basis of their work. By contrast, the newer large format made the 
photograph spectacular, requiring the viewer to step back to see it, therefore 
discouraging the attentive type of viewing implied in the Bechers’ work. Whilst Ruff 
was the first of his peer group in Germany to print at a huge scale, other 
photographers working independently of Ruff in other countries also began to 
produce work of a similar size in the 1980s, such as Jeff Wall and Jean-Marc 
Bustamante. Nonetheless the process of scaling-up subsequently became 
characteristic of Düsseldorf School photography in particular. Indeed, this approach - 
which was later accompanied by a greater increase in photographic resolution and 
depth of colour, the use of luminescent aluminium or Plexiglas panels as print-
surfaces, and a forthright embrace of digital retouching techniques - typifies the 
practice of, for instance, Andreas Gursky (some of whose photographs are printed up 
to seventeen feet long), Thomas Struth, Candida Höfer and, more recently, Thomas 
Demand.         
 The shift to a larger scale of photograph had two major consequences. First, it 
downplayed the specific content of the photographic image, making it more of an 
abstract surface. By this, I mean that we become primarily aware of the object-
character of the photograph, rather than of its content. Jean-François Chevrier refers 
to this type of photographic object as ‘tableau’ in his 1989 essay ‘The Adventures of 
the Picture Form in the History of Photography’ (which also draws attention to the 
international reach of this style, referencing artists from the United States, Australia, 
Great Britain, France, Canada and those from Düsseldorf). For Chevrier, the tableau 
form ‘summons a confrontational experience on the part of the spectator’.5 This, he 
writes, is in ‘sharp contrast…with the habitual processes of appropriation and 
projection whereby photographic images are normally received and “consumed”’.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Jean-François Chevrier, ‘The Adventures of the Picture Form in the History of Photography’ [1989], 
tr. Michael Gilson, in Douglas Fogle (ed.), The Last Picture Show: Artists Using Photography, 1960—
1982 (Minneapolis; Los Angeles: Walker Art Centre, 2003), 116. 





The large-format approach to printing was first utilised in Ruff’s Portraits: a series 
of dispassionate passport-style photo portraits that he began making (at a smaller 
scale) in 1981. Ruff started printing these in large-format - seven by five feet - in an 
attempt to prevent viewers from simply recognizing their friends (many of the 
pictures were of fellow students at the Kunstakademie). Ruff wanted them to see that 
person as a ‘photograph’ rather than simply identifying the person in the picture. By 
printing large, the photographic object is recognized first.7 In this respect, Stefan 
Gronert writes, ‘he is no longer concerned with the picture as illusory reproduction 
of something else; his interest lies in showing that the construction of the image is at 
least equal in importance to the subject matter itself’.8 Turning the photograph into a 
definite object works to resist what Vilém Flusser refers to as the ‘naïve’ idea that 
photographs signify ‘states of things that have been reflected onto surfaces…[such 
that they] represent the world itself’.9 Indeed, of his Portraits series, Ruff 
complained that ‘[m]any people peer through the photo to see what they want to 
recognize’, because of this, they ‘totally fail to see that this is a photographic 
image’.10 The large format tableau-style photograph, by contrast, forces people to 
confront this fact: that the photographic image is an abstraction of the four-
dimensional world into a two-dimensional surface - what Flusser calls a ‘magic state 
of things’ rather than a transparent representation of the world.11    
 The second impact of large-format printing was that it enabled photography to 
become a luxury art object, whose prices could rival and exceed those of painting. 
This is primarily because photography at a large scale looked more like painting than 
it did before. In addition, Ruff’s decision to start combining the ‘previously light, 
photographic sheet with a fine, dark, wooden frame’ assisted the photograph’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In an interview with Stephan Dillemuth, Ruff discusses his series of large-scale portraits in the 
following terms: ‘I don’t give viewers a chance anymore to draw conclusions about the lives of the 
people I portray’. Instead he wants his viewers to respond to the images only on very superficial 
terms. Ruff offers an ideal hypothetical response: simply, ‘aha, big photograph, big head’. Here the 
viewer receives ‘the picture as a picture and say[s], thank you, Mr. Ruff, well done’. Thomas Ruff 
quoted in Stephen Dillemuth, ‘That Remains to be Seen Many Things are Conceivable that have 
Little Basis in Reality’, in Christov-Bakargiev ed., Thomas Ruff, 104. 
8 Gronert, The Dusseldorf School of Photography, 50. 
9 Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography [1983], tr. Anthony Matthews (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2005), 41 
10 Thomas Ruff quoted in Bennett Simpson, ‘Ruins: Thomas Ruff’s Jpegs’, Thomas Ruff: jpegs (New 
York: Aperture, 2009). 





transition into desirable art object.12 The large scale of the new photographic object 
enabled its ‘emancipation’ from existing themes and tendencies in photographic 
interpretation, such as documentary and indexical representation.13 This so-called 
‘emancipation’ of photography from its subject matter is discussed at length in 
Michael Fried’s Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before (2008), which 
focuses on photographs that, like paintings, are ‘manifestly the bearers of no 
intentions other than the artist’s own’.14 As a result of this transition, art photography 
was ‘ennobled’ and able to join painting at the apex of the art market. It had been 
remade, Julian Stallabrass writes in Art Incorporated (2004), as a ‘spectacular 
creature of the museum’.15 Stallabrass continues: 
Such photographs, made with large-format cameras, printed to the scale of grand 
painting, sometimes on aluminium panels, convey visions of the contemporary 
world which have a startling clarity and depth of colour. These photographs tend 
to be produced in small editions and at different sizes, making them as suitable 
for the museum as for the collector’s living room. In the recession of the early 
1990s, museums looking for spectacular and accessible works bought many of 
these pieces, and their prices began to climb steeply as a result. Now prices rival 
those of the top painters; in 2002 a large Gursky was sold for over £400,000 at 
auction, a record for a contemporary photograph.16 
For Stallabrass, these developments, which ultimately sealed art photography under 
lock and key, in storage containers, as precious objects of financial speculation, 
destroyed the Düsseldorf School’s potential to make ‘critical’ reflections on the 
world. He writes that whilst ‘their modest early photographs [which more precisely 
displayed the influence of the Bechers] encouraged a critical reading of their subjects 
and matched banal scenes to deadpan photography…their latest productions tend to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Gronert, The Dusseldorf School of Photography, 44. 
13 Gronert, The Dusseldorf School of Photography, 13 
14 Walter Benn Michaels quoted in Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before 
(New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2008), 336. Fried also includes an extended quote 
from Michaels, which states: ‘the question about painting…has become the question about the 
photograph, not so much because the photograph can somehow be taken as the object it is a 
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Michaels quoted in Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, 336. 
15 Julian Stallabrass, Art Incorporated: The Story of Contemporary Art (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 96.  
16 Stallabrass, Art Incorporated: The Story of Contemporary Art, 94. Of course, the figure of 
£400,000 which Stallabrass cites as record circa 2004 has since been far surpassed. For instance, in 
2011, Christies sold Gursky’s Rhein II (1999) for $4,338,500. This is, at the time of writing, the most 






transform contemporary scenes into epic, even sublime, spectacles, and tend to foster 
wonder rather than thought’.17 Elsewhere, he writes that in a lot of these ‘large-scale 
museum photographs’ the viewer is ‘overwhelmed by a mass of data that they lack 
the conceptual tools to make sense of’.18 This is what he calls the ‘data sublime’. In 
short, ‘large-scale museum photographs’ have become fetishized commodities: 
looked after like precious jewels and displayed, speculated upon and traded in global 
auction houses. In this understanding, their exchange value, supposedly, overwhelms 
everything else – the contemporary art photograph having become pure capital. 
 This isn’t entirely the way I want to read Ruff’s work, although, as I have 
indicated, I think Stallabrass’s notion of a ‘data sublime’ is important. Nevertheless, 
to my mind, Stallabrass plays down what is most interesting in Ruff’s work. Ruff’s 
Jpeg series is not, I shall argue, entirely reducible to its economic value (as 
Stallabrass would seem to have it), although its economic value is an important 
aspect of my interpretation of the work. Rather I want to argue that the Jpegs’ 
collapsing of production values (high definition photographs of the lowest 
resolution), represent an important reflection on digital photography and the way in 
which it mediates contemporary life. The photographer’s interest in the ‘construction 
of the image’ as something ‘at least equal in importance to the subject matter itself’ 
can be productively explored in relation to this body of work, which definitively puts 
the structure of the digital image at issue: pushing its pixels forward so that they 
dominate the picture frame and obscure everything else.19     
lossy 
	  
Ruff’s Jpeg series (2004 – 2007) comprises over 150 images, ranging in scale from 
six by six feet to nearly ten by twelve feet, each of which has been sourced from the 
internet, downloaded and compressed as a jpeg file of the lowest possible quality. 
Before printing they are also manipulated using photo editing software, in order to 
heighten the effect of the image’s pixelation.20 Whilst the particular subject matter of 
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18 Julian Stallabrass, ‘Negative Dialectics in the Google Era: A Conversation with Trevor Paglen’, 
October, no. 138 (Fall 2011), 12. 
19 Gronert, The Dusseldorf School of Photography, 50. 
20 Commenting on the Jpeg series, Greg Hainge writes that: ‘before printing these images are subject 





these photographic images can be hard to read, it is possible to recognize that at least 
half the images represent scenes of spectacular catastrophe, for instance of the attack 
on the World Trade Center on September 11 2001 (fig. 3.4), and of American nuclear 
bomb testing in Bikini Atoll in the ’40s and ’50s (fig. 3.5). The rest seem to show 
unspecific landscapes or objects of architectural study. All the appropriated images 
have been magnified beyond their limit of resolution: a point beyond which the 
image’s overall readability or indexicality collapses, and seems to shift into a form of 
geometric abstraction. The effect of this might be compared to the look of buffering 
screenshots of bad quality online video streams. It flips our perception of the image, 
forcing us up against a grid of pixels, which confuses recognition of the pictorial 
subject. Fried, commenting on the obfuscating abstraction that results from the 
Jpegs’ extreme pixelation, compares Ruff’s photographs to ‘the pointillist structure 
of Neo-Impressionism’.21 In a historically more direct comparison, we might suggest 
Ruff’s compression produces a result that is comparable to one of Gerhard Richter’s 
totally abstract colour chart paintings, such as 256 Colours (1974) or 4900 Colours 
(2007) (fig. 3.6). The Jpegs, however, contain nearly 100,000 individuated colour 
swatches, far exceeding the visual data in Richter’s colour charts.   
 Ruff’s series takes its name from an acronym for the ‘Joint Photographic Experts 
Group’, an international standards organization, which worked to develop a standard 
means by which colour images could be compressed.22 The jpeg is the name of an 
image file type (it carries the common extension .jpg) that has become a ubiquitous 
and everyday presence in our visual culture. It is the most common format used by 
digital photography apparatuses (digital cameras, phones, tablets etc.) and the format 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regridded and thus expanded, emphasising the structural properties of the image, and some colours are 
altered also. The characteristics of the image that are emphasised by Ruff’s manipulations 
are…artefacts of an image compression standard’. Greg Hainge, Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology 
of Noise (New York; London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 218. 
21 Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, 154. 
22 The ‘Joint’ refers to it being a joint committee between ISO/IEC JTC1 and ITU-T. ISO/IEC JTC1 
is itself a joint committee of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Its purpose is to develop international standards in 
information and communication technologies. See ‘Mission and Principles’, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/list_of_iso_technical_committees/jtc1_home.ht
m#JTC_1_mission_and_principles, accessed 21/09/15/. ITU-T is a division of the International 
Telecommunication Union, which also works to ensure the maintenance of global telecommunication 
standards. Its website states that their aim to ‘develop the technical standards that ensure networks 
and technologies seamlessly interconnect’. See ‘About ITU’, 





normally used for storing and transferring photographic images on the World Wide 
Web. It was first detailed in a technical document, published in 1992 by the Joint 
Photographic Experts Group, which covered the requirements and guidelines for the 
digital compression and coding of continuous-tone still images. This document, titled 
‘ISO/IEC IS10918-1 / ITU-T Recommendation T.81’, ushered in what William B. 
Pennebaker and Joan L. Mitchell refer to - in their co-authored book JPEG: Still 
Image Data Compression Standard (1993) - as ‘the new international standard for 
colour image compression’.23 These requirements and guidelines, through third party 
development, became known as jpeg files. The jpeg permitted the widespread use 
and distribution of digital images, which was previously impeded by the massive 
amount of space required to store high-quality, readable digital images. It overcame 
this impediment by providing a standardized algorithm. This allowed for an 
interchange of images between diverse applications and media platforms in a way 
that was both quick and cheap. Indeed, it is now so widespread and extensively 
implemented that the acronym is deployed as an informal name in and of itself: 
something that simply denotes a digital image. ‘The purpose of image compression’, 
Pennebaker and Mitchell state, ‘is to represent images with less data in order to save 
storage costs or transmission time and costs’.24 So, the less data required to represent 
the image, the better (cheaper and easier) for its users. Compression is achieved by 
‘approximating the original image…[therefore] the greater the compression, the 
more approximate (“lossy”) the rendition is likely to be’.25 Instead of reducing the 
image, in scale for instance, the image is approximated: i.e. data is lost. This is 
achieved via a mathematical formula called the Discrete Cosine Transfer (DCT), 
which negotiates the amount of damage an image can receive without losing its 
overall readability. In simple terms it decomposes visual samples into eight by eight 
blocks of segmented colour, which standardizes different colour tones according to a 
prescribed set of variables. The ‘loss’ is thus a loss of continuous tonality, as the 
image now contains what are known as ‘blocking artifacts’.26 This process, which 
reformats continuous visual information into discrete, prescribed and reproducible 
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patterns, represents a fundamental difference between analogue and digital imagery. 
On this difference, W.J.T. Mitchell writes, in The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in 
the Post-Photographic Era (1992), that: ‘The continuous spatial and tonal variation 
of analog pictures is not exactly replicable, so such images cannot be transmitted or 
copied without degradation…But discrete states can be replicated precisely, so a 
digital image that is a thousand generations away from the original is 
indistinguishable in quality from any one of its progenitors’.27 So, there is no loss of 
quality or degradation in the transmitted or copied digital image because the image is 
already ‘lossy’ and always already degraded.    
 This type of compression works successfully with digital photography by 
exploiting deficiencies in human vision. It works because our eyesight is relatively 
limited. Pennebaker and Mitchell explain that in normal use ‘colour images can be 
compressed by Jpeg lossy techniques by more than 20:1 yet have nearly 
imperceptible levels of visible distortion in the reconstructed image’.28 The bits of 
visual information that we are insensitive to are approximated more drastically. This 
‘lossiness’ is also encoded into the music that we listen to: a phenomenon that we fail 
to notice because, like our eyes, our ears are somewhat insensitive. Indeed, the MP3 
audio file format, like the jpeg, was designed for the maximum possible mobility and 
flexibility and is therefore designed to exclude information. Jonathan Sterne, in his 
book MP3: The Meaning of a Format (2012), details how early research in human 
auditory patterns informed the later development of the MP3 file. This mapped out 
the ‘positions of the nerve endings and their responses to sounds’, so that the ‘zones 
of sensitivity and insensitivity’ could be determined.29 In this research, sound was 
regarded as phenomena not necessarily corresponding to something out there in the 
world. The faculty of audition came to be seen as limited and imperfect, and hearing 
(like vision with the jpeg) came to be seen as ‘a medium…understood in terms 
analogous to the media that were being built to address it’.30 And in terms that are 
similar to Pennebaker and Mitchell’s discussion of the jpeg and the DCT formula, 
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Sterne describes the practice of ‘perceptual coding’, which ‘appears in a published 
work by 1988 and was probably in common parlance sometime before that’.31 It is 
used to ‘describe those forms of audio-coding that use a mathematical model of 
human hearing to actively remove sound in the audible part of the spectrum under 
the assumption that it will not be heard’.32 For all intents and purposes, it seems that 
these regulations are embedded in our audio-visual language and inform our 
comprehension of sound and image, which now comes to us, for the most part, 
degraded.          
 ‘JPEGs are everywhere today’, Cory Arcangel declares in his essay ‘On 
Compression’ (2008), and, moreover, they have informed the ‘look’ of the last 
decade: ‘in case you haven’t noticed, this look is everywhere else as well (ads, digital 
cameras, digital video, etc.) If the ’80s gave us “hot” colors and “rad” graphics, and 
the ’90s gave us slick vector design, then the ’00’s are giving us compressed blocky 
images’.33 Rather than the ever-increasing audio-visual fidelity and ‘realism’ that is 
marketed at us by big-tech firms, the truth of the matter is that our audio-visual 
culture is premised upon an ever-increasing level of loss, damage and compression, 
which we don’t usually experience as such. The jpeg, arguably, can be seen to have 
ushered in a new epistemic paradigm: where the enlargement or magnification of an 
object no longer renders it more precise or reveals more detail. By contrast, 
enlargement, as is evident in Ruff’s photographs, reveals less detail, causes further 
abstraction and eventually displays absolutely nothing.    
hierarchy of images 
	  
Lossy, damaged and compressed production values are frequently interpreted and 
valued in artistic discourse through a familiar avant-garde position regarding the 
activation of the viewer as a critical agent. This is exemplified by Marshall 
McLuhan’s discussion, in his Understanding Media (1964), of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ 
media. It is also evident in more recent discourse surrounding the ‘poor image’, in 
particular the contemporary artist and theorist Hito Steyerl’s 2009 essay ‘In Defense 
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of the Poor Image’.34 Their point in common is that ‘bad’ quality images are more 
likely to enable viewer participation. Arguably, both accounts lean too heavily on a 
simplistic or binary analysis of production values, which Ruff’s Jpegs complicate: 
we might say that these photographs are equally ‘cool’ and ‘hot’, both ‘poor’ and 
‘luxury’.         
 McLuhan’s Understanding Media explains his distinction between ‘cool’ and 
‘hot’ media as follows:  
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a cool 
one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool one like TV. 
A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in “high definition.” High 
definition is the state of being well filled with data. Telephone is a cool medium, 
or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager amount of 
information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition, because so little is 
given and so much has to be filled in by the listener.35  
So, a ‘hot’ medium is something that comes to the viewer filled to the brim with 
data, and requires little viewer participation, as everything is already there in front of 
them and there is nothing to decode or ponder. On the other hand, something is 
‘cool’ if it allows for some participation, letting the viewer fill in the gaps. McLuhan, 
writing in 1964 (before television arguably ‘heated up’, becoming more high 
definition, more ubiquitous and continually available), claimed that television was a 
‘cool’ medium. In part he argued that the ‘cool’ promise of participation was evident 
in the staticky ‘look’ of television visuals. In his typically phallocentric approach, the 
static bursts of accidental colour, or blurring distortion (often referred to as ‘visual 
snow’), which sometimes occurs on analogue screens, are made objects of libidinal 
investment. These moments when we become aware of the screen, the medium 
transmitting the image, remind McLuhan of the ‘open-mesh’ of a ‘silk stocking’: 
which is ‘far more sensuous than the smooth nylon, just because the eye must act as 
hand in filling in and completing the image, exactly as in the mosaic of the TV 
image.36 Indeed an image of stockings is used in McLuhan’s book, The Media is the 
Massage (1967), co-created with Quentin Fiore (fig. 3.7). This idea is repeated by 
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McLuhan in an interview for Playboy magazine in 1969. McLuhan suggests that in 
‘a cool medium, the audience is an active constituent of the viewing or listening 
experience. A girl wearing open-mesh silk stockings or glasses is inherently cool and 
sensual because the eye acts as a surrogate hand in filling in the low-definition image 
thus engendered. Which is why boys make passes at girls who wear glasses’.37 
 The mosaic-like distortion in Ruff’s Jpegs recalls McLuhan’s thoughts on ‘cool’ 
media. McLuhan’s conflation of less information or less data with a more active 
recipient or viewer is also inherited in some of the critical reception of the Jpegs. For 
instance, Bennett Simpson suggests that by zooming in and exposing the materiality 
of the jpeg, Ruff makes the picture ‘less visible’, in order to make it ‘more visible’.38 
This process, Simpson continues, ‘encourages viewers to see and analyse rather than 
feel’.39 Simpson’s argument is therefore premised on the putative ‘coolness’ of the 
Jpegs. They must, he concludes, ‘rile art photography’s increasingly mandarin 
penchant for elaborated and pristine production values’.40 Certainly, when magnified 
to this extent, the digital image has a crepuscular and murky tonality, like dirt that 
won’t come off. Its materiality comes to the fore: the Jpegs are inscribed with the 
marks of their functionality. Like a letter, a jpeg is an image designed to be sent, 
received and opened. A letter is permanently marked by the creasing necessary for its 
package in an envelope, and likewise the jpeg is inscribed and distressed with the 
gridded structure that is necessary for its compression.     
 A different argument is used by photography theorist David Campany, who 
nevertheless comes to a similar conclusion, in a variation on a Greenbergian 
modernist formulation regarding some sort of ‘truth’ to the materials. Campany 
suggests that, despite its cold and machinic nature, the ‘pixel’ is increasingly 
replacing the photographic grain as a ‘sign of the virtuous materiality of the image’ 
and of the ‘virtuous embodied photographer’.41 Campany writes that the pixel might 
be seen to inherit ‘the connotations of “authenticity”’ put upon the photographic 
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grain in the ’30s, ’40s and ’50s, when graininess was ‘coded as a kind of limit to 
which the photographer and the equipment had been pushed’.42 In line with either of 
these positions, it could be argued that Ruff’s extreme enlargement in the Jpeg series 
symbolises a resistance to the perfectibility associated with digital media: revealing 
its structural apparatus, something that we aren’t normally supposed to see. Back in 
2003, Lev Manovich wrote that with increasingly high resolution imaging 
technology, the pixel was no longer present in the viewer’s experience of the digital 
image: ‘as far as the user is concerned’, he claims, ‘it simply does not exist’.43 Thus 
we might see this work as a ‘cooling’ down process: draining the image of its high 
definition data in order to expose a skeletal support.    
 Similarly, a narrative of the ‘poor image’ informs much contemporary discourse 
about artistic experimentation with digital imagery. It is based on the premise that 
less polished media might increase active or critical participation. More specifically, 
the ‘poor image’ builds upon the épater la bourgeoisie aspect of the historic avant-
garde, which sought to outrage the bourgeoisie, trash traditional art values, and 
offend the status quo with quick, crude and cheap materials. For instance, Steyerl 
argues that the jpeg is a ‘poor image’ and as such takes its place within a genealogy 
of ‘non-conformist materials’.44 Certainly the jpeg, as we have seen with Ruff, is, in 
some respects, a ‘poor image’. It is glitchy, lo-fi and intrinsically ‘lossy’ or 
compressed. Superficially, these aesthetic traits can be seen to symbolise non-
conformity or at least some sort of resistance to media spectacle and technological 
innovation. After all, the jpeg is designed for quick and easy distribution and the 
ability to transgress borders and elude boundaries (both geographic and 
technological) is marked all over its compressed and bashed-up appearance.  
 Ruff’s Jpeg series, however, is rarely invoked in these discussions surrounding 
artistic engagement with digital imagery. When mentioned, as in Paolo Magagnoli’s 
writing on contemporary artist Sean Snyder’s use of digital compression, they are 
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simply dismissed as ‘spectacular’.45 The implication of such a dismissal is that their 
‘spectacular’ conditions of production, sale and display contradict the true value of 
the file format, or at least damage its potential. By contrast, Snyder’s work with 
compressed photography has, Magagnoli writes, a ‘sober and minimal aesthetic’.46 
Unlike Ruff, he explains, ‘Snyder’s photographs are modest in size, unframed, and 
sometimes placed on white aluminium boards and glass exhibit cases’.47 Synder’s 
use of ‘poor’ images, in this understanding, symbolises a ‘pedagogical’ rather than 
‘spectacular’ practice.48 Again, McLuhan is echoed in Magagnoli’s account of 
Snyder’s digital compression, in which a disintegration of image quality is seen to 
open up space for the viewer’s interpretation, presuming of course (as is typically the 
case in this approach) that the viewer wants to interact with the work: 
Technically, compression entails a loss of information or resolution. 
Nevertheless, within the artist’s practice it emerges as the metaphor for a process 
of reduction and analysis through which images are questioned and new, 
unconventional readings can be generated. “Data compression results in the 
disintegration of image quality,” wrote Snyder, “leaving space for interpretation 
(or over-interpretation).” For Snyder it is this “space for interpretation” opened 
up by the manipulation of digital software like Photoshop that makes the medium 
a vehicle for the questioning of mass media propaganda…49 
However, I want to contend that Ruff’s collapsing of production values – the ‘cool’ 
loss of resolution bound up with the ‘hot’ luxuriant commodity – in the Jpeg series 
should not simply be dismissed as ‘spectacular’. Instead, I want to propose, it allows 
us to properly grasp the current historical condition of ‘poor’ imagery. The jpeg’s 
poorness is the result of compression: an operating protocol, or dominant cultural 
logic, which mediates our perceptual capabilities – we become used to compression 
because everything is compressed. It therefore becomes difficult to assume a 
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viewer’s attentiveness to ‘poor’ image quality because everything that we experience 
is already ‘poor’. It is in this light that I want to introduce Ruff’s ‘spectacular’ body 
of work into the conversation about ‘poor’ images. We might see them as a measure, 
perhaps, with which to assess the jpeg’s place within what Steyerl terms in her 
influential essay ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, a ‘genealogy of carbon-copied 
pamphlets, cine-train agit-prop films, underground video magazines and other 
nonconformist materials, which aesthetically often used poor materials’.50  
 The relationship between digital compression and activism that is established in 
Steyerl’s text is arguably influenced by the media representation of the ‘Arab Spring’ 
in 2011. In this period of revolutionary activity a visual language of digital 
compression slipped into the popular consciousness when compressed images 
saturated the media. Compressed and ‘bad’ quality images taken on mobile phones 
and digital cameras were distributed via proxy servers (web tools to mask your user 
location) and streamed around the world: they came to our screens blocky. Digital 
compression was essential for the spread of information through compromised 
channels. It became a form of political visibility for the protestor on a global stage. 
Eyewitness accounts of the escalating events could be captured and distributed 
quickly on social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, spreading 
information much faster than traditional media outlets. These images were grainy, 
glitchy, distorted and ‘poor’. In an article in the Guardian, Peter Beaumont considers 
what the ‘defining image’ of the ‘Arab Spring’ might be:  
that defining image is this: a young woman or a young man with a smartphone. 
She’s in the Medina in Tunis with a BlackBerry held aloft, taking a picture of a 
demonstration outside the prime minister's house. He is an angry Egyptian doctor 
in an aid station stooping to capture the image of a man with a head injury from 
missiles thrown by Mubarak’s supporters. Or it is a Libyan in Benghazi running 
with his phone switched to a jerky video mode, surprised when the youth in front 
of him is shot through the head.51 
That ‘defining image’ is a ‘poor’ image: stooped, jerky and compressed. Certainly, 
this type of image was a significant actor in the revolution. And this notion of the 
‘poor’ image having a particular kind of agency is echoed in Steyerl’s essay. ‘Poor 
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images’, she writes, ‘are poor because they are heavily compressed and travel 
quickly’.52 They ‘lose matter and gain speed’.53 The poorer and more compressed the 
image, the lighter, more portable and more evasive. The associated loss of quality, 
moreover, is something that counters ‘the contemporary hierarchy of images…based 
on sharpness, but also and primarily on resolution’.54 Thus, for Steyerl, the jpeg is a 
‘lumpen-proletariat in the class society of appearances, ranked and valued according 
to its resolution’.55 In this understanding values such as focus, resolution, sharpness 
and clarity of content imply class privilege. They become new markers of bourgeois 
comfort. On the other hand, a compressed, ripped, remixed, copied and pasted 
aesthetic is the visual language of a new proletariat. This new visual language is one 
that ‘strips quality into accessibility, exhibition value into cult value, films into clips, 
contemplation into distraction’.56 This image, which loses part of its ‘visual 
substance’ through compression, ‘recovers some of its political punch…[and] builds 
alliances as it travels, provokes translation or mistranslation, and creates new publics 
and debates’.57        
 Steyerl’s narrative of the ‘poor image’ is related to certain avant-gardist strategies 
that foreground the material properties of the apparatus in order to shock and disrupt 
the ideological illusions of media spectacle. For instance, her argument repeats some 
of the concerns of structural-materialist filmmakers in the 1970s (such as, for 
instance, Hollis Framption, Michael Snow, Stan Brakhage), who sought ‘to 
demystify the film process’.58 Structural film did so by making visible the various, 
often shoddy-seeming editing techniques used in commercial cinema (lighting 
effects, slow motion etc.) that manipulate our affective response to the film and 
which we don’t tend to perceive in normal experience. Steyerl’s discussion of the 
compressed and shoddy-seeming jpeg is built on a similar claim. ‘[A]lthough they 
are frequently drawn from commercial media and circulate via networks that support 
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58 Here I’m particularly thinking of the theorist Peter Gidal, who suggested that this type of 
filmmaking worked ‘to demystify the film process’. See Peter Gidal, ‘Theory and Definition of 





corporate and state interests’, Lucy Soutter writes, in her commentary on Steyerl’s 
account of digital ‘poor’ images, they ‘may have subversive effects…they have the 
potential to undercut spectacle in the ways that they are used’.59   
 T.J Demos’s discussion of Steyerl’s artistic practice in his book The Migrant 
Image (2013) sustains this proposition regarding material ‘weakness’ or ‘poorness’ 
in the art work. He devotes a long discussion to Steyerl’s ‘essayistic documentary’ 
video work and, in part, discusses her employment of ‘poor’ production values as a 
destabilising element. For instance, Demos argues that the ‘poor’ quality of images 
in this context (owing to multiple generations of copies and the recording of imagery 
directly off the TV screen) has the effect of ‘derealiz[ing] the video’s referents’.60 It 
lessens the image’s ideological inscription, helping to ‘reveal the intrinsic 
malleability of video’s meanings’.61 Again, the glitchy or lossy image is associated 
with a mode of reception that creates an active, even liberated, form of spectatorship. 
Steyerl, Demos writes, does not fetishize high-definition, rather she ‘appears 
politically committed to her images’ low resolution’.62 Poor production values are 
synonymous with political commitment, on this account the narrative of the ‘poor’ 
image, as these writers present it, is a narrative of resistance and oppositionality; a 
means of disrupting the teleology of technological progress with a flow of bad, 
substandard, weak and deficient images. Indeed, Boris Groys argues in his essay 
‘The Weak Universalism’ (2010), that the avant-garde has always sought to make the 
weakest and worst possible images in order to interrupt and stymie the violence of 
technological progress.63 Thus it is suggested that the hopes of the avant-garde 
flicker, and live on, in this aspect of visual culture.    
 We can draw parallels between these arguments regarding the critical potential of 
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‘low resolution’ and the use of shoddy materials in artistic practice, and the work 
associated with Arte Povera: an Italian neo avant-garde movement in the ’60s and 
’70s (whose name makes this the most obvious point of reference). Writing about the 
links between the Italian historic avant-garde and Arte Povera, Karen Pinkus draws 
attention to their shared use of cheap and disposable materials: sculptures made of 
cardboard, tissue paper, chicken wire and mirrors. These materials, she writes, 
‘increase the potential for movement in the work of art’.64 This dematerialization of 
the art work into assemblages of disposable materials (in contradistinction to the 
static and flat surface of the canvas) manifested a ‘ridding oneself of excess 
objects…of trying to climb out from behind commodities and strip one’s work down 
to a bare distillation’.65 The ‘poorness’ of Arte Povera was authenticated through its 
presentation of an object stripped of reification. The use of such materials put the 
work at a remove from the conspicuous consumption of commodity culture. The 
weakness and insubstantiality of the object supposedly allows it to evade the 
magnetic pull of capitalist culture and the status quo of what Groys calls ‘strong 
images’.66 In this understanding, it is through its material ‘weakness’ that the avant-
garde maintains its critical relation to society.    
 Ruff’s series of Jpegs demands our attention because it upsets this long-standing 
genealogy of ‘poor’ materials. Indeed, there is an utter incompatibility between 
Ruff’s series and these accounts of ‘poor’ quality. Ruff’s ‘poor’ images, printed lush 
and large and framed nicely in dark wood, form a fascinating counterpoint to this 
narrative. They remind us of the risk of fetishizing ‘poor’ quality in an artwork – 
particularly when, as with the jpeg, that ‘poorness’ is the result of a technical 
operating protocol. Often, in the accounts I have quoted, it is made to seem as if 
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these aesthetic traits are automatically in possession of critical, subversive or creative 
power.67 It is as if the artwork, or technology, is theorized as ‘political’, ‘critical’ and 
‘creative’ so that we don’t have to be. This is a tendency to which we might apply 
Jodi Dean’s description of the current technologized, or ‘communicative’, stage of 
capitalism, within which technological fetishes often work to cover over ‘a lack on 
the part of the subject’: 
That is to say, it protects the fantasy of an active, engaged subject by acting in the 
subject’s stead. The technological fetish “is political” for us, enabling us to go 
about the rest of our lives relieved of the guilt that we might not be doing our part 
and secure in the belief that we are after all informed, engaged citizens. The 
paradox of the technological fetish is that the technology acting in our stead 
actually enables us to remain politically passive. We don’t have to assume 
political responsibility because, again, the technology is doing it for us.68 
From this perspective, the ‘poor’ image might be seen, more simply, as a support for 
all our fantasies of political action. This notion is embodied, perhaps at its most 
extreme, in media theorist McKenzie Wark’s claim that every compressed and 
shared file can be seen as an act of détournement: ‘every kid with a bitorrent [a 
protocol for peer-to-peer file sharing] client’, he writes, ‘is an unconscious 
situationist in the making’.69 However, if the ubiquitous practice of compressing and 
sharing a file (by some estimates file-sharing accounts for nearly one third of all 
internet traffic) is an act of situationist détournement, then nearly everything is 
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détournement and nearly everyone is a situationist lying in wait.70 In this scenario, 
everything becomes political and politics is made banal, unthreatening and 
meaningless.          
 By contrast, I want to argue that what Ruff’s Jpeg series shows us is that the 
glitchy, degraded ‘poor’ image is always there, right at the heart of our visual culture 
- perhaps representing the deepest secret of the commodity within contemporary 
capitalism. The degradation, or compression, of the image is entirely in tune with the 
systematic impoverishment that capital itself performs. All commodities are in a 
similar sense compressed: whittled down and concentrated, generating interest and 
desire though spare, shoddy and expendable means. Indeed, Robert Capps argues, in 
Wired magazine, that the main philosophy of twenty-first century consumer 
technology ‘favor[s] flexibility over high fidelity, convenience over features, quick 
and dirty over slow and polished’.71 ‘Cheap and simple’, Capps makes clear, is ‘just 
fine’ for contemporary consumers.72 Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman writes, in Liquid 
Modernity (2000), that ‘it is now the smaller, the lighter, the more portable that 
signifies improvement and “progress”. Travelling light, rather than holding tightly to 
things deemed attractive for their reliability and solidity – that is, for their 
heavyweight, substantiality and unyielding power of resistance – is now the asset of 
power’.73 Bauman goes on to assert that ‘it is the mind-boggling speed of circulation, 
of recycling, ageing, dumping and replacement which brings profit today – not the 
durability and lasting reliability of the product’.74 Therefore, ‘poorness’ is not in 
opposition to ‘spectacle’ or the commodity. By contrast, it is the essence of spectacle 
and commodification in what Bauman refers to as our ‘liquid modernity’.    
 At this point I want to bring to light what is at stake with the Jpegs by 
considering a comparison with the work of Pop artist Andy Warhol. At first sight 
there might seem many similarities; for instance, like Ruff, Warhol used commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Uncredited author, ‘BitTorrent: The “one third of all Internet traffic” Myth’, Torrent Freak 
(September 2006), https://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-the-one-third-of-all-internet-traffic-myth/, 
accessed 11/11/15.  
71 Robert Capps, ‘The Good Enough Revolution: When Cheap and Simple is Just Fine’, Wired 
(August 2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/08/ff-goodenough/, accessed 11/11/15.   
72 Capps, ‘The Good Enough Revolution: When Cheap and Simple is Just Fine’, 
http://www.wired.com/2009/08/ff-goodenough/, accessed 11/11/15.    
73 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 13. 





equipment in a manner that generated seemingly ‘poor’ versions of mass media 
imagery. And both artists notably appropriated archival imagery featuring scenes of 
disaster: Warhol took his material for the Death and Disaster series (1962 – 1964) 
from the United Press International news agency and Ruff simply used the World 
Wide Web for his Jpeg series. Indeed, this correspondence is something frequently 
commented upon in the critical writing about Ruff, which often portrays the German 
photographer as an inheritor of Warhol’s brand of Pop art. This is perhaps most 
strongly evident in his deadpan passport-style series Portraits, which resembles 
Warhol’s own experimentation with photo-booth photography and use of portraiture 
in his Screen Tests (1964 - 66). In point of fact, the basic set of formal rules 
employed in the Screen Tests - static camera, plain background, centred and evenly 
lit subject - might equally be applied to Ruff’s Portraits.    
 Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev has suggested that Ruff presents us with a ‘world 
with no memory, a world with no history, a world with no stereoscopic vision; a flat, 
dull universe’.75 In this sense, Daniel Birnbaum argues, ‘no one else, it seems, makes 
art that is so obviously of our times’.76 Like Warhol, Ruff’s representation of the 
world is deemed so accurate because his photographic gaze seems so indifferent and 
resolutely machine-like. What is more, Ruff’s persona in interviews recalls Warhol’s 
notoriously glib form of self-presentation. ‘If things are the way they are’, Ruff is 
quoted, ‘why should I try to make them look different’.77 In a conversation with 
Régis Durand, Ruff is asked what ‘realism’ means to him. He responds: ‘letting the 
machine do the work it would do anyway’.78 This clearly mirrors Warhol’s, oft-
repeated, phrase made in interview with Gene Swensen in 1963, that ‘everybody 
should be a machine’.79 It is also reminiscent of the Pop artist’s claim to Time 
magazine that: ‘Paintings are too hard. The things I want to show are mechanical. 
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Machines have less problems. I’d like to be a machine, wouldn’t you?’80 In this 
regard, Durand deems Ruff an ‘heir to Warhol, dreaming like him of seeing 
mechanically’.81         
 This sort of ‘machine vision’ is inscribed in much of Warhol’s artistic processes, 
not least in the serial character of his work: prints, photographs and films are 
repeated, over and over, with little to distinguish one from the other. Warhol mimed 
the aesthetics of industrialised consumerism, claiming to ‘like things exactly the 
same over and over again’.82 These aesthetic strategies (which were realised through 
the use of commercial reproduction technologies such as the silk-screen press) are 
ever-present in Ruff. He works in large series (the influence of the serial work of 
Bernd and Hilla Becher, his tutors at the Kunstakademie Düsseldorf, is also 
important here) emphasising the generic aspect of his subjects rather than the 
distinctive.83 The aforementioned embrace of large format printing also linked his 
practice to commercial billboard photography. Gronert, for instance, explains that 
Ruff worked in dimensions ‘which had previously been reserved for the consumer 
industry’.84 However, there are important differences between Warhol and Ruff, 
which can be brought to light by considering some of the most famous critical 
arguments for Warhol (which typically focus on his work from the early ’60s). Both 
Hal Foster and Thomas Crow offer variations on the aforementioned avant-garde 
valorisation of ‘poor’ images from slightly different theoretical starting points, 
applying them to Warhol’s work. Foster provides a psychoanalytic reading of 
Warhol’s Death and Disaster series, within which he interprets their marks of 
degradation as traumatic. And in Crowe’s writing on the Marilyn Diptych (1962), the 
messed-up print quality is understood as a conscious process of mourning the actor’s 
death. The marks of degradation in Ruff, by contrast, have an entirely different 
affective register.          
 In an argument that appears in the eponymous essay in The Return of the Real 
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(1996) and that is recycled in his more recent book The First Pop Age (2012), Foster 
comments upon Warhol’s tendency to repeat imagery over and over again. For 
instance, citing Warhol’s Two Hundred Campbell’s Soup Cans (1962), he identifies 
the abstraction that sometimes results from the repetitious printed motif: ‘Repetition 
in Warhol often either produces a sameness or releases a difference…[B]oth’, he 
writes, ‘can be corrosive of the identity of the image…Sometimes, too, the effect is 
to obscure the image, literally, as the silk-screen ink thins with repeated use of the 
screen or blots with uneven application on the canvas’.85 And whilst commenting on 
a particular version of Warhol’s Ambulance Disaster (1963), Foster describes a large 
and intrusive smear of ink that covers a corpse’s face as a Barthesian punctum – 
something that pierces through the image, affectively connecting, or cathecting, with 
the viewer (fig. 3.8). This is not directly the result of Ambulance Disaster’s content, 
a gruesome press photograph of a fatal ambulance crash. Instead, for Foster, its 
affective charge is the result of its repetition and incidental degradation, the 
combination of the grisly appropriated image and the accidental ‘floating flashes of 
the silkscreen process’.86 The image is reformatted and, Foster writes, ‘several 
contradictory effects can occur at the same time: a warding off of traumatic 
significance and an opening to it, a defending against traumatic affect and a 
producing of it’.87 The ‘poorness’ of the image weakens its mediatized spectacle of 
death and disaster, or, in other cases, the spectacle of mass consumption, liberating 
these objects and images from instrumental reason and opening up points of cathexis 
with the spectator. This poverty of the image is similarly important to Crow’s 
remarks on Warhol’s silkscreens in his essay ‘Saturday Disasters: Trace and 
Reference in Early Warhol’ (1987). For Crow, Warhol’s ‘early’ work (which, in his 
argument, encompasses the Death and Disaster series and Marilyn Monroe portraits) 
expresses ‘a fascination with moments where the brutal fact of death and suffering 
cancels the possibility of passive and complacent consumption’.88 Like Foster, Crow, 
it seems, is affected - or ‘pricked’ - by a punctum in the image. In particular Crow 
focuses on the Marilyn Diptych (1962), which juxtaposes pristine colour portraits of 
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Monroe with scuffed-up (some over-inked and some under-inked) black and white 
versions of the same image, and suggests that Warhol’s repetitive printing and 
reprinting symbolizes an act of mourning or memorial for the actor’s life and death 
(fig. 3.9). The imprecise black and white inked images of the actor references the 
‘flickering passage of film exposures’ in which she is best remembered, ‘not one of 
which is ever wholly present to perception’.89 Therefore, Monroe ‘is most present 
where her image is least permanent’.90      
 Whilst Foster and Crow construct a traumatic and melancholic interpretation of 
Warholian repetition, we might, by contrast, propose a more dialectical reading 
based around the same formal features, following Slavoj Žižek’s account of 
Deleuzian repetition. In Organs without Bodies (2012) Žižek writes that ‘the proper 
Deleuzian paradox is that something truly New can only emerge through 
repetition…What repetition repeats is not the way the past “effectively was” [as with 
reproduction] but the virtuality inherent to the past and betrayed by its past 
actualization’.91 In this respect, repetition might be said to repeat and release the 
utopian energy that inheres in the object. Foster describes a traumatic (rather than 
utopian) release in Warholian repetition. However, to my mind, it is equally possible 
to argue that a utopian energy inheres and bursts through in Warhol’s repetitious 
images of, for instance, Campbell soup cans and Coca-Cola bottles. Indeed the artist 
arguably signals a utopian and joyfully democratic aspect of everyday mass-
produced consumer items in a glib quote from The Philosophy of Andy Warhol 
(From A to B and Back Again) (1975) about Coca-Cola: ‘What's great about this 
country’, Warhol declares, ‘is that America started the tradition where the richest 
consumers buy essentially the same things as the poorest…A Coke is a Coke and no 
amount of money can get you a better Coke…All the Cokes are the same and all the 
Cokes are good’.92 Therefore, we might claim that a utopian aspect of mass produced 
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commodity culture is revealed in Warhol’s use of repetition: the hidden virtuality, or 
transcendent ideal, of Coca-Cola (that it is the same for everyone and that it is always 
good) emerges. This claim, like Crow’s or Foster’s, is likewise premised on the 
observation of some material degradation - smudges and stains - that occur in the 
print process, since these signal that the image has been repeated.   
 This reading of Warhol’s embrace of commodification in its full dialectical 
ambivalence, both traumatic and utopian, would understand Warhol as a forerunner 
to Ruff, more than can be captured by any solely traumatic reading of the 
deployment of the ‘poor’ or degraded image. Indeed turning back to Ruff’s series, we 
can make a direct link with Warhol on the issue of poorness: both sets of practice 
create ‘poor’ versions of mass media imagery via a form of repetition that alters the 
image (Warhol’s prints are deliberately over-inked and Ruff’s are deliberately over-
compressed). As we have discussed, Ruff’s repetition of the appropriated image in 
this body of work compresses and recomposes the image as a grid of murky colour 
swatches. This process of extreme compression is one that creates a ‘lossy’ version 
of the source image, where continuous tone is broken down into what are known as 
‘blocking artifacts’. What interests me is the aesthetic outcome of such extreme 
compression, which often results in opaque abstract marks. These might be compared 
to the smears, stains and ‘floating flashes’ in Warhol: for instance, to paraphrase 
Foster, the ‘obscene stain’ in Ambulance Disaster that takes the form of a large inky 
streak pulling a smear of colour over the corpse’s face. And yet, the ‘obscene stains’ 
in Ruff are importantly different and, I want to argue, call for an entirely different 
critical response. With Warhol the damage to the image looks accidental, whereas 
with Ruff it is consistent, automatic and ordered. The damage is a structural part of 
the image. Fig. 3.10 displays a close up detail of Ruff’s jpeg bb03: an appropriated 
image of the ‘Shock and Awe’ initial bombing of Baghdad in 2003, which is shown 
in full in fig. 3.11. Rather than revealing, as with Warhol, something that pierces the 
surface of the image or which torments us with concealed details (things that we 
know to lie beneath its smear of ink), we only reveal a more crystalline, ordered and 
hard-edged surface – an opaque desert of bluey black. Here we have a level of the 
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image beyond which we cannot go, and where hermeneutics can’t take place. 
Commenting on this element of the Jpegs’ aesthetic, Rachel Wells notes that ‘it 
draws attention to a sense of denied understanding, of something obscured….an 
awareness of a barrier or limitation to the image’.93 For McLuhan, the fuzzy gridded 
moiré pattern of the television image was a source of libidinal investment, and for 
Foster the accidental smearing of an image forced through a silk-screen press 
cathected the object with traumatic energy. By contrast, Ruff’s compression of 
imagery seems to lead to a sense of complete disaffection: focusing on a barrier, 
limitation or inherent blankness that exists at the heart of the digital image.  
 As with my earlier comparison between Polke and Warhol, what I want to 
achieve here is a characterisation both of what is different about our present moment, 
compared to the ’60s, whilst also suggesting threads in ’60s culture that can be seen 
to lead here – this amounts to an alternative genealogy for contemporary cultural 
strategies. For instance, rather than appropriating from the ’60s familiar concepts of 
trauma, criticality etc., we can identify with Ruff an inheritance of Warhol’s interest 
in the ambivalence of the object, which is both traumatic and utopian. In this sense, 
their work is not fully grasped by forms of reception, such as that of Foster and 
Crow, which comprehend it in terms of a traditionally avant-garde model of artistic 
production.          
 This aspect of the digital photograph revealed in Ruff’s Jpegs can be seen to 
invert the main plot point of Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow Up (1966), where the 
protagonist discovers more information than immediately meets the eye, when he 
‘blows up’ and magnifies a photographic negative, inadvertently uncovering 
evidence of a murder. Regarding this feature of analogue photography, W.J.T. 
Mitchell explains that ‘there is an indefinite amount of information in a continuous-
tone photograph, so enlargement usually reveals more detail but yields a fuzzier and 
grainier picture’.94 Walter Benjamin also discusses photographic close-ups and 
enlargements (focussing on the close-up botanical photography of Karl Blossfeldt) in 
his ‘Little History of Photography’ (1931). For Benjamin, these techniques (as with 
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the use of slow-motion in the moving image) reveal a ‘secret’: we ‘discover the 
existence of…[the] optical unconscious’.95 The nascent technology of photography is 
understood to provide us with access to a never before seen realm of minute detail 
and slowed down time. Esther Leslie summarises Benjamin’s idea of the ‘optical 
unconscious’ as a playful and harmonious relationship between humanity and 
machinery: ‘A “new region of consciousness” is summoned…contracted only in 
conjunction with technology’, she writes, ‘enlargements, emphases of miniature 
details, the focus on banal, everyday milieus…not only renders more precise what 
was already visible but unclear: it divulges wholly new structural formations in the 
material’.96 The camera is like a tool that both simulates the visual organ and extends 
its perceptual reach. By contrast, ‘a digital image’, Mitchell writes, ‘contains a fixed 
amount of information...Once…[it] is enlarged to the point where its gridded 
microstructure becomes visible, further enlargement will reveal nothing new’.97 The 
camera in this context does not work like a tool or prosthesis that enhances 
perception. Instead, it seems to work on a different basis, inverting the relationship 
between human and technology, because we always inevitably come up against a 
wall of pixels that divulges nothing to us. We might suggest that this ruins the 
imaginative possibilities of an ‘optical unconscious’.    
 Benajmin’s ‘Little History of Photography’ also references Brecht’s description 
(in a famous passage of ‘The Threepenny Lawsuit’) of a photograph of ‘the Krupp 
works [the original factory in the Krupp steel, armaments and shipbuilding empire] 
or the AEG’.98 A photograph of these institutions, Brecht argues, ‘tells us next to 
nothing’.99 He uses this example in order to claim that, such has become the 
reification of human relations, ‘less than ever does the mere reflection of reality 
reveal anything about reality’.100 This claim can equally be put upon the magnified 
jpeg, which shares more with Brecht’s understanding of photography than with 
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Benjamin’s playful understanding of photographic magnification and the ‘optical 
unconscious’. Brecht’s thoughts on photography can be seen to anticipate the murky 
and opaque grid that is revealed by Ruff’s magnification. Certainly with Ruff, the 
idea of the photograph telling us ‘next to nothing’ is revealed when the image is 
blown up. Indeed this feature is exposed as something embedded within the structure 
of the image. This, perhaps, is the ‘secret’ of the digital photograph’s ‘optical 
unconscious’. The glitch, stain, smear or floating flash is already there in the image. 
It is not something added by the artist, as in Foster’s discussion of Warhol, in order 
to signal the ‘cracks’ in the capitalist system or the ‘trauma’ of industrialised 
consumption. It is only the shoddy surface value of this type of image: the truth of 
depletion at the heart of the commodity. Foster argued that Warhol’s repetitious print 
process charged, or re-cathected, the appropriated disaster imagery with affective 
energy. However, I want to argue the opposite with Ruff, whose imagery, 
nonetheless, is comparably disastrous.      
 Ruff explains in an interview with Max Dax, that ‘in terms of content, the jpegs 
series consists of images that have been seared into the collective memory…images 
of the world that are unforgettable’.101 Accordingly, the series includes compressed 
images of the 9/11 attack, the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, the U.S ‘Shock and Awe’ 
campaign, nuclear bomb testing on Bikini Atoll, the ‘killing fields’ of Cambodia, 
scenes of warfare in Beirut and Grozny, as well as more apparently innocuous 
landscapes and tourist ‘hotspots’. The treatment of these diverse, eventful and 
historically significant images, however, renders them uniform. Each photograph is 
subjected to the same level of compression and is ‘blown-up’ to a similar scale so 
that they are equally pixelated. This appears to make each image equivalent to one 
another. They appear as alternative configurations of the same coloured grid. They 
no longer seem singular or eventful. Instead, each appears as uninteresting and 
generic as any other. The titles of individual works in the series encourage this 
response. They resemble indiscriminate filenames, the type that often appear 
automatically on a computer database, which don’t speak to the nature of the 
photograph’s content. They simply include some abbreviated detail of the location of 
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whatever is depicted. For instance, a photograph of smoke billowing from the site of 
the twin towers is titled jpeg ny14, a photograph of some woods is titled jpeg wd02 
(‘wd02’ simply because this is the second picture of some woods in the series), and a 
photograph of a bombed out Grozny is titled jpeg gr01.    
 Nevertheless, in Rachel Wells’s analysis of the series in her essay ‘Digital Scale: 
Enlargement and Intelligibility in Thomas Ruff’s JPEG Series’, she argues that 
Ruff’s artistic process has an important ethical aspect. This is premised on Judith 
Butler’s claim, in ‘Torture and the Ethics of Photography’ (2007), ‘that visual culture 
in a time of war should demonstrate the unseen within our seeing’.102 This is because 
war, Butler argues, tends to numb the senses, decimating ‘our capacity to feel 
outrage in the face of human suffering’.103 Referring in particular to the notorious 
Abu Ghraib photographs (blatant evidence of this numbing of the senses), Butler 
writes that ‘this “not seeing” in the midst of seeing, this not-seeing that is the 
condition of seeing, has become the visual norm…one that we read in the 
photographic frame as it conducts this fateful disavowal’.104 In this sense, a visual 
culture that ‘teaches us to see the frame of what we see’, is crucial.105 For Wells, the 
opaque grid of pixels in the Jpeg series stands in for this idea of the unseen within 
the frame of our vision: ‘we are shown the blunt finiteness of the image’.106 
Discussing the stakes of Ruff’s limited and ‘lacking’ images of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, she suggests that ‘only by becoming resolved to their own distance and 
limitation in their attempts to comprehend the horror of 9/11 can those who were not 
directly affected come closer, and see more clearly’.107 Leaning on Butler, she argues 
that ‘Ruff’s jpeg images of war highlight [our] “quotidian acceptance [of war]”’, and 
highlight the necessity to ‘break apart and fragment a recognized, learned response 
from the media’s model of images’ in order to try to understand a larger ‘horror and 
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outrage’.108          
 However, to my mind, there is a disproportion between the photographs and 
Wells’s argument about comprehending the horror of the event depicted. Simply put, 
the Jpegs are too big. To a certain extent, the scale of these photographic objects is at 
odds with Wells’s ethical program - their large format overwhelms the image’s 
historical specificity. The compression of the image means that the content, whilst 
being visible (for instance, billowing smoke and buildings in rubble are identifiable 
in the Jpegs of 9/11), is not foregrounded.  Instead, we focus on the generic effects of 
pixelation. It is the limit of what we can see in the digital image that we see. In this 
sense, the subject matter in Ruff’s appropriated photographs seems incidental. Their 
compression and concurrent enlargement dispossess us of the ability to respond to 
the image as Wells would have it (the fact that the images appropriated by Ruff are 
already well-known through incessant circulation in the media also dampens their 
effect). Indeed the image’s formatting as a blown-up jpeg seems to dispossess us of 
any judgement at all, because the photograph mostly shows us the standardized 
structure of the image. Roland Barthes said once of an exhibition of ‘Shock-Photos’ 
that ‘the photographer has left us nothing’.109 In his case, the judgement arose from 
his view that the photographers showed too much and that the photograph’s so-called 
‘shock’ was over-indicated. This leaves the viewer no mystery to decipher, no work 
to do. In the Jpegs, however for perhaps the opposite reason, the photograph has 
similarly left us without anything to decipher. Their pixelated representation 
decomposes the event, leaving a grid of blank pixels: the lack of information 
rendering the image predominately decorative. Perhaps this is why these large format 
photographs of death and disaster function, at least according to fig. 3.12 and fig. 
3.13, so effectively as anodyne office and foyer decoration: the ‘shock photo’ here 
easily assimilated as corporate ornament.       
 Nevertheless despite the blandness of the Jpegs, I want to argue that there is a 
horrifying dimension to Ruff’s photographs, going beyond their apparently anodyne 
surfaces. But contra Wells, I don’t see this horror as located in their subject matter: 
instead I want to argue that it is in the structure of the digital image. These 
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photographs picture the fact that, with the jpeg, the closer we look, the less we get to 
see. We are confronted with a level of the image that, I think, can be constructively 
defined as an ‘aphotic zone’. This is a phrase normally used to describe the depth of 
an ocean beyond which there is no light and where photosynthesis can’t take place. 
In the aphotic zone of the ocean the water is pitch black and extends to the ocean 
floor. There is very little life. Likewise within the Jpeg series: the image is magnified 
to its limit of resolution, to a point where its visual information just gives out. And, 
as in the aphotic zone, we arrive at a point where we simply can’t see anything. The 
aphotic zone describes the horror of digital photography: it is the opaque mark of all 
that is excluded by the digitization of the image (fig. 3.14).  
horror 
	  
In his early essay ‘Photography’ (1927), Siegfried Kracauer observes, presciently, 
that ‘the world has become a photographable present, and [that] the photographable 
present has been entirely eternalised’.110 He refers to a ‘blizzard of photographs’; 
conjuring an image of a world in which photographs cover and cocoon everything 
like snow. This ‘blizzard’, he writes, changes our relationship to the image. It 
‘betrays an indifference to what the [photographed] things mean’.111 We can 
understand the ‘blizzard of photographs’ as having a whitewash effect, appearing to 
make individual photographs equivalent, interchangeable and individually not very 
interesting. Kracauer made these comments in the 1920s on the basis of increasingly 
popular illustrated magazines, a time that seems utterly incommensurable with what 
we might see as our current ‘photographable present’. For instance, research 
published in 2014 by Mylio (an online photo organization and storage service) 
estimates that in 2015 one trillion photographs will be taken and that by 2017 there 
will be 4.9 trillion photographs in storage. It also claims that if these photographs in 
storage were printed out, in the normal four by six inch print format, they would 
stretch far enough to make 2.5 roundtrips to the sun: less a ‘blizzard of photographs’, 
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more an extra-terrestrial behemoth.112     
 More recently Franco Berardi has highlighted the impact of this explosion of 
photographic information from a perspective similar to that of Kracauer. Like 
Kracauer, he focuses on the displacement of historical memory by the immediate 
present, or ‘the photographable present’. Echoing Kracauer, Berardi asks: ‘what 
happens to memory when the flow of information explodes, expands enormously, 
besieges perception, occupies the whole of available mental time, accelerates and 
reduces the mind’s time of exposure to the single informational impression?’113 Now, 
Berardi suggests, the ‘things that an individual remembers (images, etc.) work 
towards the construction of an impersonal memory, homogenized, uniformly 
assimilated and thinly elaborated’.114 For Berardi, this extreme mass of images - an 
incredible intensification of Kracauer’s ‘photographable present’ - puts the individual 
in a state of constant excitement without the possibility of climactic release. We are 
confronted by innumerable images, but none of them ‘prick’ us as Barthes famously 
said of the punctum. Rather than engage with or be affected by an individual image, 
we would prefer to see more and more of the images in the vast online database. 
Berardi writes:    
if, into the circle of excitement, we introduce an inorganic element such as 
electronics and impose an acceleration of stimuli and a contraction of 
psychophysical reaction times, something ends up changing in the organism and 
its forms of erotic reaction. Orgasm is replaced by a series of excitations without 
release. Orgasm is no longer the prelude to any accomplishment. Inconclusive 
excitation takes the place of orgasmic release.115  
For Berardi, this psychopathology is a symptom of the mass of imagery and stimuli 
in the current media sphere. Our desire for the electronic, ‘lossy’ and massively 
reproducible digital image signals a libidinal disinvestment: providing only the 
possibility of inconclusive excitation, hindering, perhaps, the Barthesian punctum (as 
that point of contact between the spectator and photograph is never fully 
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accomplished).         
 Ruff’s Jpegs contribute to this understanding of our ‘photographable present’. 
However, by picturing - and emphasising, blowing-up and framing - what I have 
called the aphotic zone in the digital photograph, Ruff draws our focus away from 
formulaic suppositions that are based on the abundance of imagery in the media 
sphere, and which, as we have seen, have been a continuous theme for theorists of 
technically reproduced photography. With the aphotic zone, by contrast, Ruff 
focusses on what is aesthetically new in the digital photograph: namely, the 
hollowness, or inaccessibility, that exists at the core of the image. These muddy 
blocks seem precisely linked to the psychopathological condition discussed by 
Berardi – they are impersonal and homogenized. The aphotic zone indicates a 
blankness right at the heart of the photograph and, in doing so, precludes the 
imaginative possibilities of an optical unconscious because a viewer always comes 
up against the dull finiteness of the image. Certainly this medium cannot be 
understood according to the libidinal categories proposed by McLuhan: unlike the 
TV’s open-mesh stocking-like image there is nothing to tease and for the eye to fill 
in and complete. The jpeg is complete, signalled by the irreducibility of its grid of 
pixels. This produces something similar to what Robert Pfaller has called, an 
‘interpassive’ relationship to the image, in contradistinction to the idea of the 
interactive viewing experience, which is typically invoked with ‘poor’ imagery. 
‘There are artworks that already contain their own viewing and reception’, Robert 
Pfaller has claimed: 
For interpassive artworks…viewers are not required to participate…The work is 
there, completely finished – not only completely produced, but completely 
consumed as well. Contained within such works is not simply the necessary 
activity, but also the requisite passivity…absolv[ing] viewers of any necessary 
activity whatsoever, and also of their passivity [because they don’t even need to 
passively view the object]. They can now be even more passive than passive.116  
Ruff’s emphasis on the gridded-up structure of the jpeg seems to indicate an 
‘interpassive’ stage of photography, which absolves the viewer of any activity 
whatsoever. The scenes depicted in the Jpegs appear simply as variable distributions 
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around a norm: that norm being a DCT eight by eight grid of segmented colour. 
 It is at this point that I want to return to Stallabrass’s idea of the ‘data sublime’, 
which he proposes represents a broad tendency in contemporary art photography 
(encompassing Ruff’s large-scale work). This style of photography, he argues, tends 
to confront ‘the viewer with the impression and spectacle of a chaotically complex 
and immensely large configuration of data’.117 He argues that these ‘awesome’ 
displays function ‘much as renditions of mountain scenes and stormy seas did on 
nineteenth-century urban viewers. They overwhelm the viewer with an ocean of data 
that they cannot make sense of…[and] abandon the viewer in a wilderness of 
information’.118 Indeed the compressed aesthetic identifiable in the Jpeg series would 
seem to represent a precise depiction of a ‘data sublime’ (that is if we take the word 
‘data’ in its normal usage, meaning transmittable and storable computer 
information). This is because they, quite literally, make a spectacle of data: the jpeg 
simply representing, as Ruff explains, ‘a purely technical solution [for image 
compression] that has nothing to do with aesthetics’.119   
 The ‘data sublime’ is invoked by Stallabrass in order to denounce this type of 
spectacular photography. Stallabrass focuses on the stupefying aspect of the sublime, 
which we can perhaps link to Freud’s remarks on the ‘oceanic’; an affective response 
to an object that plunges the viewer into a strangely narcissistic reverie.120 This is 
achieved, Stallabrass writes, through purely technical means, for instance, ‘greater 
resolution and bit depth’, and at the expense of ‘subjective, creative choice’.121 As a 
result, he charges the ‘data sublime’ with: 
a transparent complicity with commercialized spectacle. There is a link, in other 
words, between the presentation of these subjects as mere image and the familiar 
powerlessness of people in day-to-day democracy, of image and news 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Stallabrass, ‘What’s in a Face? Blankness and Significance in Contemporary Art Photography’, 82. 
118 Stallabrass, ‘What’s in a Face? Blankness and Significance in Contemporary Art Photography’, 83. 
119 Ruff in Dax, ‘Interview with Thomas Ruff’, Thomas Ruff (Milan: Skira Editore, 2009), 74. 
120 The ‘oceanic’ refers to a sensation of limitlessness resulting from the perceived absence of 
perceptible boundaries - like an ocean. In his writing about this ‘feeling’, Freud argues that it 
represents a fragment of infantile consciousness; a time before the infant can ‘distinguish his ego from 
the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him’. It is a feeling associated with 
a time before the infant was aware of other people in the world: thus, a very narcissistic form of 
elation. In this respect, an ‘oceanic’ feeling represents a complete disinvestment in the actual or 
historical content of the object. Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents [1930], tr. James 
Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963), 13-14. 





management, of the hollowing out of citizenship in favor of consumerism, of 
broadcast and celebrity culture. This strand’s relentless focus on the fixed image 
is a reflection of the marked decline in political agency, in democratic 
participation, which is a steadily growing and universal feature of neoliberal 
societies.122 
Stallabrass bemoans the work of art that displays complicity with commercialized 
spectacle, instead of working to reinstate a subject with a political and social 
conscience and sense of purposeful agency. However this approach to the artwork is 
arguably too prescriptive: heroising an idea of a ‘powerful’ subject and disavowing 
new cultural forms that don’t adhere to an avant-garde model. It precludes the 
appreciation of any deeper complexity in works such as Ruff’s Jpegs, which might 
be said to offer insight into contemporary technological conditions. Adorno wrote, in 
Aesthetic Theory, that ‘even the most sublime artwork takes up a determinate attitude 
to empirical reality by stepping outside of the constraining spell it casts, not once and 
for all, but rather ever and again, concretely, unconsciously polemical toward this 
spell at each historical moment’.123 Thus the work that is sublime is not fixed as 
such. It wavers and even steps outside of its own spell, so that even on the most 
intense site of spectacularization or sublimity, dialectical thinking can occur. This 
means that we are not always under the spell of the sublime: we can also see 
something as sublime. Whilst this might seem like a slender difference, it means that 
we can interpret Ruff’s Jpeg photographs as picturing our technological condition as 
sublime: suggesting that nature’s capacity to overwhelm, awe and astound us is now 
invoked by technology or objects of ‘second nature’.   
 The Kantian sublime, which is appealed to in Stallabrass’s discussion of 
‘mountain scenes’ and ‘stormy seas’, is based on an observer’s experience of natural 
objects of infinite magnitude or awesome power. The sublime is a metaphorical 
response in the viewer by which they transform, provided they are safe and not 
‘afraid’, such immense scenes - Kant cites, for instance, thunderclouds, volcanoes, 
hurricanes, high waterfalls, and the ‘boundless’ ocean - into images of their own 
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power, a ‘nonsensible’ sense of ‘superiority over nature itself in its immensity’.124 A 
feeling of ‘astonishment that borders on terror’, ‘awe’, ‘dread’ and physical 
inferiority is resolved and the viewer experiences a feeling of ‘inspiriting 
satisfaction’.125 Stallabrass attacks the supposed instrumentalistion of this process in 
contemporary art photography because it lures the viewer into a system of false 
consciousness. This feeling of ‘inspiriting satisfaction’ only increases and disguises 
the distance between the viewer and the object, which is emblematic of the distance 
between the individual and political processes in neoliberal society. However, this 
does not encapsulate the process by which we experience Ruff’s large format digital 
photography. In my own experience of Ruff’s ‘data sublime’ there is no inspiriting 
and positive resolution of the object that asserts a feeling of self-superiority in the 
subject, nor are such responses commonly reported by others in the literature on the 
work. Instead, the Jpegs reveal the finite limit of vision with digital imagery: an 
aphotic zone forcing us to confront the depressing truth of our technological 
apparatuses. Namely, that they no longer function as a tool or prosthesis, they don’t 
improve our perceptual capabilities, but instead function according to a logic that is 
hidden from us.          
 In this respect, I want to argue that Stallabrass sells Ruff, and indeed this type of 
photography, short. Ruff’s Jpegs have an effect that is not imagined by, or that 
exceeds the terms or imaginative horizons of Stallabrass’s account. Rather, I want to 
argue, they put us in touch with what I want to call the horror of digital photography. 
Indeed the sublime invoked in this type of photography is radically different to the 
Kantian sublime and its inspiriting overcoming of ‘crude nature’. By contrast, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Kant asks us, in Critique of Judgement, to ‘consider bold, overhanging and, as it were, threatening 
rocks, thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and 
thunderclaps, volcanoes with all their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave 
behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river, and so on. Compared to 
the might of any of these, our ability to resist becomes an insignificant trifle. Yet the sight of them 
becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, provided we are in a safe place. And we like to 
call these objects sublime because they raise the soul's fortitude above its usual middle range and 
allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which is of a quite different kind, and which gives 
us the courage [to believe] that we could be a match for nature's seeming omnipotence’. Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Judgement [1790], tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), 120. 
125 This feeling of inspiriting satisfaction, Kant writes, ‘raise[s] the energies of the soul above their 
accustomed height and discover in us a faculty of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us 
the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature’. Kant, Critique of 





seems more related to what Sianne Ngai has recently called the ‘stuplime’: a 
neologism collapsing the ‘stupid’ and the ‘sublime’ that speaks to the aesthetic 
experience of mass accumulations of information or data.126 Whilst the scale of these 
accumulations induces a sense of astonishment, the accumulation of data puts strain 
on the viewers’ capacity to metabolize the information: it exhausts rather than 
astounds them. Indeed we might say that this ‘stuplime’ feeling of disaffection is the 
only available means by which we can engage with photographs now, since they 
have accumulated around us exponentially and routinized our behaviour to the extent 
that we seem to have become a function of the camera, or now, more precisely, the 
camera phone. Whilst this is an effect of all digital photography, it is something that 
Ruff’s Jpeg series brings to heightened visibility because of the focus put upon the 
aphotic zone of the digital photograph.      
 A central motif of the horror genre is the idea of confronting a limit to our ability 
to understand something. In horror, as Eugene Thacker suggests (mentioning the 
supernatural literary horror of H.P. Lovecraft), ‘you find a fundamental question 
about the fabric of reality and the impossibility of ever fully knowing or 
comprehending it…horror moves away from human-centric concerns…and towards 
a view of a world that is either against the human, or in many cases indifferent to the 
human’.127 It is in these terms that we can understand the aphotic zone in the Jpegs: 
when we come up against, to use Thacker’s phrase, a world ‘that is not-for-us’. The 
grid of pixels is the boundary or interface to a ‘world-without-us’.128 The experience 
of a ‘world-without-us’ in horror represents ‘the subtraction of the human from the 
world…[,] a nebulous zone that is at once impersonal and horrific’.129 In this respect, 
Ruff can be seen in dialogue with Flusser, who appealed for an ‘informative 
photography’ that would ‘reveal the fact that there is no place for human freedom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ngai is here specifically discussing certain literary and artistic works that foreground this affect. 
For instance, Ngai suggests that Gerhard Richter’s exhaustive accrual of photographs in his Atlas 
project, Gertrude Stein’s literary taxonomy of human types in The Making of Americans and On 
Kawara’s bureaucratic cataloguing of dates from 998031 B.C. to 1969 A.D in One Million Years 
(Past) are all emblematic of the ‘stuplime’. See Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 2005), 248 – 297. 
127 Eugene Thacker quoted in ‘The Sight of a Mangled Corpse: An Interview with Eugene Thacker’, 
Scapegoat, Summer/Autumn 2013, Issue 5, 379.  
128 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1 (Winchester; 
Washington: Zero Books, 2011), Kindle edition.  





within the area of automated, programmed and programming apparatuses [such as 
photography]’.130 The photographic image ‘must not lead to the fetishizing 
compensation of lost objects by their symbolic replacement’, Hubertus von 
Amelunxen glosses, putting stress on Flusser’s belief that we must give up any 
illusion of recovering a pre-photographic and pre-technological world.131 Instead ‘it 
must…educate us into an awareness of this translation within the image’.132 It is only 
in revealing this horror that a philosophy of photography, Flusser writes, might 
‘finally…show a way in which it is nevertheless possible to open up a space for 
freedom’.133         
 Flusser’s Towards a Philosophy of Photography was originally published in 
1983, before the emergence of the digital image (therefore the ‘photograph’ in this 
context still refers to the capture of light and other rays onto sensitive surfaces via 
chemical and mechanical devices). In this book he argues that photography is 
emblematic of a post-industrial and fully apparatized world.134 This is because the 
photograph is a ‘technical image’ – an image produced by apparatuses. ‘As 
apparatuses themselves are the products of applied scientific texts’, Flusser explains, 
‘in the case of technical images one is dealing with the indirect products of scientific 
texts. This gives them, historically and ontologically, a position that is different from 
that of traditional images’.135 Flusser’s strict interpretation of photography as an 
apparatized practice, and thus ‘technical’, can be seen to lay important groundwork 
for thinking about digital photography, within which the photographic image’s 
relationship with the apparatus becomes ever tighter, because the light admitted by 
the camera’s lens is automatically digitized and made ‘lossy’ by the camera 
apparatus: this is the horror pictured in Ruff’s Jpegs.    
 Flusser’s concept of photography as an apparatized practice is based on the idea 
that photographic representation constitutes a variation of the technical categories of 
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131 Hubertus von Amelunxen, ‘Afterword’ to Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, 93- 94. 
132 von Amelunxen, Afterword’ to Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, 93- 94.   
133 Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, 81 – 82. 
134 Flusser contrasts apparatuses from the machines of the industrial world. ‘Tools and machines 
work,’ he writes, ‘by tearing objects from the natural world and informing them, i.e. changing the 
world. But apparatuses do not work in that sense. Their intention is not to change the world but to 
change the meaning of the world. Their intention is symbolic’. Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography, 25. 





the camera, offering little in excess. So the image, in this understanding, is simply a 
dumb function of its technological support. Whilst this point of view might seem 
overly deterministic, it appears precisely to describe the digital image as pictured by 
Ruff. What we see in the Jpegs is a gridded system of pixels, not the window onto 
the world that is sometimes described in traditional thinking about photography.136 
This is why the Jpegs come across as banal colour charts rather than documents of 
historical events. The banality of photography is invoked in Flusser’s definition of 
photographs as ‘post-industrial’ objects, because they are ‘practically worthless 
supports of information…[that] can be replicated and…elaborated by an automated 
apparatus’.137 The photograph itself has no objective significance or purpose other 
than to register the apparatus’s technical capabilities. Therefore the ‘act of 
photography’, Flusser argues, merges the photographer and camera ‘into one 
indivisible function…it is post-ideological and programmed, an act for which reality 
is information, not the significance of this information’.138 In other words, the 
photographer has no agency. It is the camera that has agency.    
 In this respect, Flusser’s theorisation of photography relates to the discussion of 
our contemporary world picture in Chapter One. The world picture that I described 
there is one in which technology is not used to transform, or ‘enframe’ nature 
productively, as in Heidegger’s account of the ‘Age of the World Picture’ and ‘The 
Question concerning Technology’. Instead our world picture is dysphoric, meaning, 
in part, that we have no useful relationship to the world, rather we have become the 
object of technology or, put differently, the object now takes precedence over the 
subject (this was also suggested in Chapter Two, specifically in relation to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 On this tendency for the photograph to be seen as a ‘window’, Flusser writes that: ‘Technical 
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Photography, 14 – 15. 
137 Vilém Flusser, ‘The Photograph as Post-Industrial Object: An Essay on the Ontological Standing 
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functionalization and monetization of our ‘free time’ online). Technology no longer 
seems to function as the object of our intentions. This is manifest in contemporary 
photographic practice, in which the photographer is always operating within the pre-
programmed possibilities of the apparatus. And the ‘freedom of the photographer’, 
Flusser proposes gloomily, is ‘a programmed freedom’.139 This is the horror 
translated in the aphotic zone of the digital photograph. The blank pixels represent 
the boundary between us and the apparatus, which, following Flusser’s logic, is a 
world-without-us: a ‘black box’ that functions automatically. And because all 
‘human decisions are made on the basis of the decisions of apparatuses; they have 
degenerated into purely ‘functional’ decisions, i.e. human intention has 
evaporated’.140        
 The horror of photography thus understood is that it functions for the benefit of a 
photographic apparatus, servicing a feedback mechanism with the ‘single aim of 
maintaining and improving’ itself.141 So whilst the photographer might feel that they 
are bringing their own criteria – artistic, political, scientific – to bear (so that ‘the 
apparatus functions as a function of the photographer’s intention’), this intention, 
nevertheless, ‘functions as a function of the camera’s program’.142 Flusser’s notion, 
in the early 1980s, that the simple act of photography is symptomatic of our 
functionalisation for inhuman apparatuses might seem overstated in relation to that 
historical period of analogue photography. However it represents a surprisingly 
precise diagnosis of photography’s current digital condition. The idea of a 
photographic apparatus whose single aim is to maintain and improve itself is 
arguably expressed in our use of camera phones (recent research suggests that by 
2017 nearly 80% of all photos will be taken using camera phones): recent projections 
speculate that nearly 1.3 trillion photographs will be taken in 2017.143 This is 
indicative of a 16.2% annual compound growth rate in the number of photographs 
circulating in the public domain. As the photographic apparatuses get more 
advanced, it seems that we only wall ourselves deeper and deeper into a cocoon of 
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‘technical images’, which serve no purpose beyond that of the apparatus. Indeed, this 
pessimistic view of photography is reflected in the pressure that photo-sharing 
Instagram users feel to constantly ‘prove their life’ by taking and posting photos of 
anything and everything.144 Who are they proving their life to? The Instagram 
program, which coerces our relentless photographic activity to maintain, expand and 
improve itself.         
 One of the purported aims of horror is to confront ‘the impersonal and indifferent 
world-without-us’.145 The genre is directed against the presupposition that the world 
is always the ‘world-for-us’. In doing so it focuses on blind spots, instances when 
there is a horrible disproportion between the ‘world-for-us’ and the ‘world-in-itself’. 
‘It makes these blind spots its central concern’, Thacker writes, ‘expressing them not 
in abstract concepts but in a whole bestiary of impossible life forms – mists, ooze, 
blobs, slime, clouds, and muck’.146 This is, I want to claim, what Ruff does in the 
Jpeg series. In this respect, perhaps we could add the murky form of the aphotic 
zone, which expresses the blind spots encoded in the digital image, to Thacker’s list 
of bestial ‘life forms’. Moreover, it is how Ruff’s practice bears out Flusser’s desire 
for an ‘informative photography’. This is a photography that does not ‘venerate 
apparatuses and programs’ and does not overcompensate for a putative lack in the 
photographic image. Instead, it works to expose ‘the cracks in [photographic] 
representation, the absurdity of any “post-historical” technical representation’, which 
is absurd because it evidences the absence of photographic agency or intention.147 
This horrible absurdity is a symptom of our functionalisation by photography and it 
finds expression in the form of an aphotic zone in Ruff’s Jpegs. And, worse still, this 
aphotic zone is also expressed, if we look a little closer, in the trillions of 
photographs that circulate around us on a daily basis.   
 This returns us, I think, to the Stedelijk’s depot in the Gyroscoopweg area on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 This idea of a pressure to ‘prove your life’ on Instagram is taken from Essena O’Neill, a teenage 
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followers). O’Neill received a lot of publicity in November 2015 after she announced her retirement 
from the photo sharing platform, stating that the pressure to constantly ‘prove her life’ had become too 
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outskirts of Amsterdam, where I saw Ruff’s Jpegs in a refrigeration unit. There was a 
kind of horror to this experience: a glimpse into the absurd conditions necessitated by 
the financialisation of art objects in contemporary art museums, whose value is such 
that they, in general, are not permitted to be seen. Instead, objects like Ruff’s Jpegs 
are stored offsite, in out of town business districts, sealed in climate-controlled 
darkness in order to preserve and protect the museum’s expensive assets. Indeed, it 
seems that the museum is not, as Stallabrass argues, ‘devoted to gallery spectacle’, 
but is in fact devoted, at least partly, to the absence of spectacle.148 Perhaps this is 
because the truth of the art object is in complete, absurd, disproportion to its 
monetary value and institutional status: the object’s value is purely financial so the 
material thing is shunned - put away somewhere else, so that it is very difficult for 
someone to actually see it. Above all, this seems to particularly characterise the state 
of contemporary art photography, which only achieved recognition within the upper 
echelons of the art market on the basis of an embarrassing and inane detail: that it 
could be printed as big as painting. At the Gyroscoopweg this embarrassing detail is 
safely locked away, along with another embarrassing detail: that these huge 
photographs are far more fragile than earlier, and much smaller, analogue 
photographs. When we see these photographs in such fastidious environments they 
seem dumb and disappointing, a function of a larger apparatus of financial valuation 
that is increasingly reliant upon ‘black box trading’ (what is also known as 
‘algorithmic trading’). A system that operates automatically, indifferently and like 
Flusser’s photographic apparatus, seems to function with the single aim of 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







Fig. 3.1 Thomas Ruff, jpeg ny06, 2005. Chromogenic C-print, 276 x 185 cm. 
Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam. 
	  
 
Fig. 3.2 Thomas Ruff, jpeg wd02, 2005.Chromogenic C-print, 234 x 164 cm. 

































Fig. 3.3 Thomas Ruff, jpeg ny06 (details), 2005. Chromogenic C-print, 254.8 x 164 




Fig. 3.4 Thomas Ruff, jpeg ny02, 2004. Chromogenic C-print, 269 x 364 cm.The 








































Fig. 3.5 Thomas Ruff, jpeg nb01, 2004. Chromogenic C-print, 249 x 188 cm. Private 
collection. 
 
Fig. 3.6 Gerhard Richter, 4900 colours, 2007. Lacquer on Alu Dibond, 680 x 680 

































Fig. 3.7 Illustration from Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the 
Massage: An Inventory of Effects (Berkeley; Hamburg: Gingko Press, 1967). 
	  
 
Fig. 3.8 Andy Warhol, Ambulance Disaster (detail), 1963-1964. Silkscreen ink on 












































Fig. 3.9 Andy Warhol, Marilyn Diptych, 1962. Acrylic paint on canvas, each panel 
each panel 205.4 x 144.7 cm. Tate London. 
 
 
Fig. 3.10 Thomas Ruff, jpeg bb03 (detail), 2007. Chromogenic C-print, 185.1 x 
















































Fig. 3.12 Thomas Ruff, jpeg ny01, 2004 (photographed in exhibition ‘Thomas Ruff, 
































Fig. 3.13 Thomas Ruff, jpeg diptych in the lobby of 980 Madison Ave, New York. 
Image taken from https://collectordaily.com/thomas-ruff-in-the-lobby-of-980-




Fig. 3.14 Thomas Ruff, jpeg bb03 (detail), 2004. Chromogenic C-print, 185.1 x 













Last summer, I went up to the dia Beacon. And I saw a lot of…minimalist works, 
a lot of, I guess, great works, if you know, you see these works as…uh massive 
tributes to art. But actually I think the best piece was this piece by, um, Robert 
Smithson. He had this pile of sand. OK. And he took this mirror, just one mirror, 
and he put it right into the pile of the sand. It was just amazing. It was everything 
and nothing, at once. I think it was the best work I’ve ever seen in my life…1  
This text is transcribed from the American contemporary artist Jordan Wolfson’s 
early film The Crisis (2004), in which the artist is followed around an austere 
cathedral with a hand-held camera as he describes his favourite artworks and art-
related experiences. The atmosphere is reverential and the tone of his delivery is 
strange: enthusiastically mock-serious. The artist expresses a pleasure in the artworks 
that is nonetheless laced with a deadpan cynicism. ‘There’s one other piece I can 
think of, which was one of the best pieces I’ve seen in my life’, Wolfson tells us in a 
hushed voice, ‘it was this piece by, uh, Olafur Eliasson. It’s this room with this 
diffused yellow light, like sepia or something. And when you walk into the room, 
you don’t really understand what’s happening. And then’, Wolfson continues, giddy 
with enthusiasm as the sound of an organ swells up in the space, ‘you realise that the 
whole colour in the entire room is diffused…’.2 He continues to wax lyrical about the 
experience, likening it to being ‘inside a black and white television screen’, then 
eventually wondering how ‘time before…[his] birth [could] exist in colour’.3 The 
music surging through the cathedral seems to unground his trail of thought, or mirror 
his increasingly discombobulated recollection of the experience: the enthusiasm 
expressed by the artist eventually seems content-less, becoming sheer affect. This has 
the effect of undercutting the apparent sincerity of his words. We can’t face them 
seriously. Instead they seem a parody of art appreciation. This is, perhaps, the titular 
‘Crisis’. It is as if the artwork can only be appreciated and enjoyed sarcastically, with 
humour. In this sense, the artist seems to express something like the pessimistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Transcribed from Jordan Wolfson, The Crisis (2004), available to view at UbuWeb Film, 
http://www.ubu.com/film/wolfson_crisis.html, accessed 21/06/16. 
2 Wolfson, The Crisis, http://www.ubu.com/film/wolfson_crisis.html, accessed 21/06/16. 





worldview described in Chapter One. Here this pessimism is directed toward a 
deadpan performance of aesthetic experience that appears stupid, dumb and funny.
 Wolfson can be seen to express this deadpan comedy again in a later video, titled 
Raspberry Poser (2012): a montage of film, animation and music that appears to 
exemplify many of the key features of our cotemporary screen space. Indeed the 
work simply seems to repeat its clichés in a deadpan technique that can be likened to 
a particular strain of ‘deadpan’ comedy. This is perhaps epitomised by the comedian 
Andy Kaufman and his notorious refusal to tell jokes. Reflecting on this approach, 
Kaufman writes that ‘there are times when real life is funnier than deliberate 
comedy. Therefore I try to create the illusion of…“real-life”…if I were to let people 
in on the joke, it wouldn’t have that effect’.4 Kaufman’s comedy simply repeated real 
life situations, allowing them to play out, without any obvious comedic effect or 
commentary added. Likewise Wolfson, in his early work The Crisis and, as I will 
argue, in Raspberry Poser, repeats real life situations without any obvious artistic 
commentary or creative licence. Instead, as with Raspberry Poser, he repeats the 
tropes of contemporary screen space, and in deadpan repetition it is made to seem 
funny.           
 The phrase screen space refers to the system of screens that increasingly mediate 
and reconfigure our lived reality, so that, to put it simply, every aspect of our lived 
experience takes place in a space that is increasingly interwoven with and mediated 
via our experience of screens. Indeed, in their co-authored book on screen mediated 
relationships, Modern Romance (2015), Aziz Ansari and Eric Klinenberg refer to 
some astonishing statistics regarding the average amount of time we are now 
spending with screens. Certainly these figures seem to confirm the importance of the 
screen in our relationship to the world. They write that: ‘In 2014 the average 
American spent 444 minutes per day - nearly 7.5 hours - in front of a screen, be it a 
smartphone, tablet, television, or personal computer. That’s higher than the numbers 
in most European countries, where people spend “only” 5 to 7 hours per day with 
screens, yet it’s not nearly enough to put the United States in the top five nations: 
China, Brazil, Vietnam, the Philippines, and, in first place, Indonesia, where people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Andy Kaufman [1981] quoted in Bill Zehmne, Lost in the Funhouse: The Life & Mind of Andy 





spend 9 hours per day staring at a screen’.5 The system of screens that surround us 
and structure our time and attention comprises a network of related, differently 
scaled, differently technologically-based screens (phone screens, TV screens, 
computer screens, laptop screens, advertising hoardings), which pervade and mediate 
almost all our everyday spaces; in particular, supporting and conditioning our 
activities of consumption and production. Navigating this network, we hop from one 
type of information to another, absorbing each screen’s content as part of an 
undifferentiated data stream. The screen breaks up reality and puts it back together 
again as a jigsaw of interconnected, interrelated, interactive, responsive and 
permeable electronic display units.        
 In short, I want to claim that we have come to experience reality as a montage of 
discontinuous screens and ‘depolarised’ images. This term is taken from Jean 
Baudrillard, who employs it in his description of screen-mediated information in the 
essay ‘Xerox and Infinity’ (1990). ‘Depolarisation’ refers to the way in which space 
on the screen creates ‘a dimension that is no longer quite human, an excentric 
dimension’, meaning that the things we see on screens are disjointed and detached 
from their normal symbolic or material register.6 They are decontextualized and 
seem to exist in a vacuum: ‘things are no longer anything but what they are’ and all 
juxtapositions between images are violently discontinuous.7 I will argue that 
Raspberry Poser’s reflection of this contemporary screen space works to 
demonstrate the exhaustion of the traditionally avant-garde technique of montage. 
The system of screens that surround us might be seen to functionalise, or make banal, 
this artistic technique - montage - that was once, and still is in some contemporary art 
discourse, attributed with the power to cognitively awaken the spectator as an active 
political agent. Wolfson, however, gives us a montage that is funny in its pathetic 
lack of difference from the general screen space surrounding us. In this respect, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Aziz Ansari and Eric Klinenberg, Modern Romance (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), Kindle 
edition.  The figures they cite come from come from a report on Internet usage by Mary Meeker of the 
venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers. See ‘Mary Meeker’s 2014 internet trends 
report: all the slides plus highlights’, Quartz (May 2014), http://qz.com/214307/mary-meeker-2014-
internet-trends-report-all-the-slides/, accessed 21/08/15. 
6 Jean Baudrillard, ‘Xerox and Infinity’, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena 
[1990], tr. James Benedict (London; New York: Verso, 1993), 55. 
7 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or The Lucidity Pact [2004], tr. Chris Turner (London: 





want to ask whether Raspberry Poser evidences the exhaustion of montage as an 
active category of dialectical visual experience. I also want to ask what value we can 
place on a work of contemporary art - such as Wolfson’s dead montage - that draws 
attention to, exaggerates and exploits the redundancy of avant-garde models of visual 
culture.   
post internet montage 
	  
Raspberry Poser is a looping, thirteen minute, fifty-six second moving-image 
sequence of hand-drawn animation, CGI (computer generated imagery) graphics, 
photography and live action overdubbed with some pop music: Beyoncé’s Sweet 
Dreams, Mazzy Star’s Fade into You and Roy Orbison’s Only the Lonely. It is 
neither fully film nor fully animation, instead, it transitions between the two and 
appears as a hybrid work that combines and interweaves multiple visual categories. 
In this sense, Wolfson has been described as emblematic of ‘a younger generation of 
artists whose work cannot be ascribed to any one specific medium’.8 Raspberry 
Poser is typical therefore, of the contemporary moving image, which is, to borrow 
Steven Shaviro’s term, ‘post-cinematic’, meaning based in digital and computer-
based media and interweaving various media forms (animated, computer generated, 
photographic) into the same image.9 Moving image works are now ‘post-cinematic’ 
hybrids: spatiotemporal composites of spatiotemporally discrete elements. Wolfson’s 
Raspberry Poser is the third in a trilogy of works made by the artist that experiments 
with this form of the moving image. The first is titled Con Leche (2009) and the 
second is titled Animation, Masks (2011) (figs. 4.1 and 4.2).10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This statement formed part of the accompanying text to Wolfson’s exhibition as part of Klaus 
Biesenbach and Hans Ulrich Obrist’s ‘14 Rooms’, displayed at Art Basel 2014. See Uncredited 
author, ‘Epilogue - Jordan Wolfson’, 14 Rooms, http://www.14rooms.net/en/Artists/Jordan-Wolfson, 
accessed 20/10/14. 
9 See Steven Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect (Winchester; Washington: Zero Books, 2010). 
10 Interview Magazine suggests that Con Leche (2009) is the work for which Wolfson ‘first gained 
wide notice’. In this 22 minute film, hand-drawn cartoons of small milk-filled Diet Coke bottles 
march around film-footage of desolate Detroit sidewalks – abandoned factories and ruined 
warehouses covered in graffiti – ‘to the soundtrack of a female actress reading text from Internet 
queries such as “How do I know I'm gay?” or “Why don't I have any black friends?”‘. Animation, 
Masks (2012) is a twelve minute computer generated animation of a stereotypical ‘Shylock’ figure, 
composited from a Google Image search for ‘Evil Jew’. This character aears in front of a changing 
backdrop of interior photographs holding a copy of Vogue. Throughout the video his facial features 
morph and he mimes along to an intimate conversation between two lovers, and to a range of stock 





 Wolfson is an American artist based in New York and Los Angeles. In 2003, he 
received his B.F.A. in sculpture from the Rhode Island School of Design. He has 
since exhibited globally. In 2009 he was awarded the Cartier award from the Frieze 
foundation, and in 2013 the Stedelijk Museum voor Actuele Kunst (S.M.A.K.) in 
Ghent exhibited the first major survey of his work to date, Jordan Wolfson: Ecce 
Homo/le Poseur. At the time of writing he is in his mid-thirties and affiliated with 
Sadie Coles and David Zwirner commercial galleries. In April 2014, he had a much 
publicised solo show at David Zwirner in New York. This show featured Raspberry 
Poser but hit the headlines for Female Figure (2014): a life-size, highly-sexualized 
robot, made to look like a stripper with a witch mask, fitted with a motion-sensor (in 
order to look at and intuitively respond to spectators), that danced to pop music (fig. 
4.3). The work was made in collaboration with Spectral Motion, an animatronics 
studio in California. All three ‘editions’ of Female Figure were promptly sold to 
‘megacollectors’, one of whom was Eli Broad whose collection of modern and 
contemporary art also includes Andy Warhol, Robert Rauschenberg, Damien Hirst, 
Cindy Sherman and Jeff Koons.11 Wolfson’s sudden notoriety within the 
contemporary art world encouraged Holland Cotter, in the New York Times, to refer 
to him as ‘the latest in a line of young male artists to shoot to the top of the New 
York career heap with relatively little buildup’.12      
 Wolfson is often lumped together with what is known as a ‘post internet’ trend in 
contemporary art. This term functions to unify the dispersed nature of contemporary 
artworks according to the premise that they were only conceptually or technically 
possible because of the internet. The term was coined by the artist Marisa Olsen 
sometime between 2007 and 2009. She suggests that ‘[e]verything is always-already 
postinternet…[and] all works produced now are produced in the postinternet era’.13 
The critic Gene McHugh also helped popularize the term in his influential ‘post 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Marten, ‘Jordan Wolfson’, Interview Magazine, (December-January 2012), 
http://www.interviewmagazine.com/art/jordan-wolfson#_, accessed 20/10/14.  
11 Jori Finkel details Zwirner’s sale of the three editions of Female Figure in the article: ‘Reality 
Bytes’, W Magazine (December 2014), http://www.wmagazine.com/culture/art-and-
design/2014/12/jordan-wolfson-robot-artist/photos/, accessed 08/10/15.  
12 Holland Cotter, ‘Where Blue-Chip Brands Meet Brassy Outliers, From Hot to Schlock: Holland 
Cotter Tours Chelsea Galleries’, New York Times (April 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/arts/design/from-hot-to-schlock-holland-cotter-tours-chelsea-
galleries.html, accessed 08/10/15. 





internet’ blog, which ran from December 2009 to September 2010 and was 
subsequently published in book form. In this McHugh clarifies that:  
The Internet, of course, was not over. That wasn’t the point…So what changed? 
On some general level, the rise of social networking and the professionalization 
of web design reduced the technical nature of network computing, shifting the 
Internet from a specialized world for nerds and the technologically-minded, to a 
mainstream world for nerds, the technologically-minded and grandmas and sports 
fans and business people and painters and everyone else. Here comes 
everybody.14 
So, ‘post internet’ refers to a reality in which the Internet is an inseparable part of 
everyday life, for everybody. This condition, for Olsen and McHugh, reconfigures 
contemporary artistic practice, which is now ‘always-already’ related to the post 
internet milieu. Wolfson is no exception. Nevertheless, his work stands out from the 
crowd. Much ‘post internet’ artistic practice is characterised by a sense of the 
liberatory possibilities of art’s relationship to current technologies, seen by some 
critics as building on the ‘net.art’ of the 1990s. This was a web based community of 
artists who, Marco Deseriis and Giuseppe Marano write, explored ‘the limits and 
possibilities of many-to-many communication in a techno-social environment’.15 
They excitedly embraced the internet as a tool for open and democratic artistic 
production; net.artist Vuk Cosic even suggested that ‘[a]ll art up to now has been 
merely a substitute for the Internet’.16 It was as if the spread of the internet in the 
’90s represented the culmination of the historic avant-garde’s desire to ‘collapse art 
into life’.  The speculative potential for net.art was proclaimed on a fake CNN web 
page (fig. 4.4) published online in 1996 by the net.art community, which stated that 
‘the artist devoted to the more advanced and intense art experience now has the 
production means in his hands. The difference is that today he also controls the 
distribution’.17         
 The idea that the ‘post internet’ generation of artists takes on the responsibilities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Gene McHugh, Post Internet: Notes on the Internet and Art (Link Editions, Brescia, 2011), 5. 
15 Marco Deseriis and Giuseppe Marano, Net.art. The Art of Connecting (Milan: Shake Edizioni, 
2003), English translation available at http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-
0402/msg00029.html, accessed 25/04/16. 
16 Vuk Cosic quoted in Alexander Galloway, Protocol: How Control exists after Decentralization 
(Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2006), 220.  
17 Transcribed from ‘Specific Net.art found possible’, CNN Interactive 1989-05-16, reproduced at 





and aspirations of net.art is reflected in Cadence Kinsey’s writing on contemporary 
art. In her argument, ‘post internet’ art inherits Felix Guattari’s notion of ‘molecular 
alternative practices’, which call for a ‘redemptive re-appropriation of both 
media…and the media’.18 With this, Kinsey refers to an idea of artistic practice 
focused on the ‘removal of the alienating properties of media, its normalising and 
pressurising tendencies’.19 Thus ‘post internet’ can be seen as a ‘liberating 
framework through which to reject the claim that the concerns of technology are 
antithetical to the concerns of art’.20 Kinsey’s argument therefore pursues more or 
less traditional avant-garde aims, above all those of ‘de-alienation’. In this sense, the 
internet becomes another form of what is sometimes called ‘tactical media’.21 
However, Wolfson’s form of ‘post internet’ art refuses such determinations.  
 The critic Timo Feldhaus has praised Wolfson’s practice for its demonstration of 
the cynical inverse to ‘the optimism that characterises post-Internet art’.22 His work 
does not seem to offer ‘liberation’, ‘redemption’ or escape from ‘alienation’. Instead, 
Feldhaus writes that Wolfson’s practice is symptomatic of the ‘narrowness of the 
space with which artistically inflected thought can still respond to technology’.23 And 
Martin Germann and Aram Moshayedi have called the aforementioned trilogy of 
moving image works (that includes Raspberry Poser) a ‘family of apparent 
degenerates’.24 Further to this, the artist explained to me in conversation that his 
primary interest is simply in ‘witnessing the world’ (as opposed to actively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Cadence Kinsey, ‘From Post-Media to Post-Medium: Rethinking Ontology in Art and Technology’ 
in eds. C. Arich, J. B. Slater, A. Iles and O. L. Schult Provocative Alloys: A Post-Media Anthology, 
(Lüneburg; Berlin: Post-Media Lab and Mute Books, 2013), 72.  
19 Kinsey, ‘From Post-Media to Post-Medium: Rethinking Ontology in Art and Technology’, 72. 
20 Kinsey, ‘From Post-Media to Post-Medium: Rethinking Ontology in Art and Technology’, 81. 
21 ‘Tactical Media’, Pramod K. Nayor writes, ‘explores the tactical potential of consumer electronics, 
especially the video camcorder, as a means of social mobilization’. They are ‘based on temporary 
alliances provoked by an immediate issue or event that utilizes media forms to protest, campaign, and 
organize opinions for anti-government or anti-corporate purposes’.  Pramod K.Nayor, An Introduction 
to New Media and Cybercultures (Malden, MA; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 100. 
22 Timo Feldhaus, ‘In the Moment of Terror’, Spike Art Quarterly, no. 40 (Summer 2014), 
http://spikeart.at/en/a/magazin/back/Encounters, accessed 20/10/14.  
23 Feldhaus, ‘Jordan Wolfson’s Robot: In the Moment of Terror’, 
http://www.spikeartmagazine.com/en/articles/jordan-wolfsons-robot-moment-terror, accessed 
20/10/14. 
24 Martin Germann and Aram Moshayedi, ‘Introduction’, in Aram Moshayedi ed., Jordan Wolfson: 





intervening in it) and that he’s keen for his work to appear ‘polluted’ by it.25 He is 
concerned, it seems, to repeat or reflect the lived reality of our screen-mediated 
world, providing us with something like a ‘cynical enlightenment’ of our historical 
condition.26 By this, I mean to invoke a form of cynicism discussed by Michel 
Foucault in The Courage of the Truth, the last course of lectures that he delivered at 
the College de France in 1984.27 This form of cynicism represented an aggressive 
and ‘untamed’ materialism that sought to strip conventions, societal obligations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In my own conversation with Wolfson, he explained his non-programmatic methodology in the 
following terms: ‘I use the word pollution a lot, but the idea of something polluted doesn’t necessarily 
mean something poisonous, but instead that it has been tainted. If you were to have white paint and 
drop a spoonful of red paint in, it would pollute the white paint. And I always think of pop culture and 
all these aspects of our lives as one big stew, and everything is kind of swirling together. But I’m not 
an authority on popular culture, I’m not an authority on psychological analysis, I’m not an authority 
on any of these things. I’m just a person looking at the world and reprocessing it, and it just comes out 
the way it comes out. I don’t want to turn myself into a politician or someone who’s going after 
something; I’m not interested in that. I’m just interested in my own witnessing of the world’. Jordan 
Wolfson, Skype conversation with author, 04/03/15. 
26 This is not to say that Wolfson is the only contemporary practitioner whose work can be understood 
in these terms. For instance, Amalia Ulman’s 2014 project Excellences and Perfections involved the 
artist conducting a scripted online performance on her Instagram and Facebook profiles from April to 
September. Here she maintained the image of an alluring, luxury, consumerist lifestyle of the type that 
is typical on social media: for instance, posting artfully arranged flowers, expensive couture items, 
tasteful lingerie shots, weekend city breaks and meticulous brunch dishes. Ulman carefully replicated 
the conventions attached to this lifestyle, including captioning idiosyncrasies (i.e. #friends, #nails, 
#strongisthenewskinny, #foodporn, #gratitude) and the pacing and frequency of new posts. An article 
in Rhizome discusses how neatly this work slipped into the social economy of social media: ‘For three 
months, she allowed her profiles to be exactly what social media seems to demand—that she be a 
"Hot Babe." As a result, she garnered the support of other women who had endured similar makeovers 
or procedures. She earned criticism for seeming to promote retrograde physical ideals, she was the 
target of cheap flattery, vulgar propositions, and abusive comments. Her close friends were often 
confused, unable to demarcate the Ulman of social media as a separate fiction…’ Michael Conner, 
‘First Look: Amalia Ulman – Excellences and Perfections’, Rhizome (October 2014), 
http://rhizome.org/editorial/2014/oct/20/first-look-amalia-ulmanexcellences-perfections/, accessed 
15/10/15. See also Ulman’s Instagram profile, https://instagram.com/amaliaulman/?hl=en, accessed 
15/10/15. 
27 This Ancient cynicism is associated with Diogenes of Sinope (c.404—323 B.C.E.) - ‘the dog’ 
philosopher. Foucault argues that the cynic mocked societal obligations and etiquette by actively 
seeking out humiliation and dishonor. And ‘within the accepted humiliation’, Foucault explains, the 
cynic ‘is able to turn the situation around, as it were, and take back control of it’.  In order to illustrate 
this point, Foucault discusses a humorous anecdote about Diogenes eating dinner: ‘There is the story 
of Diogenes who, eating on the public square, is treated by the passers-by as a dog: You eat like a dog, 
they tell him. And Diogenes immediately turns the situation around, accepting the humiliation. He 
accepts the humiliation and turns it around by saying: But you too are dogs, since only dogs form a 
circle around a dog which is eating. I am a dog, but so too are you, no less than I am. One day he was 
at a dinner where he was thrown a bone, since he is a dog. At that point he left with his bone, returned, 
and pissed on the guests, like a dog’. See Michel Foucault, The Courage of the Truth (The 
Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the College de France 1983 – 1984 [2008], tr. Graham 







philosophic thought of its idealistic trappings so that they would be revealed as 
something banal. The cynical mode of life, Foucault writes, is one that mocks 
‘pointless conventions and all superfluous opinions’.28 It does not indicate a 
withdrawal from society, but instead reveals what Foucault calls ‘the scandal of 
truth’.29         
 Indeed Wolfson’s work seems to revel in a negativity that is lacking in a ‘post 
internet’ culture of artistic production, and not addressed by critical claims currently 
made for this culture. Instead I aim to follow a lead suggested by Esther Leslie who, 
in a recent short essay, suggests an explicitly Adornian reading of his work, invoking 
the philosopher’s final aphorism from Minima Moralia that ‘perspectives must be 
fashioned that displace and estrange the world’.30 In this understanding Wolfson 
endeavors to provide us with or reveal one such perspective. This informs Leslie’s 
description of the protagonist from Wolfson’s earlier film Animation, Masks, who 
‘sheds light on his own negativity. He exudes his own would-be messianic light, 
illuminating in liquid crystal his own environment as a parade of distortions’.31 We 
might also remind ourselves of a passage from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, which 
states that ‘in the face of the abnormity into which reality is developing, art’s 
inescapable affirmative essence has become insufferable’.32 In response to this, art 
must ‘become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber’.33 Perhaps this 
uncertainty might be claimed for Wolfson. It is any rate Wolfson’s negativity that I 
find interesting. And it is this negativity that I want to interrogate, and question the 
value of in Raspberry Poser, which in what follows will be taken as exemplary of his 
work more generally. 
database aesthetics 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Foucault, The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the College 
de France 1983 – 1984, 180. 
29 Foucault, The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the College 
de France 1983 – 1984, 180.  
30 See Esther Leslie, ‘Complex Messiah’, in Aram Moshayedi ed., Jordan Wolfson: Ecce Homo/le 
Poseur (Köln, Walther König, 2013), and Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from 
Damaged Life [1951], tr. E. F. N. Jephcott (London; New York: Verso, 2005), 247. 
31 Leslie, ‘Complex Messiah’.	  
32 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory [1970], tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London; New York: 
Continuum, 1997), 2.  





Raspberry Poser begins with a three second live-action shot of an empty showroom 
kitchen filmed in New York’s heavily gentrified SoHo district. The scene contains 
numerous displays of gleaming and unused reflective surfaces. Two squirming, 
computer-generated HIV virus-type figures bounce and skitter around on top of the 
backdrop, like squeaky, red plastic dog toys (fig. 4.5). Despite the reflective façades 
on display, the virus-like objects do not produce any reflection or trace of their 
presence. We are made hyper-aware, at this point, of the layering of visual elements 
in post-production editing, which generate composite images from discrete, non-
interacting, spatial elements. The soundtrack to this grouping of kitchen and virus is 
Beyoncé’s 2009 synthpop single Sweet Dreams (originally titled ‘Beautiful 
Nightmare’). The film continues to cut and sync alternate shots of equivalently chic 
interior stores at an irregular rhythm. The HIV viruses multiply and disappear and 
appear again, their candy apple red form riddled with peg-like nodules that bulge, 
wobble and spill across the clean environment. Wolfson also throws in a number of 
animated anthropomorphic characters, some computer generated and some more 
traditional-style hand-drawn cartoons. A silvery CGI floating condom that sprays red 
hearts like bubbles, a cartoon lock and key in coitus, a docile cartoon elephant lying 
on a rotating trapdoor, an angry cartoon boy in a birdcage and CGI pills that swarm, 
morph and collect into various symbols - hearts, triangles, gender signs, an anarchist 
‘circle-A’. The background shots switch variously to images of, in the artist’s words, 
‘houses being renovated’, inner city New York ‘Technogyms,’ ‘heterosexual teenage 
scenes’, and ‘erotic drawings’.34 The artist himself appears in Raspberry Poser 
dressed as a stereotypical ‘punk’, wandering listlessly around parks in Paris, eating 
salad and playing innocuous pranks on strangers. Certainly, the film does not appear 
to illustrate Beyoncé’s (or Mazzy Star’s, or Roy Orbison’s) song nor follow its 
narrative logic. Despite this, in my view, the experience of watching Raspberry 
Poser is compelling. It seems to borrow the music’s emotional affect, allowing it to 
surge in and charge up the haphazard imagery. In this sense, Wolfson’s film is 
experienced like most commercial music videos, in which a powerful soundtrack 
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often seems to supply a series of disconnected images with its libidinal energy.35 One 
effect of this, in both music videos and Wolfson’s work, is that the disconnected 
visual material is barely noticed, but appears unified.    
 The supposedly disconnected arrangement of image and sound in Raspberry 
Poser (and in other works by Wolfson) has perplexed critics. Paddy Johnson, in a 
2014 article, asked ‘Is Jordan Wolfson’s art meaningless?’ and Germann and 
Moshayedi have observed of his work’s scattergun collage of references that ‘it 
might be easy to say that the references throughout…are empty, that any and all 
meaning has been evacuated’.36 As this latter comment indicates, such criticisms 
arise from the extreme editing technique Wolfson employs, which quickly cuts 
together discontinuous elements. For instance, as I have indicated, the HIV viruses in 
Raspberry Poser are visually discontinuous in type from the imagery behind them, 
and so might appear meaningless because they seem to have no clear links to other 
imagery. Indeed, discussing his practice, Wolfson has insisted that there ‘is no 
didactic message in the work. The message is form…and letting whatever meaning 
surfaces exist’.37 And talking specifically about Raspberry Poser, Wolfson clarifies 
that he is ‘not trying to make these elements come together…by any means or any 
narrative. There is no story. There is no clarity of content, only isolated areas of 
content…I am definitely concentrating on inventing and using a kind of form that 
binds these subjects together, but also abandons any clarity of form…if a pocket of 
really Freudian content came out, I would then figure out a way to balance its 
meaning’.38 This idea came across in my own conversation with the artist. For 
instance, he insisted that the music used in Raspberry Poser is just another formal 
element, something that is balanced and kept in equilibrium with the other areas of 
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content: ‘With the music I thought, what if I just take it, as if it is a colour and put it 
in…as if you were taking a piece of an object or a piece of an image, and then cutting 
it…so it’s like a cropped image as a piece of music’.39 This idea of the work being a 
balancing of complex elements is further stressed in the artist’s description of his 
editing technique: ‘if you can imagine holding a ball’, Wolfson explained, ‘and you 
are constantly trying to balance the ball in different ways on your hand so that it 
never remains static, that’s how I think about editing. Something that is never 
static…’40 In these circumstances, when the artist has so carefully edited and 
flattened the elements in the work, how can we understand the work, or at least not 
resort to calling it ‘meaningless’?      
 One critical approach might be to see the origins of Wolfson’s technique of 
discontinuous, fast cutting and syncing of references, images and sounds in the 
avant-garde theorisation of montage. Raspberry Poser resembles both the spatial 
compositions that layer different elements in the same frame, as in surrealist 
photomontage, and the shot-to-shot successive montage, where images are cut 
together sequentially, as in the Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein’s cinematic 
montage, sequences seen, for example, in Battleship Potemkin (1925) and October 
(1927). The former can be identified in the aforementioned scenes of kitchen 
interiors overlaid with CGI viruses. And the latter, for instance, is evident five 
minutes into the film with a ten second sequence of fast and interchanging snapshot-
style photos of, in the artist’s words, ‘heterosexual teenage scenes’.    
 A common thread in montage’s theorisation across the arts - including both 
photomontage and cinematic montage - is the idea of violent juxtapositions that 
produce cognitive emancipation in the viewer. For example, Eisenstein stressed the 
dissociative power of aggressively conflicting cuts in cinematic montage, in which 
concepts and ideas in the viewer are produced ‘from the collision between two shots 
that are independent of one another’.41 In his essay ‘The Cinematic Principle and the 
Ideogram’, he compares the total ‘phalanx of montage pieces’ in a film ‘to the series 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Wolfson, Skype conversation with author, 04/03/15. 
40 Wolfson, Skype conversation with author, 04/03/15.  
41 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘The Dramaturgy of Film Form (The Dialectical Approach to Film Form) 
[1929]’ in ed. Richard Taylor, The Eisenstein Reader, tr. Richard Taylor and William Powell 





of explosions of an internal combustion engine, driving forward its automobile’.42 
The colliding juxtaposition of imagery fuels the film, giving it momentum and thrust. 
An example of this process can be found in Eisenstein’s first full-length feature, 
Strike (1925): in which a scene of striking workers being attacked is abruptly cut 
together with a shot of a bull being slaughtered. The violent combination of these 
images draws parallels between the workers and cattle: both appear as appendages to 
the production process, beaten down and easily replaced.    
 Similarly, in his Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin employed a terminology of 
‘awakening’ to describe the effects of surrealist photomontage, ‘in which things put 
on their true - surrealist - face’.43 Brigid Doherty, glossing Benjamin’s understanding 
of montage, describes it as a ‘medium of illumination and agitation intended to 
arouse the reader cognitively as well as politically’.44 In the Arcades Project, 
Benjamin conceives of capitalism as a ‘natural phenomenon with which a new 
dream-filled sleep came over Europe, and, through it, a reactivation of mythic 
forces’.45 It is against this backdrop that montage functioned. Its de-naturalization of 
images through their shocking juxtaposition was felt to resist the prevailing 
narcoleptic ideology, by jolting us out of its ‘dreamtime’.46 Moreover, Benjamin 
understood his own work in the Arcades Project as a kind of ‘literary montage’: an 
attempt to construct a materialist history of nineteenth-century Parisian life through 
the textual assemblage of fragmented references.47 Its criticality lay in its bringing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘The Cinematic Principle and the Ideogram’ [1929], in Jay Leyda ed., Film 
Form, tr. Jay Leyda (San Diego; New York; London: Harcourt, Inc, 1977), 39.  
43 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, tr. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 464. 
44 Brigid Doherty, ‘“The Colportage Phenomenon of Space” and The Place of Montage in The 
Arcades Project’, in Beatrice Hanssen ed., Walter Benjamin and The Arcades Project (London; New 
York: Continuum, 2006), 160. 
45 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 391. 
46 For Benjamin this ‘dreamtime’ (orig. Zeitraum) is a fact of nineteenth-century capitalism, in which, 
he writes ‘the individual consciousness more and more secures itself in reflecting, while the collective 
consciousness sinks into ever deeper sleep’. See Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 389. Glossing 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘dreamtime’ and its association with ideology, Max Pensky writes that 
capitalism ‘deploys the hypnogogic appearance of endless progress to mask its own delusional core’. 
See Max Pensky, ‘Geheimmittel: Advertising and Dialectical Images in Benjamin’s Arcades Project’, 
in Beatrice Hanssen ed., Walter Benjamin and The Arcades Project (London; New York: Continuum, 
2006), 114. 
47 Benjamin explains of the work: ‘Method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. 
Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the 
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light the disjointedness of the everyday world, juxtaposing, for instance, signs of 
luxury with misery (for example, Benjamin establishes a ‘dialectic of fashion’ with 
the relationship between ‘pleasure’ and the ‘cadaver’, drawing upon peculiar 
accounts of morgues being visited for entertainment in mid-nineteenth century 
Paris.)48 In Benjamin’s view, the shock of these de-idealized images might arouse the 
reader from their ‘dream-filled-sleep’ and into a more critical awareness of their 
historical circumstance.        
 A sense of shock was also important to the convulsive images of the Dadaists, 
who employed photomontage as part of their project to outrage public opinion. For 
instance, Hans Richter famously pronounced his desire to arouse ‘the bourgeoisie to 
rage, and through rage to a shamefaced self-awareness’.49 In her writing on Dada, 
Doherty has argued that the ‘montage materializations’ of the 1920s be understood in 
relation to ‘the bodily materializations of traumatic psychic shock that characterized 
the war neuroses’.50 Commenting on a famous passage from Richard Huelsenbeck’s 
‘Dadaist Manifesto’ (1918), which utilises a vivid rhetoric of shock, dismemberment 
and frenzy, she outlines the ethical imperative that undergirds the shattered imagery 
in photomontage:  
dada’s art is to have a “conscious content” in the form of dismembered 
embodiments of contemporary life…The dadaist’s own body is to be bloodied 
inside and out (leaking from the hand as from the heart, in pain both physically 
and emotionally) and shattered in a way that will allow him - perhaps compel 
him - to comprehend the frenzy and the specific intellect of his age because he 
can identify with them, because, we must suppose, both the frenzy and the 
intellect, both the madness and the consciousness will be his own.51   
Thus, with the early twentieth-century avant-garde, the capacity to induce a form of 
historical consciousness is specifically associated with the fragmented form of 
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montage.         
 Georg Grosz claimed to have invented the technique with John Heartfield in 
1916 with a cardboard-supported collage of scattershot elements, which recalls the 
radical discontinuities of Wolfson’s cut-up imagery. ‘On a piece of cardboard’, he 
writes, ‘we pasted a mishmash of advertisements for hernia belts, student song books 
and dog food, labels from schnapps and wine bottles, and photographs from picture 
papers, cut up at will’.52 Indeed, certain points of commonality might be seen to exist 
between Wolfson’s work and that of the Dada and Surrealist artists. Bearing out such 
links, Wolfson has said that he understands the imagery he uses in relation to 
Benjamin’s Arcades Project and its representation of late nineteenth-century Parisian 
arcades as ‘surreal dream spaces’.53 It is as if he sees New York (specifically the 
SoHo area) in the present day as being like Paris then - an environment cluttered with 
the debris of the past, now gentrified, smoothed over and thoroughly sanitized. The 
HIV viruses function as an artefact of his growing up in a ‘generation where we were 
impacted and conditioned by a fear of the HIV virus’.54 Thus, in Raspberry Poser, 
the streets, shops and gyms of SoHo are made to seem haunted by its presence.55 
From this perspective, Wolfson’s discontinuous mish-mash of elements might be 
seen as exemplary in a Benjaminian sense: a montage that rescues and reactivates 
fragments of the past in order to work against and resist a state of historical amnesia 
imposed by the ‘dream time’ of contemporary New York.   
 And yet it isn’t possible to see Wolfson’s work simply as inheriting the older 
model of montage, with its radical efficacy intact. In part, I want to argue, this is 
because reality itself has moved on and superseded those strategies of the early 
avant-garde. Indeed, in the intervening period, the idea of a city constructed with a 
montage-like aesthetic of violent juxtapositions has become something like a 
postmodern orthodoxy. The fragmented image of the city that emerges in Benjamin’s 
Arcades Project as a figure of critical resistance has come to be known as a structural 
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54 Wolfson, Skype conversation with author, 04/03/15. 
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feature of the postmodern city. In the view of many observers of this phenomenon, 
the chaotic, discontinuous and disorientating character of the city now seems to do 
the inverse of Benjamin’s montage: de-realizing and slackening our purchase on 
historical reality.56 Moreover, the cut-up discontinuity and seeming meaninglessness 
of Raspberry Poser’s content now reads as a structural aspect of contemporary 
screen culture, as Shaviro has observed, in which ‘multiple differences ramify 
endlessly; but none of these differences actually makes a difference, since they are 
all completely interchangeable’.57 Indeed the seeming ‘meaninglessness’ and 
overwhelming ‘flatness’ of Wolfson’s work - in both its formal and affective register 
- serves to throw this fact into relief. The artist is careful, I think, not to lapse into a 
vain or skeuomorphic reprise of the older, analogue avant-garde technique, which is 
built upon the physical cutting, dismembering and suturing of image fragments. 
Instead, the fragmented elements of the film have a fluid quality: appearing to glide, 
slip and flow without any sense of conflict or friction.    
 This is not to say that a causal association between violent juxtaposition and 
cognitive emancipation does not persist in current writing about art and the moving 
image. For some commentators this relationship (to my mind, problematically) 
remains a criterion of value in contemporary moving image practice; as if montage’s 
affiliation to critique, or to a critical perspective, has persevered despite shifts in 
visual culture that normalize and therefore compromise its immediate shock-value. 
For example, Pasi Väliaho, in his book Biopolitical Screens: Images, Power, and the 
Neoliberal Brain (2014), appears to pick up on the visceral physicality of the 
method, suggesting that the technique continues to generate forms of resistance to 
current ‘biopolitical’ structures of power.  
Through montage, incisions into and intervals between images can emerge that 
decontextualize, inject indefiniteness into, and bring forward novel figurations in 
perception and thinking…spatiotemporal intervals, interruptions, associations 
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and dissociations in the movement of images on the screen’s surface serve 
as…cuts wherein the images we live by can reinvent themselves.58  
For Väliaho, montage retains the productive dialectical value discussed by Eisenstein 
in his early essays on the film form, whereby the combination of discrete images 
produces something new - a ‘transcendental (conceptual) result’.59  Indeed, Väliaho 
argues that montage is indispensable if we are to ‘unleash the political potential of 
images’.60 This line of thinking is also evident in a dismissive review of 
contemporary artist Isaac Julien’s film Playtime (2014) by Alberto Toscano. 
Toscano’s article, published in Mute magazine, criticizes Julien’s seven-screen 
installation film, which explicitly references Eisenstein’s unrealised project to make 
a film of Marx’s Das Kapital. Toscano condemns Playtime for its lack of explicit 
Eisensteinian montage technique. On this basis, he accuses Julien of merely 
reiterating ‘the representational clichés through which we typify capitalism’.61 
Playtime, Toscano claims, ‘is more or less devoid of true montage…creating no 
flashes of insight, no clashes of form and content, no unexpected connections, no 
break with the smooth empty time of financialised capital…’62 Thus, Toscano leans 
upon a concept of montage - built upon cuts, incisions and insertions - that is 
inherently felt to be related to critique of and resistance to capitalist temporality. Yet 
I would argue that these forms have been functionalised by contemporary screen 
culture, rendering Toscano’s criticism of Julien’s film empty. Moreover, Toscano 
assumes that montage is consumed by a viewer actively and with a sense of alertness 
to its technique. This idealizes the viewer’s receptiveness to a process that has 
become a cultural dominant and therefore part of our everyday visual diet. It is 
because of a failure to recognise the cultural dominance of montage that this 
recuperation of the idea of montage-based avant-garde art work, and a viewer who is 
‘activated’ by montage (as in, for instance, the accounts developed by Väliaho and 
Toscano) does not correspond to our lived reality.      
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 The avant-garde model of montage is present in Raspberry Poser, but as a vague 
memory - it doesn’t work as it should. Wolfson inherits the cut-up haphazardness of 
the technique but his work lacks its supposed intensity and conflict. Images don’t 
explode into concepts via their interaction. Instead they sit side by side, one on top of 
the other: there are never any collisions. We might say that Wolfson replaces the 
physicality of the ‘cut’ with the gestural ‘swipe’ or ‘flick’: referencing, perhaps, our 
relationship to images that are mediated via a touchscreen device. This reading is 
encouraged, in particular, by one sequence in Raspberry Poser in which the artist 
appears sitting on a bench: the camera is angled from behind his shoulder, so we can 
see Wolfson browsing through a series of images on his iPhone - pornographic 
drawings, manga, Sonic the Hedgehog, Batman, and other cartoon characters, some 
black and white photographic images. Many of them have already appeared, or will 
appear, in the film. The artist’s laconic swiping through of these images on the 
phone’s screen displays no obvious desire for the deeper, more conflictual 
manipulation of imagery in avant-garde montage. By contrast, they appear 
interchangeable and only arbitrarily linked because they are stored in the phone’s 
database: swiped and flicked away, they remain undamaged and, contra Eisenstein, 
conflict to no effect (fig. 4.6).       
 Indeed the visual elements in Wolfson’s film seem organized according to what 
Lev Manovich (in his analysis of The Language of New Media (2001)) calls 
‘database logic’.63 This is a feature, he argues, of the computer age, and by extension 
its screen culture, in which ‘many new media objects…do not have any 
development, thematically, formally, or otherwise that would organize their elements 
into a sequence’.64 Instead, the database operates as a ‘collection of individual items, 
with every item possessing the same significance as any other’.65 The computer 
database, Manovich writes, has become a ‘true cultural form’: a means of 
representing ‘human existence in the world’ that can be seen as a contemporary 
correlate to the novel or cinema in the modern age.66 Emblematic of this is the figure 
of the DJ, who selects and combines, cross-referencing and cross-fading, pre-existent 
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elements into a composite whole or ‘mix’.67 In this respect, typical cultural forms 
now follow database logic: they don’t operate according to a linear temporality, as, 
for instance, a traditional movie in a cinema, instead they are ‘spatialized’. This is to 
say that we consume the cultural object as a spatial rather than temporal form: it is 
designed to be experienced on various multimedia devices, with images, sounds and 
hyperlinks that locate the cultural object in a wider database of information rather 
than in linear time. We can think here about people using their smartphones in the 
cinema in order to search something related to the motion picture, thereby 
interrupting the experience of the film as a singular temporal object. Manovich, 
writing in 2001, cites, as an example of this process; ‘CD-ROMs devoted to a single 
cultural figure such as a famous architect, film director, or writer. Instead of a 
narrative biography, we are presented with a database of images, sound recordings, 
video clips, and/or texts that can be navigated in a variety of ways.’68   
 Raspberry Poser has a database aesthetic. Its systematic and seemingly arbitrary 
accumulation of images, sounds and references mirrors the database logic that 
informs our experience of, and navigation through the world, which now appears as 
an endless accumulation of images, texts and other information that we can swipe 
and flick our way through. We might, furthermore, see this database logic as an 
aesthetic expression of the current disciplinary system: what Antoinette Rouvroy has 
termed ‘algorithmic governmentality’, in reference to ‘the new information 
infrastructures [that] ‘translate’ or ‘transcribe’ the physical space and its 
inhabitants…into constantly evolving sets of data points’.69 For Rouvroy this 
governance by ‘algorithm’ increasingly ‘impact[s] on how we conduct ourselves, 
how we attempt to conduct others, and how others attempt to control our conduct’.70  
The impact of algorithmic governmentality on our experience of the world can be 
seen, for example, with Google’s PageRank algorithm, which functions according to 
a database logic. Similar to Facebook’s EdgeRank algorithm, discussed in Chapter 
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Two, PageRank’s underlying assumption is that the more important websites (and 
higher ranked) are those likely to receive more links from other websites and produce 
more data. Therefore value is attributed to an object according to the quantity of its 
data production.  
PageRank relies on the uniquely democratic nature of the web by using its vast 
link structure as an indicator of an individual page’s value. In essence, Google 
interprets a link from page A to page B as a vote, by page A, for page B. But, 
Google looks at considerably more than the sheer volume of votes, or links a 
page receives; for example, it also analyzes the page that casts the vote. Votes 
cast by pages that are themselves “important” weigh more heavily and help to 
make other pages “important.” Using these and other factors, Google provides its 
views on pages’ relative importance.71 
This system forces us, the then-editor of Wired magazine Chris Anderson explains, 
‘to view data mathematically first and establish a context for it later’.72 Data, we 
might say, is foregrounded in the current epistemic paradigm, and the materiality of 
objects is downplayed. ‘Google’s founding philosophy’, Anderson writes, ‘is that we 
don't know why this page is better than that one. If the statistics of incoming links 
say it is, that’s good enough. No semantic or causal analysis is required. That’s why 
Google can translate languages without actually “knowing” them (given equal corpus 
data, Google can translate Klingon into Farsi as easily as it can translate French into 
German). And why it can match ads to content without any knowledge or 
assumptions about the ads or the content’.73 Therefore, Google’s database logic can 
be seen to perform a ‘flattening exercise’ on the content contained in its ever-
expanding corpus of knowledge and information. In this system, value is determined 
via relational systems such as ‘hyperlinks’ and ‘keywords’, thereby flattening out the 
historical and material complexity of the object.     
 An unfortunate implication of this system was inadvertently revealed by a 2007 
project by contemporary artist Cory Arcangel and curator Hanne Mugaas titled Art 
Since 1960 (According to the Internet). The project took the form of a performative 
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lecture that asked what you would know about art history since 1960 if your only 
source of information came from YouTube’s database of videos. It turns out that one 
result of this is an almost complete absence of women. Artist and writer Marisa 
Olsen put this point to Arcangel and Mugaas. She recalls that:  
they replied simply that it was not an intentional choice, but rather that they let a 
widely-accepted primer determine the list of names for which they searched, and 
then they showed only those for which they found results; both steps filtered out 
women, as history is wont to do. In this sense, Arcangel and Mugaas performed 
art history, par excellence, by reenacting its cycles of filtration and info-
trickling.74  
So, in this set-up, YouTube’s ‘database logic’ only worked to perpetuate pre-existing 
prejudices: its system chewed the data and smoothed over any problems or 
dissonance in the information (here, an overwhelmingly patriarchal canon of art 
history). As a result, Arcangel and Mugaas’s project demonstrated a systemic 
tendency for the database to simply repeat the logic of its creators, however 
hegemonic or politically-loaded that information may be, mostly because the 
database flattens out the historical complexity of its information.     
 The ‘database logic’ that undergirds Raspberry Poser’s haphazard assemblage of 
imagery can be seen as an aesthetic expression of this value system: this is why it 
appears to us as meaningless, overwhelmingly flat and without the sparking, 
colliding imagery that was (and still is for some critics) significant for a critical 
concept of montage. Indeed, in observation of this type of new media aesthetic, 
Manovich argues that the ‘database logic’ of computer-based imagery confirms a 
shift away from montage toward ‘composite’ images that are characterised by 
smoothness and continuity. In the digital composition, or new media object, he 
explains, elements appear ‘next to each other without any attempt to establish 
contrast, complementarity, or dissonance between them’.75 For instance, a digitally 
produced film involves the compositing of elements into ‘a single object; that is they 
are fitted together and adjusted in such a way that their separate identities become 
invisible…The result is a single seamless image, sound, space, or scene’.76 The 
upshot of this is a mode of spectatorship in which violent juxtapositions are invisible: 
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we are conditioned not to see the severed edges or materiality of images, which 
technically no longer exist in the viewed object and are flattened out by the cultural 
form of the database.          
 In part, Manovich’s purpose in so arguing is to preserve the critical value and 
critical difference of true avant-garde montage, or what he calls ‘strong’ montage, by 
emphasising its difference from the ‘composite’ aesthetics that have increasingly 
come to define commercial moving image practices. This is a montage in which 
‘juxtapositions of elements…should play a key role in how the work establishes 
meaning, and its emotional and aesthetic effects’.77 In other words, these 
juxtapositions are active and productive: we notice them and are moved by them. 
This definition relies on montage’s difference from contemporary composited 
moving image practices, whose juxtapositions are smoothed out and made invisible. 
True or ‘strong’ montage, in this understanding, remains untainted by commerce. 
However, it is possible to argue that the shift Manovich identifies, towards the 
‘database’, manifests, instead, a massive dispersion of montage, whereby everything 
becomes like montage in ‘algorithmic governmentality’ - i.e. fragmented and 
recombined as bundles of data points, radically disassociating objects from their 
normal context and placing them in outwardly violent-seeming juxtapositions. The 
problem is seeing this as such. Instead, we tend to perceive the implicit discontinuity 
or montage of the ‘database’ as a smooth, continuous and seamless composition. 
Indeed, for some, the so-called supersession of montage by composited images in 
dominant moving image practices is a misnomer. David Rodowick, for instance, has 
argued that digital compositions are not, as Manovich has argued, smooth and 
continuous: by contrast, they are spatial montages of tiny discrete combined and 
edited elements, which are made invisible to the viewer. An example he cites is 
Alexandr Sokurov’s digitally produced film Russian Ark (2002), which appears as 
one fluid continuous shot. This movie, Rodowick explains, is ‘mistakenly 
characterized as an uninterrupted sequence of eighty-six minutes’ duration’: 
mistakenly, because the ‘finished work includes more than 30,000 [invisible] “digital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





events.”’78 Thus, Russian Ark ‘is a montage work, no less complex in this respect 
than Sergei Eisenstein’s 1927 film October’.79     
 In Rouvroy’s essay on ‘algorithmic governmentality’ she (referencing the work 
of the philosopher of science Ian Hacking) discusses the tendency of people to 
inadvertently come to affirm and be disciplined by the criteria against which they are 
evaluated. ‘[W]hen people are taken as objects of scientific or bureaucratic inquiries 
for a variety of purposes going from controlling them to helping them, organising 
them’, she writes, ‘[it] results in the reinforcement and the “viral propagation” of 
norms, of the criteria of normality and desirability against which individuals are 
being evaluated, with gratifications for [the] compliant and sanctions for the 
others’.80 Therefore, when taken as objects of ‘algorithmic governmentality’ (i.e. 
bundles of data), we come to affirm this evaluation and increasingly to perceive the 
world according to its depolarized categories. In this respect, Rouvroy’s remarks 
seem to confirm, or at least support Baudrillard’s description in ‘Xerox and Infinity’ 
of the Moebius-like interweaving of ‘the computer screen and the mental screen of 
our own brain’ - one becoming an extension of the other.81 Thus, I want to dispute 
Manovich’s claim that an active montage is possible. This is because, as Rodowick 
argues, composited images are, at root, always montaged, meaning that there is little 
difference between the two categories. Instead, we see these montaged images as 
composited (smooth and seamless) because our capacity to be moved or shocked by 
images has been negated by the database logic that, in the digital age, structures our 
experience of the world.        
 As I have said, the type of montage defined by violent juxtapositions and 
cognitive emancipation seems only a vague, or spectral, memory in Wolfson’s 
Raspberry Poser. However, it is in this sense that Wolfson’s montage most 
accurately reflects the current historical moment. This is, I think, especially visible in 
the early scenes of the film. Here the background imagery prominently displays a 
number of highly reflective surfaces and metallic screens, which nevertheless, as I 
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have pointed out, produce absolutely no reflection or trace of the overlaid image 
elements. At one moment there is a brief instance of playful interaction between the 
two image layers, as two HIV viruses seen in a shiny SoHo kitchen store take turns, 
one after the other, to hop from sink to sink, in and out. But, like something 
supernatural, they leave no reflection or hint of any meaningful contact. Instead, 
these chaotic image fragments glide and drift across the environment effortlessly. 
And accompanied by a pulsing, but similarly irregular soundtrack the montage is 
experienced as a pleasurable and composite whole. I now want to highlight the 
function of music in Raspberry Poser. It is what provides momentum and pleasure in 
the film: energising the images with a sense of vital dynamism. In this respect, music 
can be seen to demonstrate the process by which we can experience a database 
aesthetic (depolarized and arbitrarily arranged elements) as fluid and continuous. For 
instance, as I will argue, in the database aesthetic of the music video and 
contemporary action movie, the shots are typically short, aggressive and violent, yet 
because the soundtrack is amped-up and foregrounded, we are compelled to 
experience the chaotic imagery as smooth and seamless.  
music that doesn’t work 
	  
The soundtrack in Raspberry Poser is vital to its effect. It transitions from Beyoncé 
to Mazzy Star to Roy Orbison in a very blunt manner, reminiscent of an mp3 library 
of music set to shuffle. At one point Beyoncé is ‘chopped and screwed’, slowed 
down and made to sound more emotional. This shift in tempo radically impacts our 
reception of the images. They appear to parallel and visualize Beyoncé’s now 
exaggerated urgency, despite having absolutely no perceptible relationship to the 
song. This, more than anything, draws attention to the simple arbitrariness of the 
images: so empty and insubstantial that they are easily overwhelmed and filled-in, 
with no resistance, by the pop song. The idea of dissonant or clashing audio-visual 
elements is made to seem banal. There are some grotesque elements (a cartoon boy 
who eviscerates himself with a large knife, allowing his entrails to fall out in a 
bloody soup) and some highly provocative elements, but we nevertheless force these 
images into a pleasurable dialogue with the song. Perhaps unconsciously we fear that 





Raspberry Poser’s combination of sound and image resembles the form of the music 
video. As it happens, Wolfson has claimed in conversation with Paul Soto that, with 
Raspberry Poser, he ‘really just wanted to make a party video’.82 Something that, 
Soto agrees, ‘could be on in the background at someone’s house party’: the sort of 
video which is, more often than not, a music video.83     
 Diane Railton and Paul Watson, in Music Video and the Politics of 
Representation (2011), suggest that the music video is a significant ‘part of the more 
general penetration of screens and screen technology into virtually all aspects of 
contemporary life’.84 They note that the music video tends to occupy the screens that 
supplement our spaces of commerce and leisure, as if by default. ‘Whether in the 
shopping mall or the gym, bar or bowling alley, the airport lounge or the bus shelter’, 
they write, ‘it is music video that is often to be found populating these screens, if not 
forcing us to watch then at least making it increasingly difficult to ignore’.85 This 
image form emerged as a cultural phenomenon in the early 1980s. They were, Joan 
D. Lynch writes, ‘born out of necessity…when the record business slumped…with 
the lessening appeal of radio’.86 They have always been indissociable from 
commercial interests. In 1981, for instance, MTV was launched as a new visual 
system for music distribution in order to kick-start the record industry’s profits. It 
follows, Lynch writes, that ‘in many ways music videos most resemble commercials. 
They are short, usually three to four minutes, aim to engage the viewer in a direct, 
immediate experience and their major “raison d’etre” is to sell’.87 The product is, of 
course, the soundtrack to the visual experience. And for this reason ‘the video 
itself…has no intrinsic…value’.88       
 It is because of its dependence on soundtrack that, for Andrew Goodwin, ‘a 
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striking element in music video is not its sense of narrative closure, but the very 
opposite process – its pervasive ambiguity’.89 In this respect, the images making up 
the music video tend toward the abstract, ambiguous, incoherent and meaningless. 
Indeed a commonplace observation concerning the music video is ‘that the aural 
element…does not work as a sound track’.90 Lynch’s article on this phenomenon 
(published in 1984, not long after the music video emerged) contains a description of 
the bizarre incoherence between sound and image in a Billy Idol video: 
There may not be any relationship between the way the record sounds and the 
style of the video. “Eyes Without a Face,” by Billy Idol, is a very pleasant ballad 
when heard on the radio. In the video one is treated to Billy’s curled lip, leather 
and chain costuming and the imagery of Heavy Metal-fire, entrapment and sado-
masochism.91  
It might be said that these comments do not comprehend the entirety of music 
videos; some certainly do follow the narrative thread of the song and for some the 
clashing visual element intentionally supplements and enhances our understanding of 
the song’s lyrical content. It can nevertheless be argued that even the most formulaic 
examples include a level of incoherence or disjuncture between sound and image. 
Moreover, it seems that this idea of disjuncture between sound and image is a 
fundamental aspect of the music video’s form, because the image-element’s original 
responsibility was merely to provide an excuse to have the song-as-commodity 
heard.          
 Raspberry Poser has the aesthetic of a music video, in that it uses a sound track 
that does not work as a sound track to its visual media: its imagery is in no way 
illustrative of the song. Instead the aural element delivers unity to an array of 
disjointed images. In this respect, the music video aesthetic seems typical of 
contemporary screen culture. Indeed the peculiar relationship between sound and 
image in music videos is also characteristic of contemporary mainstream cinematic 
tendencies, which replace scenes of Bazinian duration with hyperactive fast cuts and 
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non-diegetic imagery.92 The definitive auteur of this cinema is Michael Bay, whose 
Transformers films of the 2000s and early 2010s have an average shot length of 
between 3 and 3.4 seconds. Certainly, some of the critical reception of Bay’s 
Transformers films suggests that their viewed experience is comparable to music 
videos, in terms of visual incoherence.93 For instance, the critic A.D. Jameson 
explains: ‘I frequently suspected that the screenwriter of Age of Extinction [the fourth 
film in the Transformers series]…while writing the earlier scenes, had no idea what 
would later happen in the film…it feels as though the screenwriter had forgotten 
what occurred earlier on’.94 He continues, arguing that what’s ‘lacking is a sense of 
the whole. Time and again, priority is given to whatever is happening at the current 
moment…the films are collections of scenes, unpredictable and arbitrary’.95 
Furthermore, he writes that:  
Little effort seems to have been taken to integrate the looped dialogue with the 
action. Instead, it frequently sounds disconnected, even arbitrary. As Hound 
whirls around, firing his guns, John Goodman declares, “I’m a fat ballerina who 
takes names and slits throats!” Elsewhere he intones, “I’m a wicked warrior 
robot!” Why does he say either? Who knows? The lines - many of the lines - are 
entirely arbitrary; Hound could say anything, or nothing.96  
The overwhelming sense of confusion is also expressed in Peter Bradshaw’s review 
of the first film in the series. He protests that ‘the editing is frenzied, almost 
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stroboscopic, so much so that you can't really get a clear look at what the 
Transformers actually look like’.97 After the press screening of the film, Bradshaw 
claims that the experience left him and his peers ‘suffering from the triple-whammy 
of tinnitus, blurred vision and sheer resentment’.98 He then jokes that ‘we resembled 
a coach party outing from the local head injury clinic’.99 This style of filmmaking has 
been termed ‘chaos cinema’ (for obvious reasons) by Mattias Stork, in an influential 
and critical video-essay published online by Press Play.100 One of the most important 
features of ‘chaos cinema’, for Stork, is its use of sound track. This is, for him, the 
only way the film maintains coherence.  
Considering all the deliberate insanity occurring onscreen, these movies should 
be totally unintelligible. Yet we still have a faint sense of what’s going on. 
 Why? 
Because of the soundtrack… as the visuals in action films have become sloppier, 
shallower and blurrier, the sound design has become more creative, dense and 
exact. This is what happens when you lose your eyesight: your other senses try to 
compensate.101 
Stork’s analysis is based on the premise that pre-‘chaos cinema’ respected the time 
and space of the pro-filmic event: images were diegetic and evoked a proper sense of 
duration. He explains that ‘chaos’ images ‘deliberately limit clarity and increase 
rapidity to overwhelm, confuse, and thereby “thrill” audiences’.102 The soundtrack is 
needed to hold the images together. Bay’s post-production audio engineer Greg P. 
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Russell, who helped design the soundscape for the Transformers series, might be 
seen to confirm this understanding of ‘chaos cinema’s’ dependence on soundtrack. In 
an interview with Variety magazine he discusses his extensive, and seemingly 
excessive, process; claiming that ‘there are thousands of [sound] choices made in a 
ten minute piece of the film’.103 The sound element in contemporary cinema, it 
seems, is charged with providing the viewer with some sense of orientation in its 
strange new chaotic spatiality. Indeed, the film theorist Thomas Elsaesser has 
suggested that ‘in the cinema…sound now lead[s]…the image…giving objects a 
particular kind of solidity and materiality’.104 Perhaps this aspect of sound is 
compulsory when the contemporary screen tends towards ‘chaos’, discontinuity and 
incoherence. Thus, the music video aesthetic can be seen as an important blueprint 
for contemporary screen culture: because whilst the chaotic imagery of the music 
video was a necessary alibi for the song (so it would be listened to), now the song, or 
soundtrack has become a necessary alibi for the chaotic nature of screen-based 
visuality.         
 However, the ‘chaos’ that these critics have observed in contemporary cinema 
and the ‘chaos’ observable more generally in contemporary screen culture is nothing 
new. Already in 1947, Adorno and the composer Hanns Eisler had remarked upon 
the importance of the soundtrack in motion pictures. In their co-authored book 
Composing for the Films they focus on the cinematic score, and consider why sound-
pictures ‘need music’.105 Their argument, I think, can be productively explored in 
relation to the pop song’s significance in Raspberry Poser. For Adorno and Eisler, 
the sound-picture’s synergy of different elements into a naturalistic-seeming whole, 
has always been a ‘fraudulent’ and ‘fragile’ endeavour.106 They provocatively 
suggest that if we were to watch a sound-picture without its score, its false 
representation of the external world would be all too apparent, and it would fail to 
cohere into a cinematic experience. The film needs music as its supplement:   
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The photographed picture as such lacks motivation for movement; only indirectly 
do we realize that the pictures are in motion, that the frozen replica of external 
reality has suddenly been endowed with the spontaneity that it was deprived of 
by its fixation, and that something petrified is manifesting a life of its own. At 
this point, music intervenes, supplying momentum, muscular energy, a sense of 
corporeity, as it were. Its aesthetic effect is that of a stimulus of motion, not a 
reduplication of motion…the relation between music and pictures is antithetic at 
the very moment when the deepest unity is achieved.107 
This is to imply that the sound-picture, combining image and music, is deceptive. It 
tricks us into an experience of plenitude because what we are experiencing is a stilted 
or petrified replication of reality. Thus the sound-picture has always been in some 
way chaotic (anticipating Stork’s ‘chaos cinema’) and has always needed soundtrack 
to provide momentum and corporeality. It deceives us into a sense of realism. David 
Jenemann has connected this critique of cinema to Adorno’s more general critique of 
realism in art (found, for example, in Adorno’s 1952 text, In Search of Wagner). 
Jenemann annotates Adorno’s line of thinking, explaining that the ‘more the artwork 
strives for realism, the more it distances itself from reality, and the more art tries to 
approximate life, the more it accommodates itself to the death [or abstraction] of 
nature’.108 It is the ‘death of nature in the artwork’ that enables it to ‘enter into the 
system of exchange as a commodity’.109 In this reading, music is crucial if the 
cinematic object is to become a commodity: because it gives a sense of ‘realism’ 
(continuity, causality or duration) to the film, which is the best alibi for the ‘death of 
nature’ that it conceals.       
 There is an additional layer of complexity to this understanding of the moving 
image. Writing with Max Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno 
commented on the way in which cultural commodities are designed to be ‘consumed 
with alertness even when the customer is distraught’.110 Adorno and Eisler’s account 
of film music fits this. The music stimulates the consumer to alertness, and precludes 
their distressed or distracted resistance to the ‘fraudulent’ object. This is directly 
counter to the usual model of audience reception of mainstream film that is implied 
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by those who valorize the sense of critical distance provided by the jolt and shock 
tactics of avant-garde montage. On Adorno and Horkheimer’s account, instead of a 
passive mode of consumption, the mainstream sound film requires that the spectator 
‘labors on the broadcast or projection to continually produce the coherent object he 
has come to expect’.111 So, in this account, the work or activity of the spectator that 
was valorised by the avant-garde - their ‘awakening’ from passivity - in fact serves 
an ideological purpose. This is the same work that we do when we watch Wolfson’s 
Raspberry Poser: labour it into coherence, because it’s not coherent. And this is the 
same work that we have to do when we watch music videos: work for which we have 
become very well trained. This is testified to, I think, by the experience of watching 
Raspberry Poser and any number of music videos with the sound set to mute: the 
sense of structure, momentum and libidinal energy suddenly collapses like a house of 
cards, leaving only fragments and muddled pieces.    
 Wolfson’s desire with Raspberry Poser to make a ‘party video’, or in other 
words, a music video, is therefore indicative of a desire to reproduce the conditions 
by which we experience contemporary screen-mediated environments. The 
requirement, in Raspberry Poser, to piece together incoherent image fragments 
according to a song with which they share no significant historical or material links 
is an ordinary imperative of everyday life. In this respect, Raspberry Poser can be 
seen as a repetition or mirroring of a montage that has become operational or 
functional, although not always seen, in our contemporary screen-mediated culture. It 
can be seen in the solipsistic phenomenon of wearing headphones whilst performing 
any and all sorts of activity. This is part of the ordinary experience of contemporary 
city dwellers, who often walk through the streets, geared with headphones providing 
their own private musical accompaniment. The music works to filter and enhance the 
environment. In Jean-Paul Thibaud’s account of this phenomenon, he suggests that 
headphone-wearer’s environment is ‘not apprehended in an equivalent and neutral 
manner… [but] subjected to choices and visual reconfigurations in terms of 
headphone listening’.112 For the listener this transforms the city into a dumb 
architectonic puppet, which is brought to life according to the whim of whatever 
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song is being played. This montage is also implied in Railton and Watson’s 
comments on the music video’s default population of the screens in everyday spaces, 
such as the shopping mall and the hotel. These spaces are non-places: environments 
marked by the bland deterritorializing of corporate culture. They are spaces which, in 
the words of Marc Augé, ‘cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned 
with identity’.113 These non-places require us to give coherence to their 
meaninglessness, and create distinction from their indistinction. The music pouring 
out of the screens encourages us to labour these uncoded and deterritorialized spaces 
into pleasurable environments, within which we are happy to carry on consuming. 
This is the same process, albeit writ large, that takes place when we labour the 
images of a music video together.      `  
 Therefore we can argue that the shocked and cognitively active spectator 
promoted in avant-garde montage is inherited in our experience of screen-mediated 
space. But, the process is inverted: here our activity functions to suture ourselves into 
dominant ideology. It is via this technique that ‘on’ and ‘off’ screen spaces are 
merged, so that the information on the screen that breaks up and fragments our 
immediate experience of the world appears as one continuous data stream. This 
complements the marketing and vague metaphors of ‘algorithmic governmentality’ 
and ‘Big Data,’ which, Rouvroy explains, promises to rationalize ‘the world [as data] 
without any kind of mediation (except virtually transparent, almost naturalized 
computers)’.114 By this, I mean that the rationalization of the world by data-
extracting instruments functions as if ‘on’ and ‘off’ screen spaces form one 
continuous and unmediated data stream. Metaphors of liquidity and fluidity are 
typically used to symbolise, and naturalise, this imagining of contemporary screen 
space.          
 However, the point is that this screen space is not smooth and continuous, but 
that we labour it into continuity – aided, in part, by energising aural 
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accompaniments. We can make a bigger claim here, and argue that with the mass 
adoption of globalizing digital technologies, our historical reality has itself only 
become more discontinuous and fragmented; or montaged (full of violent 
juxtapositions) – politically, ecologically, and economically. Crary comes to a 
similar point in his critique of neoliberal temporality and its information economy, 
24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (2013): ‘In spite of the omnipresent 
proclamations of the compatibility, even harmonization, between human time and the 
temporalities of networked systems’, he writes, ‘the lived realities of this relationship 
are disjunctions, fractures, and continual disequilibrium’.115 Technological 
innovation has long been associated with the corralling of behaviour and 
exacerbation of socio-economic disparities, and this arguably exploded with the 
large-scale embrace of digital technologies and co-emergence of ‘finance capitalism’ 
in the 1980s (also the period in which we were introduced to the music video). David 
Harvey, for instance, has argued that ‘[t]echnologies of knowledge production and 
dissemination, for data and information storage and retrieval, are crucial for the 
survival and perpetuation of capital’.116 Indeed they tend to work in tandem.  
 Thus, in this present moment – in part characterised by the marketing and 
implementation of more and more, newer and newer data-producing innovations with 
inbuilt ‘planned obsolescence’ (aiding the smooth adaptation of more innovation, as 
earlier versions are scheduled to self-destruct) - it can be argued that social and 
economic disparities are enhanced and violent juxtapositions of luxury and poverty 
are maintained (for instance, the sleek iPhones that rely upon the unregulated mining 
of coltan in the Democratic Republic of Congo).117 In this circumstance, data-
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producing technological innovations are enthusiastically embraced because they help 
to render this ‘risk’-laden and fragmented world predictable – postponing our 
reflection upon social, political, ecological and economic disparities by plunging us 
into the illusion of a dynamic real-time. The subsequent experience of this 
discontinuous and chaotic world as a continuous or smooth, screen-mediated 
composition is also implicated in Crary’s theorisation of the 24/7 temporality of the 
new economy. He writes that:  
One of the goals of Google, Facebook, and other enterprises (five years from now 
the names may be different) is to normalize and make indispensable…the idea of 
a continuous interface - not literally seamless, but a relatively unbroken 
engagement with illuminated screens of diverse kinds that unremittingly demand 
interest or response. Of course, there are breaks, but they are not intervals in 
which any kind of counter-projects or streams of thought can be nurtured and 
sustained. As the opportunity for electronic transactions of all kinds becomes 
omnipresent, there is no vestige of what used to be everyday life beyond the 
reach of corporate intrusion.118 
The ‘chaotic’ nature of digital imagery in contemporary cinema and current screen 
space seems to echo the temporality of electronic ‘24/7’ capital. Indeed we might 
understand it as a visual correlate to the unregulated electronic flow of unintelligible 
financial transactions, initiating us to its new temporality: a ‘continuous present’ that 
disavows the nurturing of resistance and the sustained imagining of any alternative. 
How, therefore, can we understand Wolfson’s repetition of this type of imagery (a 
repetition of the representational formats that seem to typify contemporary 24/7 
capitalism) and negation of more explicit Eisensteinian montage techniques?  
liquid mirror  
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In a 2013 exhibition at the Chisenhale Gallery in London, Raspberry Poser was 
shown on a large screen in a darkened space with bright white carpets. This worked 
to create a very physical experience, as the light from the film seemed to pour from 
the screen, staining the immediate environment like an illuminated LCD laptop 
screen in the dark (fig. 4.7). Wolfson explained in an interview with the gallery that 
the ‘white carpet reflects the light in the video in a profound way. It will constantly 
change the colour of the space and reflect back into the space. When the video goes 
black ideally the space also becomes very dark and when it goes white the space 
brightens. When it goes red the space becomes red’.119 This produced a sense of the 
screen’s space extending out into the environment, blurring the boundaries between 
‘on’ and ‘off’ screen. This interest of Wolfson’s in the liquidity of the screen - its 
light washing over the environment and immersing the viewer in a sort of digital bath 
- is reflective of the dominant commercial rhetoric used in the marketing of 
contemporary screens. For instance, at the time of writing, Sony’s latest television 
screen is branded with the tagline ‘Forget you’re watching TV’. Its advertisement 
explains that with ‘four times more detail than Full HD, 4K gives stunningly natural 
images, not pixels. Dramatically higher image quality means that you can sit closer 
to the screen, filling more of your field of view until the screen disappears’.120 And in 
a television advert for the ‘Samsung Galaxy Note 4’ mobile phone the narrator 
informs us that ‘this is not a screen, it’s a window’.121 Moreover the recent trend by 
numerous electronics companies to manufacture curved television screens hints at a 
similarly pleasurable conquest of the spectator. These screens promise to wrap 
around their viewer in a pleasing embrace and flood their material world with 
‘stunningly natural’ image-information; as seen, for example, in a current 
advertisement for the Samsung S9W Series 9 Curved SUHD 4K Nano Crystal Smart 
TV (fig. 4.8).122         
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 Wolfson’s strategy is passive. He passively repeats the screen’s pleasurably 
depolarized forms of representation and he passively indulges in its commercial 
language and vague metaphors of liquidity. In this sense, I want to claim that he 
constructs a dead montage - by this, I mean to differentiate his work from the more 
positive, or vital idea of montage that is referenced by Manovich, Väliaho and 
Toscano. In their accounts, montage’s purported obsolescence in relation to new 
media technologies keeps it active in a ‘critical’ sense. Indeed, building on 
Benjamin’s discussion of outmoded technologies such as magic lanterns and 
stereoscopic slides, Rosalind Krauss has argued that once outmoded, these 
technologies ‘can brush the phantasmagorical against its own grain to produce an 
outside to the totality of technologized space’.123	  Thus the obsolescent has a history 
of conceptualisation in critical theory as a form of resistance that produces value 
outwith the normal temporality of capitalist production and through which one can 
find an alternative use or transgressive critical value. However, Wolfson’s Raspberry 
Poser does not engage with montage as an obsolescent technique, seeking to 
reactivate it. His use of montage is non-productive in that it does not uncover or 
reveal or attempt to produce an outside to ‘technologized space’. Instead it is dead: 
an avant-garde technique that is beyond redemption and unable to produce anything 
or compete with technologized space. How are we to understand this very passive or 
indifferent aesthetic? What is at stake in Wolfson’s representation of montage in this 
truly negative fashion?        
 For some commentators, the most striking aspect of Raspberry Poser is its use of 
animation, which brings together computer-generated elements with more traditional 
hand-drawn style cartoon animation. Linda Norden suggests that, in this respect, 
Raspberry Poser ‘owes something…[to] Disney (as well as Ben Shahn and George 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
screen: ‘When you look at the real world you don’t perceive it as just a flat “screen”. The rounded 
nature of your eyeballs gives you peripheral vision too, so that you’re aware of the world extending 
around you to your sides. By curving the edges of their pictures toward you, curved TVs try to 
replicate this sense of a world to the side of as well as in front of you, making you feel more 
immersed in what you’re watching’. See John Archer, ‘Curved TVs: 6 Reasons You Should Buy 
One--And 6 More Why You Shouldn’t’, Forbes (August 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnarcher/2014/08/13/curved-tvs-6-reasons-you-should-buy-one-and-6-
more-why-you-shouldnt/, accessed 22/12/14. 





Grosz)’.124 Similarly, Andrew Goldstein describes the work as a ‘looping 14-minute 
melange of Disney-style animation’.125 Indeed the film features a range of animated 
cartoon sequences that seem to adhere to Gilbert Seldes’s enthusiastic reception of 
early cartoons, which convey a ‘pleasure in magic, in seeing the impossible 
happen’.126 Wolfson’s cartoons display various impossible transformations, 
metamorphoses and absurd, weird happenings. For instance, there is a recurring 
cartoon character (who resembles the Beano’s Dennis the Menace, but with red hair) 
who, at one point grins and plunges a large knife into his abdomen, slicing down, 
allowing his ribcage to splay open. At other times he silently screams and 
gesticulates wildly before pulling off his skin like a snake, leaving a hole of black 
negative space on screen. And at another point, he is shown in a sort of yoga pose 
whilst, at the same time, strangling himself (fig. 4.9). His body stretches and 
stretches like a rubber band until he appears to die: his tongue rolls out and eyes are 
voided with a black cross in that familiar cartoon representation of death. Moreover 
in interview, Wolfson has expressed his interest in the cartoon’s altered conception 
of reality, which offers ‘another set of permissions and existences’.127 In this semse, I 
want to suggest, it is possible to identify the influence of the Fleischer Studios in 
Raspberry Poser’s cartoons. The Fleischer Studios were Disney’s first significant 
competitor in the 1920s and 1930s; creators of, amongst others, Betty Boop, Bimbo 
the dog and Popeye. Their distinctive early style of animation was defined by 
transformations, morphing forms, an uncompromising vitalism (where anything and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Linda Norden, ‘Only the Lonely’, in Aram Moshayedi ed., Jordan Wolfson: Ecce Homo/le Poseur 
(Köln: Walther König, 2013), 52. 
125 Andrew Goldstein, ‘Jordan Wolfson on Transforming the 'Pollution' of Pop Culture Into Art’, 
Artspace (April 2014), 
http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/jordan_wolfson_interview, accessed 
20/10/14. 
126 Gilbert Seldes quoted in Donald Crafton, Before Mickey: The Animated Film 1898-1928 
(Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1982), 12. 
127 Wolfson makes these comments in an interview with the Kadist Art Foundation, Paris. See 
‘Kadiview with Jordan Wolfson’, Kadist Paris (2011), http://vimeo.com/54768312, accessed 
23/10/14. In my own conversation with the artist, he cites the familiar Warner Brothers Looney Tune 
‘Wile E. Coyote and the Road Runner’, whose recurring motif sees Wile E. Coyote accidentally 
running off the edge of a cliff, without realising that the ground has fallen away. The Coyote carries 
on running in mid-air for a period of time before falling. Wolfson continued to describe his art-
making process in similar terms; as like jumping off a cliff. He opined that contemporary art had 
become stale; too reliant upon institutionally grounded markers of value. Instead he wanted to remove 
the ground, throwing himself, and the viewers of his work, off a cliff - providing an experience with 





everything – e.g. plants, doorknobs, record players, and windows – might all of a 
sudden take on an autonomous life force of its own) and a general sense of 
unboundedness from the laws of physical reality (fig. 4.10). Indeed this sensibility 
distinguished their style from Disney, who more characteristically privileged a 
naturalistic approach to animation. In his book The Vatican to Vegas: A History of 
Special Effects (2004), Norman M. Klein explains that Disney’s production methods 
endorsed some very exacting directions: ‘According to the Disney rule, once a 
character’s body was shown – rubbery, watery, human-like – that substance was 
irreducible (no hesitation or lapse). Walt was convinced’, Klein continues, ‘that 
revealing the drawing behind the flesh could wreck the atmospheric effects that he 
prized so highly’.128 It follows that ‘Donald or Goofy can be made to bulge and 
implode, but never lose their “personality”’.129 By contrast, with the Fleischer style 
of animation, Klein writes that ‘[g]ravity itself seems to disappear. Laws of what 
goes up cease. An uncanny antilogic assumes control. Objects lose substance: they 
become mercurial. Flesh, or metal, flows like water…’130      
 There is one sequence in Raspberry Poser that particularly interests me, and in 
which a reference to the Fleischer style is unmistakeable. The cartoon boy appears 
again, this time holding an artefact of the previous era: a magic hand-mirror, 
recognizable from the Fleischers’ 1933 animation, Betty Boop’s Snow White (famous 
for its rotoscoping of Cab Calloway as the Koko the Clown character). Wolfson’s 
cartoon kid pulls the mirror over his head like a hoop, the screen cuts, and he returns 
a second later, transformed into a chair. The chair then grows spikes (fig. 4.11). This 
bizarre scene is repeated a few seconds later. In Betty Boop’s Snow White the magic 
mirror grows stubby arms and, of course, reveals a talking face in order to answer the 
queen’s question as to ‘who is the fairest in the land’. The queen later runs the mirror 
over her body like a hoop - revealing the original gesture that is repeated by Wolfson 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Norman M. Klein, The Vatican to Vegas: A History of Special Effects (New York; London: The 
New Press, 2004), 254. 
129 Klein draws attention to the early Disney cartoon The Band Concert (1935), which clearly 
illustrates this procedure. Here Mickey Mouse plays a band leader, conducting an orchestra when a 
tornado strikes. Despite the violence of this natural disaster, Mickey manages to stay intact and stick 
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was the central gag of the cartoon’. Disney’s commitment to the naturalistic illusion of animation was 
thus allegorically present within their cartoons. See Klein, The Vatican to Vegas: A History of Special 
Effects, 254 – 255. 





- and transforms into a witch (fig. 4.12). Later still, she runs the mirror over Betty’s 
accomplice, Koko the Clown, turning him into a strange stilt-legged and shape-
shifting ghost with a body like a rubber band who sings ‘St. James Infirmary Blues’. 
The ghost twists and ties itself into knots and has a very fluid relationship to its 
context: transforming, for instance, according to the song’s lyrical content. Koko 
becomes a twenty-dollar gold piece on a chain and then his head becomes a bottle 
from which he pours a ‘shot of that booze’, before throwing it down his own exposed 
neck cavity. Unlike Disney, these bulging and imploding cartoon characters have no 
personality to lose. Their personality is forever in flux. The mirror, which is 
seemingly responsible for these extreme morphs and transformations, can be seen as 
a surrogate for the medium of animation, which as Seldes claimed, could make ‘the 
impossible happen’. The mirror in Raspberry Poser is visually identical – indeed, it 
is as the artist verbally confirmed to me, in direct homage to the Fleischer cartoon - 
and Wolfson employs it to similar metamorphic effect: the mirror’s surface 
seemingly losing its substance, becoming mercurial, and transforming the boy into a 
chair.131 Thus Raspberry Poser might be seen to inherit this older model of 
animation as a transformative mirroring of reality. The ‘magic’ mirror reference 
would seem to affirm such a sentiment. The animated mirror produces a distorted 
reflection of the world, by pulling us through its tain. This is its function in the 
Fleischer version of Snow White. Indeed (whilst not directly mentioning the mirror) 
Klein interprets the strange transformations that take place in the cartoon as a sort of 
exaggerated reflection of material and historical conditions: it’s ‘about uncertainty – 
modernity and the Depression as the Fleischer team witnessed it’, he writes: here ‘the 
animator builds social imaginaries about collective anxiety’.132  
 The aesthetic of fluidity and liquidity invoked in Klein’s reception of the cartoon, 
which seems to redeem and liberate the Fleischer style from the normative 
conventions of Disney - whose cartoons, in this understanding, ultimately reinforced 
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dominant social narratives - is premised on a conception of the mirror that can be 
seen to correspond to the feminist thinker Luce Irigary’s discussion of mirrors. In the 
1970s Irigaray used the motif of the mirror, and the idea of passing through its 
surface, as part of her critique of the prevailing patriarchal ‘scopic economy’. This 
drew upon Lewis Carroll’s sequel to Alice in Wonderland, Behind the Looking-
Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871), in which a world is revealed on the other 
side of the mirror where language collapses.133 Glossing Irigaray’s interest in this 
motif, Carolyn Burke describes its ‘ideological space beyond the psychic economy of 
patriarchy’, which is structured by a ‘mechanics of fluids’ rather than a ‘mechanics 
of solids’.134 In this respect, Irigaray’s thinking about the mirror contains some 
similarity with the critical reception of early animation, in particular the Fleischer 
style and its ‘uncanny antilogic’ of ‘mercurial’ substances. Her vivid description of 
the ‘mechanics of fluids’ is of most interest here:  
That it is continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, 
diffusible…That it is unending, potent and impotent owing to its resistance to the 
countable; that it enjoys and suffers from a greater sensitivity to pressures; that it 
changes – in volume or in force, for example – according to the degree of heat; 
that it is, in its physical reality, determined by friction between two infinitely 
neighbouring entities – dynamics of the near and not of the proper, movements 
coming from the quasi contact between two unities hardly definable as 
such…and not energy of a finite system…that it mixes with bodies of a like state, 
sometimes dilutes itself in them in an almost homogeneous manner, which makes 
the distinction between the one and the other problematical; and furthermore that 
it is already diffuse “in itself,”  which disconcerts any attempt at static 
identification.135 
The emancipatory register of Irigaray’s text suggests a world of viscous materiality: 
of contingency, transformations, immanence and general malleability. This is 
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paralleled, I think, in Klein’s description of the morphing figures in the Fleischer 
cartoons, which ‘look unstable, in hesitation, on a journey into antimatter, where 
many atmospheres meet’.136 For Irigaray, this talk of ‘fluidity’ formed part of a 
project to conceptualise a ‘plural’ and ‘polymorphous’ idea of ‘women’; free from 
the ‘psychic economy of patriarchy’.137 For Klein, the ‘mechanics of fluidity’ that 
emerged in the Fleisher cartoons was part of a new visual language that imagined 
some form of liberation from the drudgery and order of everyday life in post-war 
American Fordism.         
 However, the mirror in Raspberry Poser does not enable this type of 
emancipatory narrative. It does not reveal a new perspective or altered view of 
historical reality. By contrast, the mirror in Raspberry Poser can be understood as a 
surrogate for the screen, mirroring its distinctive spatiality. And the distortions that 
seem ostensibly equivalent to the Fleischer cartoons are more simply synonymous 
with the distortions that result from a depolarized screen space. The contemporary 
screen normalizes the ‘mechanics of fluids’ that contributed to the emancipatory 
aesthetics of Irigarary and Klein. Here, by contrast, we have a ‘functionality of 
fluids’. This expresses the screen’s illusory world of liquidity, immersion and 
dynamic interconnectivity. In this sense, Wolfson’s passive mirroring of this world 
and its logic can be better interpreted according to the mirror motif employed by 
Adorno in his writing on the bourgeois interior.      
 A small subsection of Adorno’s habilitation thesis, Kierkegaard: Construction of 
the Aesthetic (published in 1933, the same year as the Fleischer’s Betty Boop’s Snow 
White) focuses on the ‘window mirror’. Adorno examines this device as part of a 
wider discussion of the bourgeois intérieur in Kierkegaard’s writing, in which he 
criticizes as inherently bourgeois the aspiration to isolate oneself from the capitalist 
process (as Kierkegaard famously did, to the extent that he refused to ‘put his money 
out to interest’).138 The ‘window mirror’ emblematised this point: it was a popular 
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nineteenth-century gadget that passively projected an image from the outside world 
into the living room, for the private enjoyment of the occupant. It would be common 
in the intérieur of those who, like Kierkegaard (as a ‘rentier’), lived off an 
inheritance and were able to work isolated from the outside world with pretensions 
that they were separate from the capitalist mode of production. These devices were 
appropriately called, Adorno notes, ‘spies’.139 The observer of the mirror, divided 
from the outside world, is in Adorno’s words, a ‘private person, solitary, inactive, 
and separated from the economic processes of production’.140 The window-mirror 
‘casts into the apartment only the semblance of things’ and testifies to the ‘isolated 
privacy’ of the observer’.141 The ‘semblance’ that the mirror projects in Adorno’s 
discussion of this process is an ‘endless row of apartment buildings into the isolated 
bourgeois living room…[And] by the mirror, the living room dominates the reflected 
row at the same time that it is delimited by it’.142 At this point reality ‘comes into 
focus as a mere commodity’.143 This spectral return of the outside world inside the 
bourgeois living room leads Adorno to suggest that the ‘harder subjectivity rebounds 
back into itself from the heteronomous, indeterminate, or simply mean world, the 
more clearly the external world expresses itself.’144 So the ‘window mirror’ does 
more than passively reflect. In this situation it produces a double vision, whereby the 
viewer also sees themselves viewing, perhaps enabling a heightened and 
uncomfortable sense of self-consciousness or even sense of embarrassment at their 
own pretentiousness. Thus the private subject who retreats into the intérieur is 
broken when an image of capital is projected into their private space by the mirror, 
destroying their pretence of isolation. Moreover, Adorno’s description, I think, is 
funny. Why? He exposes the ridiculous fact that we would rather watch a 
representation on a screen (here a mirror) than the real thing – something both tragic 
and comedic, which seems intrinsic to us. And unlike Plato’s famous ‘Allegory of 
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the Cave’, this figure in the living room is not chained in and forced to watch, by 
contrast, the individual is comfortable, relaxed and wants to be there watching a 
dumb projection of the outside street on the wall.    
 The world reflected by the mirror into the living room appears, Adorno suggests, 
‘with the facies hippocratica of history, a petrified primordial landscape’.145 
Therefore the reflected world appears as if on the edge of death, at its worst.146 It is 
estranged from any sort of ‘natural’ state and instead appears reified, as a commodity 
- organized according to an abstract principle of exchange. This principle, Adorno 
has written, ‘dominates human needs and replaces them’, as an ‘illusion [that] 
dominates reality’.147 In this understanding, the passivity of the window-mirror leads 
to a sense of awareness or self-consciousness of this fact. It is this sort of mirroring 
that can be seen to take place in Raspberry Poser: it mirrors our screen-mediated 
reality, making it appear at its worst: inverting the emancipatory ‘mechanics of 
fluidity’ (mentioned in Irigaray’s writing) and instead representing a ‘functionality of 
fluidity’. Perhaps we can claim the same process for Raspberry Poser; the work of 
art, in its passive reflection, is like an Adornian magic mirror, pulling the world 
through its tain and estranging it from its so-called natural state - so that it appears at 
its worst. Furthermore, we can claim that this passive reflection, or repetition, 
produces the same heightened or even comedic sense of self-consciousness as the 
window-mirror does for Adorno. When watching and enjoying the procession of 
incoherent and chaotic images in Raspberry Poser, we are like the individual in the 
bourgeois intérieur; participating in the dumb and depressing protocols of 
contemporary screen space, which compels us to find continuity and pleasure in a 
database aesthetic. In this respect, I want to claim that Raspberry Poser is, like 
Adorno’s description of the window mirror, funny.     
 Comedy has long been seen as a ‘mirror of life’, specifically associated with 
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making things appear shoddier than we immediately presume. Aristotle, for instance, 
argued that comedy ‘aims at representing men as worse…than in actual life’.148 This 
‘worseness’ is something that we recognise in ourselves and in other things, but is at 
the same time beneath the ‘level of goodness’ that we would admit.149 Certainly this 
was the case with cartoons according to Adorno and Horkheimer, which were 
popular because audiences were able to identify with the pathetic situations and 
absurd characters on screen. ‘Donald Duck in the cartoons and the unfortunate in real 
life’, they argue, ‘get their thrashing so that the audience can learn to take their own 
beating’.150 Benjamin comes to a similar, albeit more ambiguous point in a 1931 
conversation with Gustav Gluck and Kurt Weill, published as ‘Mickey Mouse 
(fragment)’ (in some of his writings animation has a therapeutic function; this led to 
much disagreement with Adorno).151 Here he compares Mickey Mouse to someone 
working in an office and suggests that ‘the explanation for the huge popularity of 
these films…is simply the fact that the public recognizes its own life in them’.152 The 
cartoon reflects and repeats aspects of the audience’s life in a way that appears funny 
or stupid, and by extension, makes their own life appear funny or stupid. The double 
vision that results - whereby reality appears both terrible and ridiculous - is a 
significant aspect of the theorisation of humour that I want to develop in this thesis. 
This double, or multiple vision moreover, seems significant with regards to 
Wolfson’s exploration of the screen in Raspberry Poser, which to a certain extent 
simply appears to repeat the representational protocols of screen space.  
comedy 
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The unifying, generic convention of the comic, for Scott Cutler Shershow, is ‘the 
clash of incongruous modes of thought and feeling’.153 Unlike classic montage, these 
clashes are not resolved into a conceptual unity; by contrast, the ‘comic spirit’ holds 
these multiple categories in an antagonistic tension - offering a ‘two-faced approach 
to “reality”’.154  In this respect, Shershow explains, comedy ‘conveys an ideological 
vision in its malice and intolerance…a vision that expresses the ruling assumptions, 
the convenient rationalizations, of a particular historical moment’.155 Thus 
understood, the simple act of saying or making apparent the fact that ‘these are the 
conditions that prevail’, or that ‘these are our ruling assumptions’, or that ‘these are 
our social customs’, can end up mocking those conditions, assumptions and customs. 
What Shershow calls the ‘comic spirit’ ‘locks us in familiar cages but at the same 
time holds out the promise of a threshold’.156 Therefore the ‘comic spirit’ indicates a 
threshold to the prevailing ideology not by proposing a solution or a way out, but 
instead by mocking it, not taking it seriously. Indeed this particular aspect of the 
comic, emerging from repetition, can be observed in Jean Paul Sartre’s comments on 
the condition of ‘seriality’ that defines our social customs. Whilst Sartre does not 
invoke the comic as part of this discussion, the blunt or depressing tenor of his 
writing, to my mind, nonetheless evokes a ‘deadpan’ comedic effect similar to that 
previously mentioned in Adorno.157 In this respect, we might describe a section on 
‘seriality’ in Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960) as comically ‘two-faced’. 
 For Sartre, ‘seriality’ describes the way in which our practical social structures 
forge us into isolated and yet conforming, homogenous individuals: into a ‘plurality 
of isolation’.158 For instance, he provides the example of the ‘series’ of people in a 
bus queue (he also writes about the serial nature of being stuck in traffic, shopping at 
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the supermarket and listening to the radio). ‘These people’, he writes, ‘do not care 
about or speak to each other and, in general, they do not look at one another; they 
exist side by side alongside a bus stop’.159 In series, individuals are passive and 
unwilling to overcome the tension that is posed by the co-existence of their isolation 
and plurality (instead, Sartre writes, they busy themselves by reading the paper; now 
more likely they look at their phones). Sartre’s discussion is related to the idea of 
class consciousness, or the difficulty of class consciousness in modern society, as 
such social structures necessitate our isolation, forcing us to ‘face each other as 
competitors [as opposed to collectives] in the life of survival’.160 Indeed, Sartre 
explains that from afar the bus queue might appear unified: a reciprocal group of 
like-minded and collectivised individuals. This is, however, an illusion because the 
people in the group are merely ‘identical instances of the same act’.161 The ‘social 
ensemble’ that queues together is not, what Sartre terms, a ‘rich, differentiated 
synthesis’ of reciprocal interests. It is, by contrast, an ‘abstract generality’ whose 
coherence is determined purely by the bus schedule, which organises the participants 
according to ‘their interchangeability’.162 This means that, in this situation, the 
individual gives the impression of a comically dumb object, whose agency is fully, 
and therefore absurdly determined by the bus company. In his interpretation of 
Sartre’s concept of radio broadcasting and the ‘political impotence’ of its listeners, 
Joseph S. Catalano invokes a similarly comical image of the radio listener pitifully 
talking back to their radio, as if it could respond.163 ‘The broadcaster’s voice’, he 
writes, ‘appears to speak to us and invite us to reciprocal relation; but this reciprocity 
is false’.164          
 At the same time, Catalano, writing in 2010, holds out hope for the internet’s 
‘power to alter our political impotence’ - as if it could overcome our condition of 
‘seriality’.165 However, it seems that the opposite is true. With broadcast radio we are 
‘constituted in our interchangeability’ because of our passivity, or inability to 
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genuinely respond to and interact with the broadcaster’s voice. Now we might say 
that we are ‘constituted in our interchangeability’ because of our activity: our ability 
to constantly broadcast our own voices. It is in this aspect that ‘seriality’ continues in 
the present day. The system of screens stimulates our continuous engagement, 
forcing us to act impulsively and unthinkingly, organising us into ‘serial’ social roles 
that keep us productive in the new economy. This ‘serial’ social form is related to the 
tracking and recording of user behaviour by ‘Big Data’ companies, which call for the 
non-selective collection of as much statistical data as possible. One of the 
implications of this process is that any kind of impulse in the user (which might 
previously have been considered too idiosyncratic to record) can be detected, logged 
and subsequently marketed at. We are thus encouraged and given the tools to 
constantly broadcast ourselves, and our slightest desires. Rouvroy argues that this 
process is fundamental to ‘algorithmic governmentality’, and happens at the expense 
of the individual’s ability to ‘revise their first-order preferences’.166 This means that 
our impulse control is negated by screen technologies because services like Google 
track and record our impulse clicks and build our profiles from these. It is this data 
that helps determine internet search prompts, the adverts we see and high hit 
websites. The repercussion of this screen culture is that we are building a mirror 
image of our most regressive, simple and impulsive selves. In short, for Rouvory, 
these technologies employed by ‘algorithmic governmentality’ are reversing our 
achievement of ‘autonomy’.167       
 Thus understood, the screen excludes any sense of negativity because in its space 
no aesthetic form seems to clash with any other, nothing is reflected on critically and 
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all complexity or ambivalence is exorcised from the system because it is not 
conducive to its data-driven consumerism. This algorithmic system is precisely 
anticipated in Baudrillard’s account of ‘the political economy of the sign’, which 
describes a situation where all ‘ambivalence is reduced by equivalence’:168  
All the drives, symbolic relations, object relations and even perversions – in 
short, all the subject’s labor of cathexis – are abstracted and given their general 
equivalent…Everything surging from the subject, his body and his desire, is 
dissociated and catalysed in terms of needs, more or less specified in advance by 
objects. All instincts are rationalized, finalized and objectified in needs – hence 
symbolically cancelled.169 
Wolfson’s film mirrors this. Indeed it seems to delight in it. It is a montage that 
doesn’t attempt to subvert, transgress or oppose because these traditionally avant-
garde strategies of resistance have been depolarized like everything else. Instead its 
montage mirrors the peculiar montage that is contemporary screen space, thus 
appearing as a dead montage - unproductive, useless and in this respect funny. 
Raspberry Poser seems to adopt the negativity of the comic - that is in witnessing the 
‘face of reality’ with a multiple, unfixed and incoherent vision: facing the world with 
what Shershow describes as ‘a constantly shifting perspective of mockery, derision, 
resignation, and praise’.170 In this sense, the seemingly passive mirroring and non-
oppositional approach adopted in Raspberry Poser appears to embrace the movement 
of what Baudrillard calls a ‘double spiral’, mentioned previously in the Introduction 
as a potential model for a new critical imagination that does not fall back on 
modernist tropes. The ‘double spiral’ accounts for the inseparability of oppositional 
categories, which run throughout Baudrillard’s writing; for instance, production and 
seduction, political economy and death, hyper-reality and symbolic exchange, the 
fatal and the banal, appearance and disappearance. ‘It means there is no static 
opposition, no binary system that functions ad libitum from beginning to end’.171 
Instead the idea of the ‘double spiral’ suggests that these forms all haunt one another, 
allowing for the possibility of reversibility because there is ‘no static 
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opposition…What is interesting’, Baudrillard writes, ‘is that notions and concepts 
criss-cross each other, slide into each other, melt into each other’.172 There is no 
reconciliation, construction or synthesis with the notions and concepts tied together 
in a ‘double spiral’ because the logic of the ‘double spiral’ is ‘sworn to radical 
antagonism’.173 Indeed, the ‘double spiral’ seems to describe the ‘fearful symmetry’ 
Shershow recognises in the comic spirit, which holds together incongruous modes of 
thought and feeling, allowing it to swirl between ‘realism and fantasy, cynicism and 
optimism, ideology and utopia’.174        
 This, I think, clarifies the aesthetic form of Raspberry Poser, in which there is no 
construction of an idea, no clear form of knowledge production, no resolution or 
dialectical synthesis of images: only a swirling accumulation and disaccumulation of 
incongruous elements. For this reason, Raspberry Poser is emblematic of 
contemporary screen space and, crucially, reiterates its norms; making it incongruous 
and funny at the same time. We might see this, more generally, as a blueprint for all 
the visual culture highlighted in this thesis, in which expressions of stupidity, 
pessimism and horror emerge as figures of passivity, but thereby also present a 
powerful negativity, in which we can begin to apprehend a critical imagination that 
does not fall back on the functionalised and implicitly productive language of the 
avant-garde, which is so often premised on agency rather than passivity. Indeed, as I 
have shown, the technological systems of Control have the tendency to exorcise and 
de-vitalise or de-differentiate the avant-garde’s cultivation of otherness, 
transgression, alterity and criticality by subsuming these forms within the general 
flow of data. And, such is our mediation by these systems, we are no longer 
‘cognitively emancipated’ or ‘awakened’ by traditional forms of criticality, which 
now struggle to genuinely survive.       
 In these circumstances passive mirroring emerges as a potentially comic device, 
as I hope to have shown here. And yet, it might seem that this appeal to the comic 
impulse is inherently conservative: a therapeutic and temporary indulgence in cynical 
humour that allows one to return refreshed to the smoothly running and well-oiled 
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system of production that surrounds us - what Adorno and Horkheimer have 
memorably termed a ‘medicinal bath’.175 In this understanding, this sort of fun can 
only ever be ‘a parody of humanity’.176      
 Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of the comic represents a criticism of the 
philosopher Henri Bergson’s influential Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (1914), 
in which comedy is accorded a vital or emancipatory energy that has the capacity to 
burst through and innervate the mechanisation of life.177 They dispute Bergson’s 
claim, arguing that ‘the life which…in laughter breaks through the barrier, is actually 
an invading barbaric life, self-assertion prepared to parade its liberation from any 
scruple when the social occasion arises’.178 It is not my intention for the comic 
impulse identified in the visual culture of Control to be accorded the same vital, 
irruptive energy that Bergson described. This would presume too much agency for 
the comic. Indeed, the images described here do parody humanity (because they 
display no human agency), in the same sense that Adorno and Horkheimer disparage 
the comic and are therefore not automatically emancipatory. But this, I want to 
argue, is their value. This is what I earlier referred to as a form of ‘cynical 
enlightenment’, what Foucault calls the ‘living scandal of the truth’, where the cynic 
reveals and lives the ‘scandal of truth’ rather than withdrawing from it.179  
 This is, moreover, applicable to the pessimistic, indifferent, cynical and 
depressing aesthetics of Control observed in this thesis, which seem to exceed or fall 
short of existing narratives of art and visual culture. These images have none of the 
agency of the avant-garde or the revolutionary praxis of recent socially engaged or 
activist art. By contrast, they repeat, reiterate, re-present, mirror and reflect - these 
are the forms of cultural expression that result from our dysphoric worldview, which 
cannot help but react to the shock tactics of the avant-garde and the art world’s 
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persistent appeal to ‘criticality’ with cynical disdain. In doing so, we might identify a 
recurrence of an implicit negativity that is excluded or functionalised by Control, 
which seems to make anything and everything productive. This organization of 
‘social energy’, whilst locking us, as Shershow writes of the comic spirit, into 
‘familiar cages’, also holds out the promise of a threshold, or implicit reversibility to 
the systems of Control that surround us; reminding us that technological systems, no 
matter how advanced, have an inbuilt tendency to undermine themselves, oftentimes 
comically, according to their own functioning. This is ultimately what we observed 
in the prodigious meaninglessness of Red Bull’s Stratos jump (and arguably even 
more so in Google Vice President Alan Eustace’s attempt), in the stupidity of the 
internet meme and the automated hate of 4chan, in the horrible void at the heart of 
















































Fig. 4.1 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Con Leche, 2009. Digital video, computer-




Fig. 4.2 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Animation, Masks, 2011. Digital video, 





















































Fig. 4.4 net.art, CNN Interactive, 1996 (screen grab). Image taken from 



















































Fig. 4.5 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Raspberry Poser, 2012.  Digital video, computer-





Fig. 4.6 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Raspberry Poser, 2012.  Digital video, computer-















































Fig. 4.7 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Raspberry Poser, 2012. Publicity still, 





Fig. 4.8 Still from ‘Samsung Curved TV Commercial 60 Seconds’, 2015. Samsung 
TV commercial, 01:00. Screenshot taken from 











































Fig. 4.9 Still from Jordan Wolfson, Raspberry Poser, 2012. Digital video, computer-





Fig. 4.10 Still from The Fleischer Studios, Betty Boop’s Snow White, 1933. 
Animated film, 07:04. Screenshot taken from 
































Fig. 4.11 Stills from Jordan Wolfson, Raspberry Poser, 2012. Digital video, 





























Fig. 4.12 Stills from The Fleischer Studios, Betty Boop’s Snow White, 1933. 
Animated film, 07:04. Screenshot taken from 



























































Everything is Terrible 
	  
I have had visions and dreams of the future and I have watched and heard children 
crying and people, old people dying and starving to death…there will come a time 
when there will be no food to eat and there will be earthquakes in different places…1 
Since 2003, the eschatological televangelist Jim Bakker (who was jailed for fraud in 
1989 and served five years of a forty-five year sentence) has preached the end of 
times on the daily broadcast Jim Bakker Show. Each program is concluded with a 
request for a ‘Love Offering’ of $125. In return for your donation, Pastor Bakker and 
wife Lori promise to send you a quantity of freeze-dried food for an end time still to 
be announced. ‘Money's gonna be worthless when disaster strikes’, Bakker explains; 
‘that’s why I am telling you to stock up on food and survival supplies so you can 
feed your loved ones when that time comes’.2 Bakker uses his message of impending 
disaster, chaos and total environmental collapse to encourage people to exchange 
their soon to be worthless money for large buckets of survival food products that can 
fill a storehouse and sustain a family for decades whilst the world breaks down 
around them. These industrial size buckets are often displayed on set, looming 
behind the pastor as he preaches. Pop-up adverts also appear across the bottom of the 
screen, supplementing Bakker’s doom-laden message with offers for food – for 
instance, the $3500 ‘Time of Trouble Tasty Food PLUS Meal’, a seven year supply 
of food with a twenty year shelf life. Or a $2500 ‘New Bulk Sampler Bundle’, which 
contains 28 buckets and 23,375 servings (fig. 5.1).     
 The apocalyptical message of Bakker’s show taps into the raw nerve of the 
Anthropocene, discussed in Chapter One, and the cultural expectation of disaster that 
comes with an increased awareness of the irreversible and potentially cataclysmic 
ecological damage done to the environment. This was arguably anticipated by 
Heidegger in his diagnosis of the ‘Age of the World Picture’, and the earth’s 
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instrumentalization as ‘standing-reserve’ by man. Bakker seems to exploit our mass 
cultural pessimism, or planetary dysphoria, as a means to sell hyper-industrial 
quantities of food by the bucket-load. To be sure these expectations of the 
apocalypse are not unprecedented; indeed Bakker bases his preaching on the book of 
Revelation, not on geological studies of the human impact on the environment (he 
brands himself ‘as one of today's experts on the book of Revelation’). However, the 
contemporary appetite for the apocalypse to which Bakker appeals is predominately 
informed by modern science, the predictions of which seem indisputable, empirically 
proved and seemingly non-negotiable. Bakker’s hysteric sales pitch is overzealous 
and wildly speculative, however at the same time it is coterminous with, and 
sympathetic to the current popular cultural consciousness, which presumes a pending 
global catastrophe.          
 The Jim Bakker Show is the basis for a number of videos available online by the 
satirical video editor Vic Berger IV, who publishes work with the Super Deluxe 
online video network and on his personal account on the video sharing platform Vine 
(for which he has received the moniker of ‘Vine’s Strangest Political Satirist’ for his 
six second looping videos of Republican party nominees, in particular Donald Trump 
and Jeb Bush).3 He also works as an editor with American comedy duo Tim & Eric. 
Berger’s videos of Bakker simply re-present parts of the Jim Bakker Show using a 
variety of editing techniques: loops and repetitions, muting, slowing down, adding 
pauses, adding sound-effects and soundtrack, panning across the image, zooming in 
and magnifying certain facial expressions or aspects of the set. One video, titled ‘Jim 
Bakker’s Buckets’ focuses on the theme of apocalypse and the food that Bakker 
suggests will see you through it. The Christian Minister Mark Blitz guests on the 
show featured in Berger’s video, and as he prophesises about the ‘blood moon’ and 
the anniversary of the ‘creation of the world’, Bakker works himself into a frenzy. 
Berger emphasises this with repetitions and zooms of Bakker’s and Blitz’s facial 
expressions and gestures and overlays an enigmatic instrumental electronica track by 
Paul Kass, magnifying the emotional intensity of the show. Of course, Bakker’s 
frenzy lends a sense of urgency to the sales pitch for buckets of food: ‘People are 
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ordering food faster and faster, in a few hours there’s gonna’ be an event take place, 
and you won’t get food for six months to a year’.4 Bakker is seen showing off ‘eight 
years of pulp food’ in buckets, some of which is cooked on stage with a garden 
spade: ‘two gallons of white rice’ and ‘twenty two gallons of cheesy broccoli 
sauce’.5 Bakker demonstrates the food by using his hand to shovel hot white rice into 
his mouth whilst crying ‘what if you have to survive for two years or three years, 
you’re gonna’ need some more food!’6 The audience applauds Bakker as he eats (fig. 
5.2).           
 Clearly Berger doesn’t need to do much to this material to make it seem weird, 
tragic, terrible and funny. It is already all of the above. Bakker’s definitely serious 
show already seems to contain its own satire and its own comedy. All Berger does is 
repeat, reiterate and home in on particular details in order to make this apparent: 
making the terrible seem funny and the funny seem terrible. Berger also edits videos 
of Jeb Bush’s and Donald Trump’s appearances in the Republican Party presidential 
debates and forums, to similar effect. Certainly Bush’s and Trump’s performances, 
like Bakker’s show, also contain their own satire and comedy – appearing terrible 
and funny at the same time (fig. 5.3). This is not something to which an artist can 
add, but can only draw attention to. Indeed, as Berger explains in an interview: ‘I like 
to amplify what's already there and focus on that’.7     
 What value can we ascribe to this process of repetition, mirroring or reiteration, 
seen previously in the discussion of Wolfson, arguably the only sort of humour 
possible today when cultural objects contain their own comedy, so that, to restate 
Andy Kaufman, ‘real life is funnier than deliberate comedy’.8 Berger’s action is 
more or less equivalent to the processes described in the artwork of Ruff and 
Wolfson, and the idea of cultural objects and technological systems containing their 
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own comedy or stupidity emerged in my analysis of internet memes and 4chan in 
Chapter Two, both of which can be seen to simply follow the cultural logic or 
protocol of the internet. Thus, this question reverberates throughout the thesis. I have 
attempted to provide some answers, which clarify and appraise the visual culture that 
is, to my mind, representative of Control societies and a set of seemingly passive 
artistic strategies that also respond to its conditions. These strategies seem to point 
toward an underlying Baudrillardian logic of comical reversibility, meaning that our 
technologies have a tendency to undermine themselves according to their own 
functioning. For instance, this is the value I have accorded to the ‘stupidity’ and 
‘horror’ that inheres in the various apparatuses of Control. However, what value is 
this? What sort of pleasure can we take in this? Is it simply a recreational ‘holiday 
humour’; a stimulating shot in the arm or quick fix for the tired and alienated so that 
they can return rejuvenated to the normal way of the world?   
 In a late essay, ‘Is Art Lighthearted?’ (1967), Adorno grapples with a similar 
question. His notion of ‘lightheartedness’ can be seen as synonymous with what we 
have called the comedic or humorous (in the essay Adorno flits between the terms 
‘lighthearted’ and ‘humorous’): ‘What is lighthearted in art is…the opposite of what 
one might easily assume it to be’, Adorno writes, ‘not its content but its 
demeanor…its playfulness and not…its stating of intellectual contents’.9 He 
continues: ‘A priori, prior to its works, art is a critique of the brute seriousness that 
reality imposes upon human beings…That is what is lighthearted in it; as a change in 
the existing mode of consciousness that is also, to be sure, its seriousness’.10 Adorno 
wants to question the efficacy of art’s authentic or ‘serious’ claim to lightheartedness 
because of the power of the culture industry, which takes art and places it ‘among the 
consumer goods’.11 This is to say that ‘its lightheartedness has become synthetic, 
false, and bewitched’.12 And so, in this historical context, when ‘art tries of its own 
accord to be lighthearted’, it can only affirm the dictates of the culture industry: it 
loses its critical capacity to mock the seriousness of reality because its ‘ordained 
cheerfulness fits into the way of the world. It encourages people to submit to what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Theodor Adorno, ‘Is Art Lighthearted?’ [1967], Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature – Volume 
Two, tr. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University, 1992), 248. 
10 Adorno, ‘Is Art Lighthearted?’, 248. 
11 Adorno, ‘Is Art Lighthearted?’, 251. 





decreed, to comply’.13 Therefore, Adorno argues, ‘[w]hat was once humor becomes 
irretrievably dull…degenerat[ing] into the hearty contentment of complicity. In the 
end it becomes intolerable’.14         
 Whilst it might seem strange to keep returning to Adorno in order to interpret 
contemporary cultural phenomena, his writing is to my mind still useful. In the 
present context, and to help me conclude, what seems especially useful and pertinent 
is his observation of the ‘withering away of the alternative between lightheartedness 
and seriousness’ (or the terrible and the comic) in a contemporary art that is taken in 
hand by the culture industry.15 This leads to a situation whereby the terrible and 
tragic can appear comic, and the comic appears dejected. As we have seen, this 
dialectic runs through the visual culture identified here as distinctive to the societies 
of Control, in which formerly opposed genres and concepts become blurred or 
depolarized without resolving into synthesis. In this respect, Adorno’s thoughts on 
art are vital. Moreover, the cultural forms and artworks from the early twentieth-
century that Adorno highlights as interesting or ‘radical’ can be seen to further 
illuminate and help us understand the enigmatic and impassive forms of today. He 
suggests that an authentic lightheartedness or humour survives in certain works (he 
cites, in particular Samuel Beckett and Franz Kafka) despite the machinations of the 
culture industry, in which it has become synonymous with leisure time. It survives as 
a form of self-critique. This is a ‘humor about humor. The artful meaninglessness 
and silliness characteristic of radical contemporary works of art, characteristics that 
are so irritating to those with a positive outlook; represent not so much the regression 
of art to an infantile stage as its humorous judgement on humour’.16 And thus, 
humour ‘is salvaged in Beckett’s plays because they infect the spectator with 
laughter about the absurdity of laughter and laughter about despair’.17 This, to be 
sure, is not the ‘holiday humour’ enjoyed as a form of recreation. This is a ‘third 
possibility’ – neither lighthearted nor serious.     
 Jim Bakker’s Buckets is not funny. There would be no point in it being funny 
because the Jim Bakker Show is already funny, as well as being terrible. This attests 
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to the continuing truth of Adorno’s statement on the blurring of the comic and the 
tragic or terrible. Indeed, all the visual culture highlighted in this thesis displays a 
blurring of certain generic conventions and oppositional concepts. This is partly the 
reason why they unsettle existing artistic discourses. In this respect, if Berger’s video 
was funny - for instance, if his artistic strategy were to produce a satirical parody of 
Bakker - it would only affirm the culture of Anthropocenic disaster because this 
culture, as we have already seen, produces its own comedy. Because of this, typical 
forms of humour cannot provoke a change in the existing mode of consciousness.  It 
cannot unsettle the functionalization, or ‘seriousness’, imposed upon life by the 
societies of Control. Instead the value of Berger’s video is based upon it registering 
an authentic state of consciousness, within which the concepts of the comic and the 
tragic, the pessimistic or the terrible, collapse under the sign of the Anthropocene, or 
what I have elsewhere referred to as our bad ‘world picture’. The comedic response it 
nevertheless creates is, by contrast, premised on its lack of comedy: on its drawing 
attention to the absurdity of comedy when everything is already funny and 
everything is already terrible. In registering this in a way that is ‘neither lighthearted 
nor serious’, as to a certain extent Wolfson does in Raspberry Poser and Ruff does in 
the Jpegs, it promotes a consciousness of the present situation that calls into question 
our current critical vocabulary and, by extension, critical imagination. These works 
are not expressly critical, transgressive or subversive. Instead, they are based on 
some paired aesthetic traits of the societies of Control (for instance, stupid and 
sublime, comic and terrible, suicidal and scientific), which on closer inspection do 
not always resolve productively, but are often antagonistically tied together as in a 
‘double spiral’. This is therefore an account of contemporary art and visual culture 
premised not on the agency of artists, but on the agency of the social and 
technological systems of Control, which display an implicit tendency to confound, 
exceed, undermine and disappoint according to their own functioning. My aim here 
has been to propose a new way of interpreting the seeming meaninglessness, 
stupidity, passivity and indifference of the art and visual culture that surrounds us: 
characteristics, which like Adorno says of Kafka and Beckett, might be ‘irritating to 
those with a positive outlook’, and are therefore, for the most part, ignored in 







Fig. 5.1 Still from ‘An Earth Shaking Alarm Has Just Sounded We Are Almost Out 
of Time!’, Jim Bakker Show, June 2015. Screenshot taken from 




Fig. 5.2 Still from Vic Berger IV, Jim Bakker’s Buckets, 2015. Edited YouTube 
video, 05:45. Screenshot taken from 



















Fig. 5.3 Stills from Vic Berger IV, ‘Mr. Trump and Mrs. Trump explain why Mr. 
Trump should be President #DonaldTrump’, 2016. Vine video, 00:06. Screenshots 
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